

# FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION:

Diversity Leadership for  
the 21st-Century Military

FINAL REPORT



Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>MAR 2011</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 1851 South Bell Street, Arlington, VA, 22202</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>162</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

# **FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION:**

**Diversity Leadership for  
the 21st-Century Military**

**FINAL REPORT**



# MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION

1851 South Bell Street  
Arlington, VA 22202



March 15, 2011

The Honorable Barack Obama, President of the United States  
The 112th United States Congress

Mr. President and Members of Congress:

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 established the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. The Commission was asked to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies and practices that shape diversity among military leaders. Sixteen interrelated tasks, given by Congress, informed the Commission's enclosed final report, *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military*. As chairman of this Commission, I am proud to present this report for your consideration.

The Commission held itself to high standards of openness and transparency in all deliberations. Moreover, we modeled inclusiveness by inviting those with diverse backgrounds, expertise, and experience to have a say in our independent analysis. The Commission sought extensive input for our deliberations from the Department of Defense and the Services as well as the private sector. We hosted 13 public hearings, meeting in locations across the country where many active-duty servicemembers and veterans reside. We heard public testimony from top military leaders, subject matter experts, and diversity officers from leading corporations known for their diversity practices. In addition, we conducted interviews with servicemembers.

The Commission believes that the diversity of our servicemembers is the unique strength of our military. Current and future challenges can be better met by broadening our understanding of diversity and by effectively leading our uniformed men and women in ways that fully leverage their differences. While we find the promotion policies and practices of the Department of Defense and the Services to be fair, we find also that there are some barriers to improving demographic representation among military leaders.

Among the 20 recommendations given in this report is a new definition of diversity for the 21st century. We offer ways to remove barriers that are affecting the demographic



makeup of military leadership, and we suggest approaches to leadership, education, and assessment that can enable the Department of Defense and the Services to fully benefit from the increased diversity of military leadership. We are confident that these recommendations will positively shape our military leadership in ways that meet the unique challenges of this century. However, the Commission recognizes that presidential and congressional guidance and support are necessary if success is to be realized.

It has been both an honor and privilege for this Commission to support the U.S. military's continuing journey of becoming a preeminently inclusive institution.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Lester L. Lyles". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Lester" and last name "Lyles" clearly distinguishable.

Lester L. Lyles, Chairman  
Military Leadership Diversity Commission

# COMMISSIONER SIGNATURES

---

## Current Commissioners

Peter L. Lyler

W. Black

William G. Aragon

William G. Aragon

William G. Aragon

William G. Aragon

William G. Aragon

William G. Aragon

William G. Aragon

William G. Aragon

Rebecca S. Hattstead

Carol D. Honey

Carol D. Honey

Mary Stacey Wittmeier

John W. Hopper Jr.

John W. Hopper Jr.

John W. Hopper Jr.

John W. Hopper Jr.

John W. Hopper Jr.

John W. Hopper Jr.

Robert H. Neller

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

Richard J. Noriega

## Former Commissioners

Kathlene Contres

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to a former commissioner.

Isela Pinckney

Swill

# PREFACE

---

The U.S. Armed Forces became a deliberately inclusive organization in 1948, when President Harry S. Truman issued his historic Executive Order 9981 that called for “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services” (The White House, 1948). Since then, the U.S. military force has endeavored to become an inclusive organization dedicated to the equality of all its members, regardless of their background. Its dedication to equal opportunity has resulted in increased representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women among the top military leaders in recent decades. Despite undeniable successes, however, the Armed Forces have not yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of leaders who are as diverse as the Nation they serve. Racial/ethnic minorities and women still lag behind non-Hispanic white men in terms of representative percentage of military leadership positions held. Marked changes in the demographic makeup of the United States will throw existing disparities into sharp relief, creating a recruiting pool that looks very different from the pool of 30–40 years ago, from which today’s leaders were drawn.

Recognizing existing disparities and seeking to look ahead, Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596, mandated the creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The Commission was tasked to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers.” Its charter required that a final report be delivered directly to the President and Congress one year after its first meeting.

An independent deliberative body, the Commission was itself an inclusive organization. Military Commissioners were active-duty and retired officers and senior enlisted personnel from both the Active and Reserve Components of all the Armed Forces, including the Coast Guard, as well as civilians. They included those who served in major armed conflicts from World War II to Iraq and Afghanistan. Civilian Commissioners included senior executives of major corporations, civil servants, and a law school chancellor.

The Commission’s charter listed 16 specific tasks. To address these tasks, the Commission was divided into ten subcommittees, each supported by a research team. Each subcommittee produced issue papers on specific topics and a decision paper that reports the subcommittee’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> The Legal Implications Subcommittee did not produce a decision paper because the Commission made no recommendations specific to the subcommittee’s findings. Rather, those findings served to inform all of the Commission’s recommendations.



This final report, founded on rigorous research and enhanced by serious and open deliberation, presents the Commission's main findings and recommends policies and practices to develop future military leaders who represent the face of America.

# CONTENTS

---

Commissioner Signatures.....	v
Preface.....	vii
Figures and Table .....	xi
Summary .....	xiii
Abbreviations .....	xxi

## **SECTION I: INTRODUCTION**

Chapter One: About the Study .....	3
Chapter Two: Defining Diversity for a New Era .....	11

## **SECTION II: BUILDING THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE**

Chapter Three: Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity .....	21
------------------------------------------------------------------	----

## **SECTION III: DEVELOPING FUTURE LEADERS**

Chapter Four: The Demographic Composition of Today's Military Leadership .....	39
Chapter Five: The Eligible Pool of Candidates.....	47
Chapter Six: Outreach and Recruiting .....	53
Chapter Seven: Branching and Assignments.....	63
Chapter Eight: Promotion.....	75
Chapter Nine: Retention.....	83
Chapter Ten: Going Beyond Race/Ethnicity and Gender .....	89

## **SECTION IV: ENSURING CONTINUED PROGRESS**

Chapter Eleven: Managing and Sustaining Diversity.....	95
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion.....	117

## **APPENDIXES**

A. The Military Leadership Diversity Commission Charter .....	119
B. Commission Members.....	121
C. Recommendations.....	125
D. Glossary.....	131

References .....	135
------------------	-----



# FIGURES AND TABLE

---

## Figures

2.1.	21st-Century Inclusion Builds on the Foundation of 20th-Century Representation .....	14
3.1.	Best Practices for Managing Change.....	26
3.2.	The 1998 DoD Human Goals Charter.....	28
4.1.	Racial/Ethnic Minority and Female Shares of Officers and Enlisted Personnel, by Component, September 2008 .....	41
4.2.	Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, September 2008.....	41
4.3.	Female Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, September 2008.....	42
4.4.	Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008.....	43
4.5.	Female Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008.....	43
4.6.	All Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle Affect the Demographic Composition of Military Leadership .....	45
5.1.	The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic Composition of the Eligible Enlisted Population, Marine Corps, 2009 .....	48
5.2.	The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic Composition of the Eligible Officer Population, Marine Corps, 2009.....	48
6.1.	Comparison of Air Force ROTC Host Locations and Student Body Demographics .....	58
7.1.	Percentage of AC Officers in Tactical/Operational Occupations, December 2008, by Pay Grade .....	65
7.2.	Percentage in Nontactical/Nonoperational and Tactical/Operational Occupations Who Were White Men, December 2008, by Service .....	65
11.1.	The Centrality of the CDO Within the Proposed Diversity Management System .....	98

## Table

11.1.	Court Martial Cases, by Race/Ethnicity Group, 2008.....	105
-------	---------------------------------------------------------	-----





# SUMMARY

---

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the MLDC. Under the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596, Congress asked the Commission to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers.” Congress charged the Commission to carry out 16 interrelated tasks. The nonpartisan, deliberative body of military and civilian leaders researched, reflected on, and recommended improvements to existing diversity-related policies and offered new initiatives designed to be supportive of the missions and goals of the Department of Defense (DoD).

The Commission’s recommendations support two overriding and related objectives: (1) that the Armed Forces systematically develop a demographically diverse leadership that reflects the public it serves and the forces it leads and (2) that the Services pursue a broader approach to diversity that includes the range of backgrounds, skill sets, and personal attributes that are necessary to enhancing military performance.

The Commission acknowledges that the Services have been leaders in providing opportunities for all servicemembers, regardless of their racial/ethnic background or gender. Today’s mission-effective force is a living testament to progress in the areas of military equal opportunity policies and related recruiting and management tactics. However, more needs to be done to address 21st-century challenges.

The Armed Forces have not yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of leaders who are as demographically diverse as the Nation they serve. Current projections suggest that the proportion of racial/ethnic minority youth will increase in this century, while the proportion of non-Hispanic white youth will decline. More importantly, racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented among the Armed Forces’ top leadership, compared with the servicemembers they lead. This disparity will become starkly obvious without the successful recruitment, promotion, and retention of racial/ethnic minorities among the enlisted force. Without sustained attention, this problem will only become more acute as the racial/ethnic and cultural makeup of the United States continues to change.

The Armed Forces must also acknowledge that diversity encompasses more than demographics, and they must take action to harness the range of knowledge, skills, and backgrounds needed to prevail in the rapidly changing operational environment. Leaders will need to address complex and uncertain emergent threats. For example,

[D]espite our progress today, too many people still suffer from what I call the *illusion of inclusion*, which is a condition you get when you rest on past laurels.

—The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

And the issue that we're talking about here today—diversity—is a readiness issue. Sustaining our all-volunteer force is a readiness issue.

—The Honorable Clifford Stanley,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

U.S. military and civilian cyber systems are becoming more complex to defend and utilize, and enemy techniques blur the line between combat and noncombat situations on the ground. The ability to work collaboratively with many stakeholders, including international partners, will also be critical

in meeting such challenges and will require greater foreign-language, regional, and cultural skills. In that vein, expert testimony comes from General James Mattis, then-Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. Closing out the 2010 Joint Warfighting Conference, he stated,

In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today's age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines. (quoted in Boyer, 2010)

To address these challenges, the Commission proposes 20 recommendations to

- establish a definition of diversity that addresses the complexity of today's environment
- build a foundation for change by ensuring leadership commitment to diversity
- develop and maintain a qualified and demographically diverse military leadership
- ensure continued progress through policy goals and metrics that allow DoD to manage and sustain diversity.

## Define Diversity for a New Era

Currently, each Service defines *diversity* differently. Developing a uniform definition of diversity to be used throughout DoD can inspire a common vision and elicit the needed changes. The Commission's recommended definition, presented below, brings together DoD's core values and the core values of each Service, and it addresses today's unique mission and demographic challenges:

*Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the Nation we serve.*

The definition acknowledges that individuals come to the military not only with different cultural backgrounds but also with different skills, experiences, and talents. It also acknowledges that these differences are operationally relevant. With proper leadership, diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness.

The definition is consistent with equal opportunity policies and practices. If policies resulting from the new definition are properly communicated, implemented, and assessed, the new concept will help to further eliminate discrimination and guide DoD along a path of inclusion.

## Build the Foundation for Change

Leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, vision, and know-how of leaders at every level. Without this commitment to instill respect for diversity as a core value, the needed cultural change may not take place.

## Ensure Leadership Commitment to Diversity

Diversity leadership must become a core competency at all levels of the Armed Forces, and respect for diversity should be made an explicit core value of DoD and the Services. An effective leader promotes fairness and equity in his or her organization or work-group and knows how to focus a broadly diverse group to use its members' differences in ways that benefit the mission. Getting a diverse group to work together in ways that improve mission capabilities is a learned skill. The Services should provide diversity leadership education and training, distinct from traditional forms of general diversity training, to servicemembers at every level.

This requires a fundamental shift in institutional thinking about diversity. One clear message comes from both the literature on diversity management and the experience of organizations with a strong reputation for diversity: Such a shift requires the personal and visible commitment of top leaders. The Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Secretaries and Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders will be critical to implementing the kind of change needed to inspire and manage reform.

To meet emerging operational challenges, the Services need to identify and reward the range of skills required for mission success. To endure, the new understanding of diversity as a way to enhance mission effectiveness must become inherent in military culture and in the military's way of doing business.

Commitment to change is expressed fully by national leaders when new goals and values are made into law. Consistent with this insight, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10, Section 113, to require the Secretary of Defense to report annually on the status and progress of DoD's diversity efforts.

I've always considered myself, in addition to being the commander, a safety officer of every organization I led. That was something I couldn't hand off to anybody else. And the second thing that I always considered myself as being was the diversity officer . . . Yes, there are other people who had staff responsibilities for all of this, but ultimately, those two responsibilities I saw as my own, because they are consequential of good and strong leadership.

—The Honorable Eric Shinseki,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010



## **Develop Future Leaders**

The Commission found that top military leaders are representative neither of the population they serve nor of the forces they lead. The extent to which racial/ethnic minorities and women are underrepresented varies across the Services, but the Commission found, on average, low racial/ethnic minority and female representation among senior military officers.

During the Vietnam War, the lack of diversity in military leadership led to problems that threatened the integrity and performance of the Nation's military (Becton et al., 2003). This is because servicemembers' vision of what is possible for their career is shaped by whether they see individuals with similar backgrounds excelling and being recognized in their Service. The performance of the Nation's military is tied to the individual's belief that he or she will be treated fairly regardless of his or her background.

The Commission found four explanations for discrepancies in representation among senior military leaders: low racial/ethnic minority and female presence among initial officer accessions, lower representation of racial/ethnic minority and female officers in career fields associated with advancement to flag/general officer rank, lower retention of midlevel female servicemembers across the enlisted and officer spectrum, and lower rates of advancement among racial/ethnic minority and female officers. To address these issues, the Commission recommends the actions summarized below.

### **Increase the Pool of Eligible Candidates**

Recent statistics from the Pentagon show that three out of four young people ages 17–24 are not eligible to enlist in the military (Gilroy, 2009). Many fail to meet entry requirements related to education, test scores, citizenship, health status, and past criminal history. Further, racial/ethnic minorities are less likely to meet eligibility requirements than are non-Hispanic whites, and that gap is widening. This is a national security issue requiring the attention and collected effort of top public officials, such as the President, members of Congress, and State and local leaders, all of whom can turn the tide by developing and executing strong, united, action-oriented programs to improve eligibility among the youth population. Together, these officials and other stakeholders, such as DoD, the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Homeland Security, can and should improve educational and physical readiness among American youth and foster new interest in military service.

### **Improve Outreach and Recruiting Strategies**

In the military's closed personnel system, tomorrow's leaders are developed and selected from today's recruits. Recognizing this constraint, the Services employ a variety of strategies to attract qualified youth to enlist or join officer commissioning programs, such as the Service academies, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and Officer Candidate School/Officer Training School programs. The Commission's review of recent accessions revealed that, in each Service, at least one racial/ethnic minority group was underrepresented. The review also revealed that women were underrepresented across

all the Services. The Commission's recommendations include that DoD and the Services explore untapped recruiting markets, require accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups, and develop a common application for Service academies and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

### **Eliminate Barriers to Career Advancement**

Increasing the racial/ethnic and gender diversity of senior leadership requires eliminating barriers that disproportionately affect the advancement of racial/ethnic minorities and women. This can be done on two levels. First, the Services should ensure that all servicemembers are equally well prepared to manage their own career progression. Related preparation steps include educating all servicemembers about the promotion process early in their careers and mentoring them at all stages of the career process. Multiple occasions for preparation can help servicemembers recognize career-enhancing opportunities and make choices that further their professional and personal goals.

Second, DoD and the Services must remove institutional barriers in order to open traditionally closed doors, especially those relating to assignments—both the initial career field assignment and subsequent assignments to key positions. An important step in this direction is that DoD and the Services eliminate combat exclusion policies for women, including removing barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all servicemembers who meet the qualifications.

### **Ensure Continued Progress**

The changes recommended by the Commission cannot be managed or sustained without developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement.

### **Realign the Organizational Structure**

Currently, responsibility for DoD diversity management falls under the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity. This office is understaffed, isolated from top leadership, and unable to set the agenda or drive progress. The central feature of the new accountability system proposed by the Commission is the Chief Diversity Officer. This new position will report directly to the Secretary of Defense to ensure that diversity management is embraced as a “line” rather than “staff” responsibility. The second key feature of this system is a set of mutually reinforcing elements that work together to provide effective, consistent implementation and persistent accountability for achieving the goals of diversity and inclusion. Supported by the existing Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Research & Analysis office, which will be enhanced to deal with diversity-related issues, the Chief Diversity Officer will monitor and advise on all facets of the system for the Secretary of Defense.

### **Institute a System of Accountability**

The Secretary of Defense will oversee the diversity effort of DoD and the Services through annual accountability reviews with the Service Secretaries, Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders. In parallel, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will convene biannually the Deputy's Advisory Working Group to discuss the status and progress of diversity efforts throughout the Armed Forces. Finally, to ensure consistent implementation of the new diversity vision, each of the Service Chiefs will hold internal accountability reviews prior to meeting with the Secretary of Defense. Reviews will be conversations that focus on progress and areas for improvement. They will enable military leadership not only to see evidence about demographics but also to take stock of the diversity awareness and leadership of those in line to succeed current leaders. In particular, the reviews will provide a forum for senior leaders to assess whether and how leaders at lower levels are leveraging all types of diversity in their units to improve capability.

### **Ensure the Succession of Leaders Committed to Diversity**

To ensure that the diversity effort continues, demonstrated diversity leadership must be assessed throughout careers and made, in both DoD and the Senate, a criterion for nomination and confirmation to the 3- and 4-star ranks. Individuals considered for top leadership positions should be able to demonstrate their experience in providing diversity leadership and their understanding of its connection to readiness and mission accomplishment.

### **Develop and Implement Robust Policies and Strategic Metrics**

Successful implementation of diversity initiatives requires a deliberate strategy that ties the new diversity vision to desired outcomes via policies and metrics. DoD must revise and reissue existing equal opportunity policies, formalize the new diversity management goals in clear and robust policies, and clarify what the Services must do to meet those goals. At the same time, appropriate metrics and reporting tools must be put in place to ensure that progress is made. With such data and tools, military leaders at all levels can be held accountable for their performance in diversity management and rewarded for their efforts.

### **Conclusion**

Today's military operations are executed in complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing environments. Men and women representative of the U.S. population and with different skills, experiences, and backgrounds are needed to respond to new and emerging threats. To harness these differences in ways that increase operational effectiveness, the military must revise and develop policies consistent with the new diversity vision. Diversity needs to work—for the good of the Nation and of the Armed Forces that serve it.

Joint operations, imposed by Congress on an unwilling military 25 years ago, have since become a large-scale example of the strength that comes with diversity.

These operations do not level or eliminate each Service's unique traditions and capabilities: Each Service maintains its culture, heritage, and ways of engaging in battle and peacekeeping missions. Integrating the Services' differences into a single coordinated force is difficult, and the U.S. military has spent considerable time and funding to make joint effort possible. Despite challenges, however, joint operations have demonstrated that a seamless integration of differences can be accomplished and can positively influence the outcome of the fight.

The ultimate impact of the recommendations in this report depends on the unwavering commitment of the President of the United States, the resolute conviction of the Secretary of Defense, and the concerted effort of military leaders at all levels to bring about enduring change. The MLDC is the third deliberative body established by an external authority to find ways to transform the U.S. military to become a more inclusive institution. Its predecessors were the Fahy Committee (1949–1950), created by President Harry S. Truman, and the Gesell Committee (1962), appointed by President John F. Kennedy. Historians have hailed the Fahy Committee as instrumental in desegregating the Armed Forces and thus paving the way for the Nation to move closer to its ideals. On the other hand, few even remember that the Gesell Committee existed, despite the fact that it recommended policies that might have enabled the military to avoid the harmful racial tensions and conflicts that occurred in the Armed Forces during the Vietnam War.

The U.S. military is a learning organization capable of adapting to change and the needs of the Nation, provided that the Nation's highest leaders are willing both to change and to provide a clear vision of success that is followed by the sustained oversight needed to succeed. The Armed Forces have led the Nation in the struggle to achieve equality. To maintain this leadership, they must evolve once again, renewing their commitment to providing equal opportunity for all. The time has come to embrace the broader concept of diversity needed to achieve military goals and to move the Nation closer to embodying its democratic ideals.





# ABBREVIATIONS

---

AC	Active Component
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
ANG	Air National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
CDO	Chief Diversity Officer
CEO	chief executive officer
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CONOPS	concept of operations
DACOWITS	Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DAWG	Deputy's Advisory Working Group
DEOC	Defense Equal Opportunity Council
DEOCS	DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey
DEOMI	Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	DoD Directive
DUSD(EO)	Deputy Under Secretary (Equal Opportunity)
EEO	equal employment opportunity
EO	equal opportunity
FY	fiscal year
GED	General Educational Development
JROTC	Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps

K-12	kindergarten through grade 12
MAVNI	Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest
MLDC	Military Leadership Diversity Commission
NH	non-Hispanic
OCS	Officer Candidate School
ODMEO	Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTS	Officer Training School
PI	Pacific Islander
RC	Reserve Component
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SOFS	Status of Forces Survey
USA	U.S. Army
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAFR	U.S. Air Force Reserve
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USCGR	U.S. Coast Guard Reserve
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USMCR	U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
USN	U.S. Navy
USNR	U.S. Navy Reserve
WEOA	Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active-Duty Members

---

## **SECTION I: INTRODUCTION**

---



## CHAPTER ONE

# ABOUT THE STUDY

---

The U.S. Armed Forces have played a pivotal role in the Nation's pursuit of equality of opportunity for all citizens. In 1948, after the end of World War II, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces President Harry S. Truman issued his historic Executive Order 9981. The order called for the desegregation of the Armed Forces by providing "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services" (The White House, 1948). Since then, the U.S. military has become a groundbreaking institution that is dedicated to the ideal that individual servicemembers should be rewarded for their performance and dedication, no matter their gender, skin color, ethnic background, or religion. This dedication to equal opportunity has resulted in the increased representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women at all ranks of the military, including among top leadership positions. Today, the Armed Forces have made impressive progress toward President Truman's vision of an inclusive military that reflects the ideals of the Nation it serves.

Despite this progress, however, the transformation of the Armed Forces remains unfinished. *Racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented in leadership positions.* Demographic changes in the United States are reshaping the pool from which the Services will recruit and promote future military leaders. Prolonged conflicts of unprecedented complexity require agile leadership that leverages all the capabilities at its disposal. Like the private sector, the U.S. military recognizes the need for a diverse workforce that includes a greater range of individual competencies, including skills, education, and professional backgrounds. Recognizing the needs of the new era, Congress mandated the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC).

The Commission, an advisory body of active and retired military, academic, and corporate leaders, was tasked in its charter to "conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers."<sup>1</sup> This final report presents the results of that evaluation. It examines policies affecting the career life cycles of military personnel from the five Services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—as well as the National Guard and Reserve. The report outlines a vision, strategy, and action plan for improving the inclusiveness of military leadership.

---

<sup>1</sup> The charter is reproduced in Appendix A. The Commissioners are listed in Appendix B.

## Background

The MLDC is the third deliberative body established by an external authority to find ways to transform the U.S. military to become a more inclusive institution. As this Commission offers its report to the President of the United States and Congress, the Nation's top military leaders, and the American public, it is worth reflecting on the lessons learned from the two previous committees.

### The Fahy Committee

When President Truman declared that widespread racial/ethnic discrimination would be abolished in the Armed Forces, he stated that the new policy was to be “put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale” (The White House, 1948). He assigned responsibility for ensuring rapid implementation to the newly formed President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, which was commonly known as the Fahy Committee (after its chair). The order stated,

The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the armed services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order. (The White House, 1948)

From January 1949 to July 1950, the Fahy Committee, which comprised three white and two black civilians, “advised, encouraged, and prodded each of the armed services into at least nominal compliance with the administration's expectations regarding Executive Order 9981” (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). Although the committee had no formal administrative power, President Truman made it clear to all stakeholders that he stood behind its effort. In January 1949, at the first meeting of the committee, he said, “I want this job done. And I want to get it done in a way so everybody will be happy to cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock somebody's ears down, I don't want to do that, but if it becomes necessary, it can be done. But that's about all I have to tell you” (quoted in Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

The direct support it received from the President sets the Fahy Committee apart from all other such deliberative bodies. With President Truman's unequivocal support, the Fahy Committee brought about lasting changes to the U.S. military that went beyond desegregation. For instance, the Fahy Committee's systematic analysis exposed some long-held beliefs about policies toward racial/ethnic minorities in the Armed Forces and their impact on mission effectiveness. The Fahy Committee's findings also debunked an assertion that any inclusive policy designed to expand opportunities for blacks must come at the expense of other people and at the expense of the general welfare. More importantly, the findings showed that a more inclusive military that enables all members to use their talents and skills to the fullest is a more effective fighting force.



Despite this progress, however, desegregation of the military in the following years was neither smooth nor consistent. Official racial segregation in the military was not fully revoked until 1954, four years after President Truman dismissed the committee in a compromise with Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). The momentum to desegregate was sustained during the Korean War and brought to completion by military leaders in the theater, such as General Matthew B. Ridgeway (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). But this momentum was difficult to sustain after the war, particularly because the U.S. military was ahead of the Nation in terms of race relations in the late 1950s (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

### **The Gesell Committee**

In recognition of the need to revitalize efforts to expand opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities in the military, President John F. Kennedy established a new investigative body in 1962, the President's Committee on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces, which was commonly known as the Gesell Committee (after its chair). All seven members were civilians, and three were black (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). The committee was asked to assess the status of blacks in the military and to find ways to improve their opportunities. More specifically, the committee addressed two questions:

- What measures should be taken to improve the effectiveness of current policies and procedures in the Armed Forces with regard to equality of treatment and opportunity for persons in the Armed Forces?
- What measures should be employed to improve equality of opportunity for members of the Armed Forces and their dependents in the civilian community, particularly with respect to housing, education, transportation, recreational facilities, community events, programs, and activities?

The Gesell Committee's report, released in 1964, called for "far-reaching proposals for greater institutionalization of the military's commitment to equality of treatment and opportunity." The Gesell Committee considered military commanders to be the central agents in this process. For instance, it proposed that "DoD establish a system for monitoring race relations. . . . Under this system, commanders would be held responsible for ensuring that race relations received continuous attention, and would be evaluated on their handling of racial matters." More important, according to Mershon and Schlossman (1998), the Gesell Committee "insisted that the results of such evaluations be incorporated into the regular promotion process," writing the following: "It should be made clear [that] officers showing initiative and achievement in this area will enhance their performance ratings and obtain favorable consideration for promotion and career advancement" (all Gesell Committee report quotations from Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

Unlike the Fahy Committee, the Gesell Committee did not directly report to the President. Moreover, whereas the Fahy Committee was asked to implement a policy of the President, the Gesell Committee was asked to recommend new policies to the Sec-

retary of Defense. The Gesell Committee released its final report in 1964. The committee's recommendations to institutionalize the inclusive ideals in the U.S. military are still relevant today, especially because they were never fully implemented.

Unfortunately, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara chose not to implement all of the Gesell Committee's recommendations. Instead, he issued DoD Directive (DoDD) 5120.36, *Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces*, which addressed the recommendations related to the second question—but not the first—and dealt with external issues to address how DoD should deal with the fact that many institutions in the country remained racially segregated while the military had already ended segregation (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

Unlike the Fahey Committee, which is recognized for its historic achievements, the Gesell Committee is little known. Its recommendations, if implemented, would have institutionalized the process of monitoring and evaluating progress in race relations and equal opportunity within the military and the accountability system. However, Secretary McNamara failed to implement the recommendations that might have enabled the Armed Forces to avoid the harmful racial tensions and conflicts that occurred in the decades that followed.

DoD's failure to implement the Gesell Committee's recommendations had high costs. Inequities persisted at all levels of the military, particularly in the leadership ranks. The negative effects of such inequities were detailed in the 2003 amicus brief submitted by Becton et al. to the Supreme Court in the cases of *Gratz v. Bollinger* and *Grutter v. Bollinger*, which addressed whether the treatment of race as a favorable factor in admissions decisions at the University of Michigan Law School was constitutional. The brief—filed by 29 former military and civilian leaders, including several retired 4-star generals, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretaries of Defense—recounted that the lack of diversity in military leadership led to problems that threatened the integrity and performance of the Nation's military: "[T]he armed forces suffered increased racial polarization, pervasive disciplinary problems, and racially motivated incidents in Vietnam and on posts around the world" because the percentage of minority officers was "extremely low" relative to the percentage of blacks among the enlisted ranks (Becton et al., 2003).

### **The Military Diversity Leadership Commission**

The MLDC is building on the legacy of the two previous committees in the hope that the Nation's political and military leaders will embrace its recommendations so that a new commission on this subject will not be needed in the years ahead. The Commission has tackled the same issues as its predecessors and has focused on military leadership. It has also addressed two important trends of the past decade that may become more pronounced in the future: the growing demographic diversity of the American population and the sophisticated challenges of current warfare that require a broader set of qualifications in its leaders. Congress asked the Commission to reconsider the concept of diversity with these trends in mind.

The Commission recommends an expanded definition of diversity and a modern, systematic approach to diversity management in DoD. The new definition goes beyond

the traditional concept of diversity by shifting focus away from eliminating discrimination against members of certain groups and toward valuing and leveraging all kinds of human differences, including demographic differences, to improve capability and readiness. The Commission believes that institutionalizing this broader concept of diversity will ensure that the U.S. military will develop officers and senior enlisted servicemembers who not only are demographically diverse but also have the background and skills most needed to enhance military performance.

## Approach and Scope

Congress listed 16 specific tasks for the Commission in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596. After careful review, the Commission grouped these tasks into ten substantive categories. Four were based on the military leadership career life cycle. The remaining categories were designed to cover topics critical to defining and managing diversity, tracking the progress of change, and ensuring that recommendations and affiliated policy changes were made in full accordance with U.S. law. In 2010, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 594, expanded the mission of the MLDC to include the National Guard and Reserve Component. Six new Commissioners were added to the MLDC in order to fulfill this new mandate.

The following subcommittees were formed to address the ten substantive categories:

- Definition of Diversity
- Legal Implications
- Outreach and Recruiting
- Leadership and Training
- Branching and Assignments
- Promotion
- Retention
- Implementation and Accountability
- Metrics
- National Guard and Reserve.

These subcommittees acquired pertinent information from the Services, including their definitions of diversity, ongoing initiatives, personnel data, outreach and recruiting strategies, retention efforts, promotion processes, and career development programs. They also received material on diversity management from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The Commission also gathered information through informational interviews with servicemembers and key stakeholders and through monthly public meetings that featured presentations from military leaders from DoD and each of the Services. Representatives of the diversity offices of OSD and the five Services presented demographic data and briefings on their current policies and practices. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and each of the five Service Chiefs spoke to the Commission as well, providing their perspectives on diversity. Additional speakers included the Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., the Honorable Colin Powell, and the Honorable Eric Shinseki. Diversity experts from private industry and academia addressed the Commission and answered questions about their approaches to diversity management. Finally, a panel of male and female combat veterans addressed the Commission on issues surrounding women serving in combat.

With this information, the Commission and its staff conducted extensive investigation into the demographic profile of the Armed Forces today; the ways in which the Services recruit, train, assign, promote, and retain military personnel; the future missions the Armed Forces will likely face; current diversity policies and plans; and diversity best practices in the private sector. During this process, the Commission realized that it needed to give careful consideration to the evolving concept of diversity, which is moving beyond differences in race/ethnicity, religion, and gender to include a broader set of factors needed to create an inclusive workforce.

Based on the information collected, each subcommittee released a series of issue papers providing substantive background unique to the topic. Each subcommittee also developed a decision paper that reports both the subcommittee's main findings and the Commission-approved, topic-specific recommendations that resulted from the Commissioners' understanding and interpretation of the subcommittee's findings.<sup>2</sup> The final step of the process was to develop specific, final recommendations for improving the diversity of military leadership.

## Recommendations

The Commission determined that its final recommendations should serve three inter-related goals:

- Establish the foundation for effective diversity leadership with a definition of diversity that is congruent with DoD's core values and vision of its future.
- Develop future leaders who represent the face of America and are able to effectively lead a diverse workforce to maximize mission effectiveness.
- Implement policies and practices that will make leaders accountable for instilling diversity leadership as a core competency of the Armed Forces.

Each of the final recommendations was also required to meet several criteria defined by the Commission. Each needed to fulfill the Commission's charter, be supported by empirical evidence, be strategic rather than tactical, be feasible for implementation, meet legal requirements, and have a quantifiable intent. Commissioners evaluated recommendations based on how closely they adhered to these criteria. Rec-

---

<sup>2</sup> The Legal Implications Subcommittee did not produce a decision paper because the Commission made no recommendations specific to the subcommittee's findings. Rather, those findings served to inform all of the Commission's recommendations.

ommendations that did not meet the criteria were modified or eliminated. If Commissioners in attendance did not approve the recommendations unanimously, the Commission deliberated until a consensus was reached. All final recommendations were approved by the conclusion of the final meeting in December 2010.<sup>3</sup>

Two important topics related to diversity were outside the scope of the Commission's work. First, the Commission did not study the civilian workforce and its top leadership. This omission should not imply, however, that the diversity of the civilian workforce is not important for DoD. On the contrary, a diverse civilian workforce is critical to the 21st-century military because this group is an essential element of the total force. But, because the civilian workforce is managed differently than the military workforce, to fully address the issues and challenges associated with improving the diversity of the civilian workforce requires a separate study.

Second, the Commission did not address issues related to the military service of openly gay men and women. Although the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy certainly pertains to diversity and diversity leadership, a comprehensive examination of the issue was already in progress by the DoD Comprehensive Review Working Group. Two other efforts have addressed that issue in detail.<sup>4</sup>

## Organization of This Report

This report is divided into four sections. Section I, Introduction, introduces this study and, in Chapter Two, defines diversity for DoD. This definition incorporates but goes beyond equal opportunity to include a broader range of diversity factors, with important implications for Armed Forces core values, core competencies, training, and leadership skills.

Section II, Building the Foundation for Change, articulates the Commission's belief that leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, vision, and know-how of all senior leadership. In Chapter Three, the Commission presents its most far-reaching recommendations: those related to ensuring leadership commitment to diversity. Without this commitment to instill respect for diversity as a core value, the needed cultural change may not take place.

Section III, Developing Future Leaders, describes recommendations that focus primarily on increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within military leadership:

- Chapter Four offers an overview of the demographic composition of current military leadership, documenting that military officers today are less demographically

<sup>3</sup> The recommendations are presented in full in Appendix C.

<sup>4</sup> DoD General Counsel Jeh Johnson and Army General Carter Ham led DoD's comprehensive review of the policy and of how the U.S. military must prepare for and implement any associated changes in the law (see Johnson et al., 2010). In response to congressional tasking, the RAND Corporation recently published an update of its 1993 report on sexual orientation and U.S. military personnel policy (see National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

diverse than both the enlisted troops they lead and the broader civilian population they serve.

- Chapter Five discusses how eligibility requirements both define the eligible population from which the Services can recruit and affect the demographic profile of eligible recruits.
- Chapter Six describes current outreach and recruiting practices across the Services, reports on the demographic composition of recent accessions, and recommends policies to improve recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities and women.
- Chapter Seven describes how policy changes can remove structural and perceptual barriers that create potential demographic differences in career field preferences and command assignment opportunities—which, in turn, influence the future demographic diversity of senior military leadership.
- Chapter Eight discusses how potential barriers to promotion and resulting demographic differences in promotion rates can affect the future demographic diversity of senior military leadership.
- Chapter Nine examines whether there are demographic differences in who chooses to remain in and who chooses to separate from military service and identifies barriers that may influence demographic differences in retention.
- Chapter Ten describes how the Commission recommends tracking and improving other aspects of diversity within the military.

Section IV, Ensuring Continued Progress, describes how to manage and sustain the changes proposed in the earlier sections. Chapter Eleven proposes recommendations related to developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement to ensure continued progress toward greater diversity among all ranks of the military. Chapter Twelve advises that the ultimate impact of the recommendations in this report will depend on the unwavering commitment of the Commander in Chief (the President of the United States) and the resolute conviction of the Secretary of Defense.



## DEFINING DIVERSITY FOR A NEW ERA

---

The word *diversity* provokes mixed reactions from U.S. citizens. For some—especially those who grew up before and during the civil rights movement—the word conjures up the fight against racial segregation and inequality. For these Americans, diversity policies and programs are another name for equal opportunity (EO) programs, and most notably for affirmative action. But for other Americans, especially the young who have grown up under the protection of laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity for all, diversity means something broader. It goes beyond differences among demographic groups and requires more than affirmative action.

DoD and the Services have developed their own definitions, which vary widely in length and specificity and are not consistent with one another (see Issue Paper #20 and Lim et al., 2008). One of the first tasks the Commission tackled was to develop a uniform definition of diversity that could be used by DoD and the Services. Congress asked the Commission to define diversity in a way that is congruent with the core values of DoD and its vision of the future workforce. The Commission investigated existing definitions with these considerations in mind. DoD's core values are "leadership, professionalism, and technical know-how," which are upheld through the core values that everyone in uniform must live by: "duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty" (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.). Each Service has established its own core values as well, and these too were taken into consideration.

The Commission also examined DoD's vision of its future workforce and the factors that will affect its composition. Research on this subject confirms the importance of embracing a definition of diversity that goes beyond the concept of equal opportunity for all. The future workforce will be made up not only of men and women of different racial/ethnic backgrounds and different religious views but also of people with different talents, work backgrounds, and skill sets.

The Commission recognizes that the Nation is facing enemies who attack in non-traditional ways and must be countered with a wider range of capabilities. The Nation's warfighting forces must be willing and able to benefit from the talent of all individuals who are prepared to offer their unique skills, perspectives, and backgrounds in the service of their country. With this in mind, the Commission developed a new definition of diversity.



## The Department of Defense Should Adopt a New Definition of Diversity

### *Recommendation 1—*

***DoD shall adopt the following definition: Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the Nation we serve.***

The definition of diversity recommended by the Commission has evolved from the concept of diversity that has motivated the Services for decades. That concept is associated with equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws, initiatives, and programs that make it illegal to discriminate in the hiring or promotion of an individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or other physical-appearance or individual characteristics. These laws were put in place to avoid a continuation of the historic discrimination and mistreatment experienced by certain groups.

After the Vietnam War, which highlighted the great disparities between the percentages of racial minority officers and racial minority enlisted personnel that resulted in racial polarization and harassment, the Services dedicated themselves to the goal of improving the fairness of their personnel practices, including recruitment, career opportunities, and promotion. They turned to civilian EEO laws and applied them to the military sector.<sup>1</sup> They embraced the guiding principle of EO programs, which declared that all individuals will have a chance to pursue the same opportunities and will not be discriminated against or harassed in their pursuit of a career or position (U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, n.d.). They implemented affirmative action policies that extended beyond EEO laws because these policies entailed actively reaching out to individuals from underrepresented demographic groups or groups that have been historically left out of the organization.

Because of the success of affirmative action in the military, it is easy to forget just how segregated the officer corps once was. In 1968, African-American enrollment at West Point and Annapolis was less than 1 percent; as late as 1973, just 2.8 percent of all military officers were African-American. By contrast, during that period, African-Americans constituted as much as 17 percent of the rank and file. In Vietnam, the consequences of this de facto segregation were devastating.

—Jerome Karabel, "Race and National Security," 2003

These efforts, sustained over decades, have made the U.S. military a groundbreaking institution that strives to advance the democratic equality of its workforce. The Services have pioneered outreach and recruiting strategies, management tools, and racial/ethnic minority representation goals arising from EO and affirmative action programs. Military men and women of different racial/ethnic backgrounds have learned to work together as a team to protect the Nation. Individuals expect to be promoted not on the basis of their background

<sup>1</sup> Military equal opportunity regulations are separate from EEO. The latter is the suite of laws and regulations that apply to the civilian workforce.

or heritage but on the basis of the Services' standards of excellence and performance. Building on this foundation, the Commission's concept of diversity incorporates these goals and adds others.

## Moving Forward: From Representation to Inclusion

The new definition of diversity is based on a model of diversity management that incorporates the best ideals of EO and affirmative action with the practice of casting a wide net to recruit, train, foster, and promote people with a diversity of characteristics and attributes that can benefit the Services. The new definition aims to give all service-members equal treatment at every step in their military careers, but it also goes further: The words "all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals" in the definition refer not only to characteristics and attributes legally protected by EO laws but to *any and all* characteristics and attributes that can benefit the Services, including thinking style, occupational background, and skill sets. In other words, diversity, as understood by the Commission, includes characteristics and attributes both included and not included in EO law; this is because *any* type of difference can affect mission effectiveness.

The Commission has heard concerns that defining diversity broadly in this manner will turn attention away from historically underrepresented demographic groups in military leadership positions. In other words, some critics believe that to define diversity in a way that goes beyond race/ethnicity and gender is to define away the very real challenges that specific groups still face.

The Commission recognizes this concern but believes that establishing a broad understanding of diversity throughout DoD will not harm the representation of these populations. In fact, understanding diversity more broadly can help to build the representation of these populations in military leadership because these populations have always offered the skills and talents that military leadership requires.


Furthermore, the broad definition of diversity reflects the realities faced by today's military. Just as changes in the demographic mix of the Nation's population are increasing the demographic diversity of new accessions, changes in the budgetary and conflict environments are calling for new skills, more integration across military components, better coordination with other government agencies, and smoother cooperation with global partners.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the progression from the EO model of diversity used in the past to the broader concept of inclusion proposed for the future. EO relies on compliance with regulations to eliminate discrimination; the concept of diversity as inclusion

[S]ome of these [diversity] consultants . . . would encourage you to sweep these directives on EO and EEO under the rug in the hope that they will go away and yes, they will simply want you to take down the sign off the EEO and the EO director's door and replace it with a sign that says "Director for Managing Diversity," but you can't manage diversity if you haven't first achieved diversity. So I stopped by here to tell you that if you think that you can manage diversity without first achieving diversity, in the words of Malcolm X, you have been had, took, bamboozled, and hoodwinked.

—The Honorable Claiborne Houghton, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

**Figure 2.1. 21st-Century Inclusion Builds on the Foundation of 20th-Century Representation**



SOURCE: Adapted from Defense Business Board Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004.

values individual differences *because they are critical to the new approaches and practices needed for a successful fighting force*. This concept is consistent with EO policies and practices because it is based on the fair and equitable treatment of all personnel, regardless of their membership in a protected class.

## America's Growing Diversity: A Resource for Leadership

It is critical for DoD leaders to understand that, by all accounts, *the racial/ethnic and cultural makeup of the United States is changing*. Current projections from the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.) suggest that the proportion of racial/ethnic minority youth will increase in this century and that the proportion of non-Hispanic white youth will decline. If the Services wish to stay strong in numbers, they must attract more individuals from traditional racial/ethnic minority groups. Current military leadership undoubtedly recognizes the need to ensure the continuous replacement of departing servicemembers, especially during times of crisis or threat of crisis. A military stretched thin by a lack of new members and aspiring leaders can pose a serious threat to national security.

The Commission believes strongly that the Services need to develop and promote military leaders who reflect the forces they lead. It has always been in the best interest of the military to recruit and retain leaders who are representative of the many faces

of America.<sup>2</sup> Today's multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural force is a living testament to the richly diverse population of the Nation it serves. Current Service leadership, however, does not reflect the demographics of those it leads or serves.

The Commission believes that leadership positions held by men and women from the many race/ethnicity groups that make up the United States have the potential to instill pride among the populations they represent and to secure greater trust in military leadership. A demographically representative leadership can also encourage servicemembers from underrepresented groups to aspire to leadership roles themselves, or they can inspire youth from different backgrounds to become interested in military service. One need only remember the popular perceptions of racial/ethnic minorities serving as “cannon fodder” for white military leaders in Vietnam to understand how important ethnic, racial, and gender representation is to the psychological well-being and reputation of the U.S. military (Becton et al., 2003). Perceptions of a noninclusive military leadership can estrange the military from the people it represents and from which it ultimately draws its strength.

Just as our military looks like America, so too must our general officers.

—Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-SC),  
press release, 2008

The truest melting pot in our society exists aboard aircraft carriers, in barracks, and on bases. Mess halls and exchange service stores, shooting ranges and training facilities are portraits of diversity. But in the officers' clubs, a much different picture emerges.

—Rep. Kendrick B. Meek (D-FL),  
press release, 2008

Leadership is what we need, because I believe that when someone who is attracted to the Navy . . . looks up that chain of command, they have to see themselves. If they can't see themselves, they won't believe.

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks  
to the Commission, 2010

## Diversity as a Force Multiplier

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has faced an increasingly wide range of threats. The gap between conventional and unconventional warfare continues to widen. The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* communicates DoD's commitment “to ensure that tomorrow's leaders are prepared for the difficult missions they will be asked to execute” by placing “special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and building partner capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). DoD's newly formed vision of its requirements implicitly suggests that greater diversity should be developed within and across the total defense workforce. Instead of relying on outdated strategies, the Armed Forces must expand military skill sets and

<sup>2</sup> The issue of representation in the military has existed as long as the Nation and represents “the legitimate concerns of the populace” about the motives and allegiances of its Armed Forces: “In a democracy, it is believed that a broadly representative military force is more likely to uphold national values and to be loyal to the government—and country—that raised it” (Armor, 1996).

train the force so that the right people with the right capabilities and backgrounds are brought to the fight when they are needed.

New challenges have made an emphasis on total force integration more critical than ever before, and DoD is facilitating a greater number of joint, coalition, and interagency collaborations that will allow threats to be analyzed and addressed from multiple points of view using multiple areas of expertise. Joint operations are a large-scale, military example of the strength that comes with diversity. The goal of joint operations is to bring together the Services' unique strengths and capabilities to maximize the odds of military success. Each Service has its own "personality"—traditions,

We are going to be operating in diverse cultures, and having a diverse squad or a platoon gives you a lot of different views to deal with diverse culture and the complexities that they are going to be confronting. It's absolutely a combat multiplier, especially in the environments that we see coming at us and that we are dealing with today.

—General George W. Casey, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

culture, and modes of training, operating, and fighting. Joint operations do not level or eliminate each Service's unique traditions and capabilities but instead work toward seamlessly integrated tactical coordination and strategic direction. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard servicemembers are not outfitted with just one uniform or taught to employ one single way of fighting: Each Service maintains its culture, heritage, and ways of engaging in

battle and peacekeeping missions. Joint operations have demonstrated that the inclusion of differences can enhance situational awareness, agility, and responsiveness to current and emergent threats. Integrating the Services' differences into a single coordinated force is difficult, and the Armed Forces have spent considerable time and treasure making it possible.

The Commission similarly recognizes that individuals come to the military not only with different cultural, racial/ethnic, and religious backgrounds but also with myriad skill sets, talents, education levels, and work experience. The Commission believes that all of these characteristics and attributes, if properly managed, can help the Services reap optimum results from their most valuable resource: their people.

In the new model of diversity and diversity management put forth by the Commission, there are four dimensions of characteristics that can assist in meeting new missions:

1. *Demographic diversity* refers to immutable differences among individuals, such as race/ethnicity, gender, and age, as well as to differences in personal background, such as religion, education level, and marital status.
2. *Cognitive diversity* refers to different personality types, such as extroverted/introverted, and to different thinking styles, such as quick and decisive versus slow and methodical.
3. *Structural diversity* refers to organizational background differences, including Service, occupation, component (i.e., Active or Reserve), and work function.
4. *Global diversity* occurs through contact with those (e.g., members of foreign military services) who have national affiliations with countries other than the United States (Lim et al., 2008; Riche et al., 2007).

Although *demographic diversity* alone is not enough to meet the challenges that lie ahead, it is a critical component of overall diversity. Including a broad range of men and women from different backgrounds can increase the likelihood that the U.S. military “knows the enemy” and is better able to work with international partners by adding to the cultural and linguistic knowledge base from which U.S. forces may draw. Actively seeking demographic diversity also ensures that no talented individual will be “left behind” as a result of prejudice or discrimination. Engendering greater demographic diversity in both the rank and file and among leadership will result in a military that is representative of the citizenry it serves.

*Cognitive diversity* ensures that the military will be able to fill both traditional and novel positions. Different skill sets, personalities, and thinking styles are needed to manage, strategize, equip, fight, operate, repair, and otherwise engage in any of the hundreds of functions that the Services perform daily (Issue Paper #4; Kraus et al., 2007).

*Structural diversity* provides the expertise of servicemembers affiliated with particular occupations, Services, or components. It also enables needed capabilities to be brought to the table and fully incorporated into the mix. Exchanging information and perspectives across different branches or occupations can result in innovative ways of confronting the threat.

*Global diversity* is an inevitable part of today’s missions. Both warfighting and peacekeeping are increasingly being done in cooperation with global coalition partners.

## **Diversity Management: An Institutional Priority**

Many nonmilitary organizations recognize that diversity can provide a competitive edge if it is developed and managed properly. The Commission reviewed relevant management literature and a number of diversity goals from successful businesses. These emphasize the importance of developing and utilizing the diversity of workforces in ways that improve outcomes, such as generating a larger customer base, boosting revenue, and improving cost-effectiveness. This set of organizational goals is usually referred to as the *business case for diversity*. The corporate diversity statements generally share two broad themes:

- Diversity, broadly defined, creates performance advantages through the synergy of people’s different ideas and competencies.
- Good diversity management entails recognizing, appreciating, respecting, and utilizing a variety of human attributes, not just race/ethnicity.

Evidence suggests there is not a strong business case for diversity per se, but, given that demographic diversity is already here, pervasive, and growing, demographic business-case arguments stress the importance of managing diversity to achieve desired organizational and business outcomes (Issue Paper #14). The evidence also suggests that organizations may be able to mitigate diversity’s potential costs: Diversity must be



managed, diversity management tools must be provided, and there must be agreement that the benefits are worth the investment (Issue Paper #29).

DoD and the Services are also interested in improving performance through diversity, but their desired outcomes differ from those of nonmilitary organizations. These different objectives include increasing regional and cultural capabilities, better coordinating military and civilian capabilities, more seamlessly integrating the National Guard and Reserve with the full-time, active-duty forces, and developing a broader inventory of specialized skills (such as foreign languages, medicine, and computer network operations).

The new definition of diversity and the focus on diversity management necessarily have profound implications for the way the military conducts big-picture and day-to-day personnel management. Therefore, the Commission suggests that DoD accompany the release of the recommended definition—or indeed any new definition—with a mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides a purpose that is actionable, measurable, and accompanied by a concept of operations to advance implementation. As with any mission objective, diversity will require a clear presentation of goals, strategies, and tactics, as well as recommended processes for initiating and maintaining implementation to move closer toward success.

Diversity management calls for creating a culture of inclusion in which the diversity of knowledge and perspectives that members of different groups bring to the organization shapes how the work is done (see Holvino et al., 2004). Creating this culture will involve changing the way in which people relate to one another within a single unit, within a particular military branch, and throughout DoD. In particular, although good diversity management rests on a foundation of fair treatment, it is not about treating everyone the same. This can be a difficult concept to grasp, especially for leaders who grew up with the EO-inspired mandate to be both color and gender blind.

And diversity in the Navy, diversity at home, makes us better, when we as a Navy are operating in support of our country's interests, because I really do believe the motivator for me when it comes to diversity is [that] diversity gives us better solutions. Diversity makes us stronger. It makes us more effective because we are able to draw from many different perspectives, and that is the power of diversity.

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks to the Commission, 2010

Blindness to difference, however, can lead to a culture of assimilation in which differences are suppressed rather than leveraged (see Thomas & Ely, 1996).

Cultural assimilation, a key to military effectiveness in the past, will be challenged as inclusion becomes, and needs to become, the norm. Traditional basic training, for example, is focused on assimilating individuals into a fighting force tied together by the adoption of similar terminology, customs,

and attitudes. However, current military operations are executed within more-complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing operational environments that defy the warfighting standards of the past and that need to be met with an adaptive and agile leadership that is ready to respond more flexibly and with a greater propensity for creative strategizing.

The need to leverage diversity while maintaining unit cohesion will require implementing new training and procedures and addressing new tensions—important elements of diversity management described later in this report.



---

## **SECTION II:**

# **BUILDING THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE**

---



# ENSURING LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT TO DIVERSITY

---

Leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, vision, and know-how of leadership, as well as an organizational plan for achieving the desired outcomes. Two different but related paths will need to be taken. One involves following through on EO principles and practices. The Commission's recommendations in this area will help the Armed Forces systematically develop a demographically diverse leadership that reflects the forces it leads. The second path involves the new, broader understanding of diversity, which includes yet goes beyond demographics. Many of the Commission's recommendations are related to both of these aspects of diversity.

This chapter addresses what the Commission believes are its most far-reaching recommendations. They are the needed changes that will most securely set DoD and the Services on a path toward reaping the benefits of diversity.

## Diversity Leadership Must Become a Core Competency

### *Recommendation 2—*

*To enhance readiness and mission accomplishment, effectively leading diverse groups must become a core competency across DoD and the Services. To implement this recommendation,*

- *a. Leadership training at all levels shall include education in diversity dynamics and training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively.*
- *b. DoD and the Services should determine the framework (e.g., curriculum, content, methods) for how to inculcate such education and training into leader development, including how to measure and evaluate its effectiveness.*

Both the Commissioners and guest speakers from corporate and military backgrounds believe that diversity has the potential to increase mission capability. However, to be effective, members of a broadly diverse unit or the entire force must be led in ways that value and include their differences while minimizing any negative influence that differences can have. Effective practices for leading a diverse group, referred to here as *diversity leadership*, address how leaders at all ranks and organizational levels shape the effect that diversity has on the forces under their command. *Diversity lead-*

*ership* thus refers to how leaders influence the ways in which people and groups under their command relate to one another.

The Commission strongly believes that diversity leadership must become a core competency at all levels of the Armed Forces. Diversity leadership is both a fundamental way of thinking and a set of skills at which all military leaders must excel in order to get the best performance possible from the servicemembers they lead every day. Diversity leadership can be inculcated by focusing on two strategies.

### **Leadership Training at All Levels Shall Include Education in Diversity Dynamics and Training**

The Commission identified a number of effective practices for leading diverse workgroups that can help the Services benefit from diversity and avoid some of the potential pitfalls (see Issue Paper #29). Studies suggest that effective diversity leadership begins with a leader looking through a “diversity lens” to identify and understand the diversity dynamics that are relevant in his or her command. Doing this requires the leader to

- recognize the “differences” that exist within the group
- both understand the dynamics that can cause those differences to have negative effects (e.g., loss of cohesion, communications difficulties, conflict) and create opportunities for those differences to have a positive effect on organizational performance
- apply leadership practices that can neutralize the potential negative effects and, if possible, leverage differences in support of the mission.

Diversity leadership involves applying practices that management professionals have long identified as successful personnel management techniques but that take on new significance for leaders of diverse workgroups. This is because leaders are responsible for the way group members communicate, cooperate, trust one another, and remain cohesive as a group.<sup>1</sup> Absent effective leadership, such as the leader focusing the group on the overarching mission, this fundamental and powerful human process can create in-groups and out-groups within a given work unit or organization. These dynamics can strongly affect the on-the-ground functioning of a diverse group in a planning room or in a war zone and at the platoon level or for the commander of a joint force. Facilitating strong communication, cooperation, trust, and cohesion can be challenging for leaders.

The Commission emphasizes education as part of the recommendation pertaining to diversity leadership. Developing leaders to lead diverse groups effectively goes beyond training them to understand diversity: It requires educating them about the

---

<sup>1</sup> These elements are in play because the fundamental mechanism through which diversity affects capability is social identity and social categorization (see, for example, Jackson et al., 2003; Tsui & Gutek, 1999; and Tsui et al., 1992). People attach meaning to their memberships in identity groups, such as demographic or occupational groups, and these identity groups then shape behaviors and perceptions in different settings (see, for example, Mor Barak et al., 1998).

dynamics that diversity creates in workgroups and then training them in practices that can neutralize the negative dynamics and maximize their positive potential.

### ***Diversity Leadership Education and Training Are Not the Same as Diversity Training***

A training assessment performed by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Directorate of Research (2008), found that diversity training within each Service addresses respect for demographic differences. Current diversity training does not, however, teach leaders to utilize differences to improve mission effectiveness. Briefings from DoD and Service representatives to the Commission indicate that the Services are generally not instilling these practices in their leadership paradigms and that they are not teaching them. However, Service representatives indicated that each Service does teach practices that can be effective for leading both diverse and homogeneous teams.

The Commission stresses that diversity leadership training must be offered *at all levels* because it is leaders who are in direct contact with the workgroups that can make a difference in capability. The key term here is *workgroup* because it is in these groups that day-to-day interactions among different people take place. In other words, the Commission views diversity leadership practices as the things that all leaders do every day, not what others (e.g., EO advisors, diversity officers) may do on their behalf.

### **DoD and the Services Need a Framework for Implementation and Assessment of Leader Development**

The Commission, which found no DoD or Service syllabus that addresses diversity leadership, believes it is important to ensure that DoD develop an overall framework within which the Services can develop their own leadership training.

The Commission acknowledges the large training burden already placed on the Services. As one Commissioner said, “The last thing we want is another training requirement, but we need to shift from an EO to a diversity framework.” The framework will both allow the Services to develop their own education and training modules and ensure that they address the same goal: creating a core competency at each level of leadership for leveraging diversity in the service of mission capability. In other words, the Commission is not proposing a new program but rather new modules for the Services to incorporate in their existing leadership programs.

Finally, the Commission recommends that once the curriculum, content, and methods are developed and implemented, they be evaluated. The Commission found no indication that the Services have thus far evaluated the effectiveness of either their leadership training or their diversity training. It did, however, hear about research showing that much of corporate sector diversity training is not effective for achieving the corporate goal of greater racial/ethnic minority and female representation in senior leadership positions (Dobbin, 2010; Kalev et al., 2006). Thus, evaluation is a serious concern and must be addressed in order for diversity leadership to become a true core competency.

## Leadership Must Be Personally Committed to Diversity

### *Recommendation 3—*

***The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority.***

Successful change in an organization depends on committed leadership. This is as true for the Services as for nonmilitary organizations. The Commission reviewed statements by chief executive officers (CEOs) and diversity professionals from a number of leading corporations and also examined statements by military leaders already committed to developing diversity. Time and again, it was stressed in documents and presentations that *leadership must personally and visibly lead a diversity effort in order to bring about meaningful and lasting change.*

Organizational change is a top-down process, and creating a powerful coalition of leaders to manage and maintain the change process is a critical component of success. Persons in top leadership positions are the ultimate drivers of change because they have both the authority to initiate new methods of operation and the final responsibility for ensuring the methods' success. The leaders responsible for driving a diversity

paradigm shift throughout DoD and the Services include the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, members of Congress, and leaders from each of the Services. Each of these leaders must authorize change and oversee the success of military diversity management programs and initiatives. Together, active top leaders can develop, implement, and maintain change by constantly reinforcing one another (see Issue Paper #21).

It is important to remember how critical strong leadership is to servicemembers' performance and morale. When change comes into view, there can be strong resistance. Changes that address people's racial/ethnic, religious, and other differences can prove to be especially challenging because these topics can be emotionally charged for many people.

A model of diversity leadership from the top is Admiral Gary Roughead, the current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Alone among the Service Chiefs, Admiral Roughead, in his diversity policy statement,

The first and most effective thing in any organization's desire to manage diversity is clear-cut support from the senior leader.

—Luke Visconti, remarks to the Commission, 2010

Senior leadership commitment in both word and action was the most commonly cited key to success mentioned in the Task Group's best-practices interviews. Interviewees were adamant that the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) leadership must be visible to the whole organization, that it must be plain-spoken, clear, convincing, frequent and supported by action. The CEO must incorporate this commitment into the corporate strategy, culture and values.

—Defense Business Board Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004

Part of getting there . . . is if your senior leadership declares [diversity] as key to its success and the key leaders—the top leaders—are actively, not passively, but actively managing the process.

—Michael Montelongo, remarks to the Commission, 2010

states clearly and unequivocally that he will lead diversity initiatives: “As the Chief of Naval Operations, I will lead diversity initiatives in the Navy. I challenge all who serve to do the same through leadership, mentorship, service, and example” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2008). He and his predecessor as CNO, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke to the Commission movingly and personally of their commitment to diversity (see Mullen, 2009, and Roughead, 2010).

## **Diversity Needs to Become an Integral Part of DoD Culture**

### *Recommendation 4—*

*DoD and the Services should inculcate into their organizational cultures a broader understanding of the various types of diversity by*


- *a. Making respect for diversity a core value.*
- *b. Identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 21st century.*
- *c. Using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision and values.*

Deep changes, like those called for in the Commission’s recommendations, cannot be instituted with the push of a button. If DoD is to institutionalize the new definition of diversity so that all servicemembers understand its meaning and importance and act accordingly, leading diversity to enhance mission effectiveness must become inherent in military culture.

All personnel must be aligned with diversity objectives in order to truly reap the benefits of diversity. Making diversity and diversity leadership top priorities may call for individuals to step beyond their comfort zones from time to time. For example, if a leader is faced with a choice between two very different individuals of equal qualifications, he or she must be ready to choose the person who best enhances the effectiveness of the work unit, knowing that diversity has the potential to improve the work of that unit. This “difference” could relate to race/ethnicity, gender, or religion, but it could also relate to educational background, specialty, or international experience. Although this is one example of a decision, it is important to remember that increasing the diversity of DoD and each Service requires thousands of decision-makers in similar situations to go beyond the comfort and familiarity of old ways of thinking.

To inform its recommendation for effectively introducing and implementing the new understanding of diversity throughout DoD, the Commission reviewed management literature and found that the leaders who were most effective in undertaking fundamental change followed some variation of the model presented in Figure 3.1 (see Issue Paper #21). Leaders understand that, to last, change must be introduced by “unfreezing” old attitudes and behaviors, implemented through forward movement, and then sustained by “refreezing” new behaviors and attitudes.





The eight steps presented in Figure 3.1 may help leadership institute the changes necessary to inculcate diversity into Service cultures while, at the same time, reducing resistance to those changes. Notably, this is not a quick-fix method; rather, it is a continuous process to improve the staying power of new programs and policies by developing servicemember commitment through planning and communication from the top down. It is critical that each leader subscribe to the same clear vision of diversity because these leaders will be communicating the vision to all of the organization's members. It is also important that the vision of diversity include the entire workforce. Leadership should express why the future state is better than the current state, explain how DoD and the Services will arrive at the future state, and inspire all members to reach new goals.

To carry out this recommendation, the Commission recommends three key strategies.

### **All Members of DoD and the Services Must Understand Respect for Diversity as a Core Military Value**

Core values are unchanging foundational principles that guide how people in an organization conduct their everyday business. An organization's core values do not require external justification. They are the internal structure that informs the way members interact with one another, and they guide the strategies that the organization employs to fulfill its mission. Ultimately, core values motivate how the organization works and give a shared identity to the people belonging to it.

In 1969, DoD issued the first DoD Human Goals Charter,<sup>2</sup> which explicitly and publicly recognized respect for diversity as a value integral to the DoD identity (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995). From 1969 through 1998, evolving versions of the charter were signed by every incoming Secretary of Defense and by the leadership of the military departments and Services.<sup>3</sup> Excerpts of the 1998 Human Goals Charter, which is reprinted in full in Figure 3.2, follow:


In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the servicewoman, the civilian employee, and family members, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities. . . . We [must] strive: . . .

TO provide opportunity for everyone, military and civilian, to rise to as high a level of responsibility as possible, dependent only on individual talent and diligence;

<sup>2</sup> The charter was ahead of its time in making the following statement of goals for the civilian workforce: "TO provide equity in civilian employment regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation, and to provide an environment that is accessible to and usable by all."

<sup>3</sup> DoDD 1440.1, *The DoD Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program*, mandates that DoD "prepare a new DoD Human Goals Charter each time a new Secretary of Defense is appointed" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1987). However, the last charter was signed in 1998 by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen. The charter was not renewed by the George W. Bush administration and, as of January 2011, had not been renewed by the Obama administration.

Figure 3.2. The 1998 DoD Human Goals Charter



July 24, 1998

TO assure that equal opportunity programs are an integral part of readiness;

TO make military service in the Department of Defense a model of equal opportunity for all regardless of race, color, sex, religion or national origin; . . .

TO create an environment that values diversity and fosters mutual respect and cooperation among all persons[.]

A process was followed that helped the charter become part of DoD's culture. The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., recalled the procedure when he addressed the Commission at its March 2010 meeting:

[The charter] must go out to all of the major elements of the Department of Defense and be coordinated and get their concurrence. . . . [T]he signatories are the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the DoD general counsel. Those are all the top leaders . . . and they must sign on to that charter before we can present it to the Secretary of Defense for signature, and so it is done that way each time that the new charter has been prepared and issued. And the wonderful thing about it is then we are authorized to make . . . a huge Styrofoam copy or a printed copy, a small copy, and you send them all over, and so when you walk into federal agencies you will see where they have maybe a picture of the President or the agency chief on the wall when you first walk in, well then, most of the DoD [offices] back in that period, they would get the charter. It's [in the] EEO office and the commander's office, different places like that, so they are clear that this is the policy and practice of the Department of Defense, and what I really love about it is it allows new political executives and new military leaders . . . to get a briefing on why should they sign that charter. They are briefed on what it is. They know what they are signing up to and they get a clear statement of the vision upfront. (Haughton, 2010)

However, the charter has not been renewed since 1998. The Commission believes that renewing the charter is an important statement for leadership to make. Of course, much more action will be required than simply reissuing the charter. For change to take root, appreciation and respect for diversity need to become an integral part of what it means to be a U.S. servicemember, and a strategic approach is required. Exposure to core values begins with recruitment, is forged during boot camp and officer induction training, and reinforced throughout a career, both in professional military education and in the unit. The Services must take this new core value on board and inculcate it into each of their cultures throughout the servicemember life cycle.

## **Skills Critical to 21st-Century Mission Success Need to Be Identified and Rewarded**

Military operations are changing, and the mix of skills required of the Armed Forces is also in flux. The Commission believes that future leadership in the officer corps will require a wider range of competencies to be effective in the future operational environment. This assumption is supported by changes that have already occurred since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and by forecasts of needed competencies made in such reports as the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. The Commission's research found that 21st-century military leaders will need

- the ability to work collaboratively in interagency environments, with different governments, and in nation-building activities
- keen decision-making skills, since leaders will need to address complex and uncertain emergent threats in 21st-century operational environments
- additional knowledge of foreign languages, regional expertise, and cultural skills
- technological skills, since U.S. military and civilian cyber systems are becoming more complex to defend and utilize.<sup>4</sup>

The Commission recognizes that DoD must also contend with its longstanding concerns that the Armed Forces may not possess enough people with the skills necessary for stability operations. Foreign-area officers, enlisted regional specialists, civil affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel are all professionals whose skills are needed for military success and who yet may be insufficiently represented in the personnel pipeline and sparsely represented among senior leadership.

Many needed skills may best be acquired through incorporating reservists, civilians, and contractors more closely into the total force. As demonstrated by the crucial role played by the National Guard and Reserve in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD is already addressing structural diversity through its work in total force integration. The total force can provide skills that are in high demand but in short supply in the Active Component. Computer skills, language proficiency, civil affairs knowledge, and other relevant expertise are likely available in the civilian skill sets possessed by reservists. Efforts are also ongoing to incorporate government employees from a range of agencies into overseas operations.

To attract and retain the range of talent they need, the Services may need to broaden their conception of who belongs in the military and what it takes to be a member of the Armed Forces. Instead of total reliance on "growing their own," the Services may want to explore lateral entry, bringing into active duty older people who already possess the experience and expertise that would be difficult, costly, and time-consuming to create from scratch. A wider range of requirements will call for more types of people. For example, can the operator of a remotely piloted vehicle do his or

---

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, 2010.

her job from a wheelchair? To compete with the private sector, does the military need to adapt to the ethos of the “computer nerd”?

A broader range of expertise is needed not just at the deckplate but also in the wardroom and at the highest levels of the military hierarchy. The current composition of senior leadership is heavily weighted toward tactical/operational occupations (i.e., warfare specialties). Officers in these specialties, such as infantry (Army and Marine Corps), fighter pilot (Air Force and Navy), and surface warfare (Navy), have been recognized and rewarded because they possess the historical core competencies of their Services. An impartial observer may wonder, however, whether the skills that are valued match up with the competencies currently in highest demand. This is not merely a matter of providing opportunities to traditionally undervalued specialties. It becomes mission critical if needed expertise is not present at councils of war or at meetings of 4-star leaders—the venues in which the Services make decisions about their strategic direction.

The bottom line is that changing operational requirements requires new expertise to be sought out, developed, and integrated into both the workforce and the leadership. How do the Services implement this recommendation? How do they indicate that they value important new skills? At the June 2010 Commission meeting, Admiral Roughead recommended looking at promotion board precepts (the guidance provided to promotion boards). He indicated that he has revised the Navy’s precepts to reflect changing needs, with visible results in the mix of skill sets among its 1-star officers. He suggested that the way to shape the force for tomorrow is to change the precepts today (Roughead, 2010).

### **Use Strategic Communications Plans to Communicate Diversity Vision and Values**

Leaders need to recognize that some servicemembers may react negatively if they feel that diversity management initiatives and programs are basically a repackaging of EO initiatives that will benefit some and not others. Other servicemembers may simply think things are fine the way they are and wonder why there is a need for the changes that a paradigm shift will undoubtedly elicit. Most troubling, research shows that, if it is not managed effectively, diversity—whether defined in traditional demographic terms or more broadly—can actually *reduce* workforce capability (Thompson & Gooler, 1996; Tsui & Gutek, 1999). This failure occurs most frequently because of decreased communication, the increased conflict that can result when some people are (or feel) excluded, or both. Thus, it is the leaders’ responsibility to communicate the new vision and values and why they matter.

One of the first steps toward establishing the new diversity paradigm as part and parcel of DoD culture is to plan and execute a high-profile communication effort explaining the values and vision behind these policies. The change management literature suggests that successful introduction and maintenance of a new institutional culture requires multiple, interconnected exposures to core values (see Issue Paper #21). Any one such communicative effort—a poster, a briefing, a leader’s orders—alone is



unlikely to have much effect. A thoughtful communications plan that ensures delivery of consistent messages from leaders at all levels is vital for successful cultural change.

The communications plan should have consistent internal and external components that explain the importance to the Armed Forces of diversity, inclusion, and diversity leadership. All communications engendered under the plan should explicitly address how diversity is critical to military success. Finally, the individual servicemember should be able to understand the expectations and implications of the new vision for his or her behavior.

## **Congress Needs to Take Action to Ensure Sustained Progress in Diversity**

### *Recommendation 5—*

*Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to*

- *a. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks to track progress toward the goal of having a dynamic and sustainable 20–30-year pipeline that yields (1) an officer and enlisted corps that reflects the eligible U.S. population across all Service communities and ranks and (2) a military force that is able to prevail in its wars, prevent and deter conflict, defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.*
- *b. Add diversity annual reports to the list of topics on which the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress and the President. Similar provisions should be added to Title 14 for Coast Guard reporting and to Title 32 for National Guard reporting.*
- *c. Require the Secretary of Defense to meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders to drive progress toward diversity management goals.*

Commitment to change is expressed fully by national leaders when new goals and values are made into law. Title 10, Section 113, requires that the Secretary of Defense report to Congress annually on a number of important topics concerning the operations and activities of DoD. These reports include information on the work, accomplishments, expenditures, and savings of the Armed Forces; the justification for projected military missions and force structure; and an account of the military and civilian personnel assigned to support positions in the past five fiscal years (FYs). The Commission found that the law does not require any reports that could help drive diversity management initiatives further across DoD. Many of the Services are performing assessments and reporting internally on diversity, but these efforts are focused on demographic diversity only and are not sufficiently consistent in terms of what they measure or how they measure it to allow for DoD-wide assessments.

The Commission wishes to stress that producing a 400-page report that presents undigested diversity-related data is *not* the intention of this recommendation. Any

report elicited by new diversity initiatives must ultimately drive improvement. Thus, reporting should focus on a key set of strategic metrics linked to the end state and include analysis and action items.

The Commission proposes the three key changes to reporting requirements.

### **The Office of the Secretary of Defense Should Develop a Standard Set of Strategic Metrics and Benchmarks**

The Commission recommends that Congress direct OSD to develop meaningful metrics that are clearly tied to its diversity goals. These metrics, focused at the strategic level, will not only give Congress and the President the ability to track DoD's progress: They will also improve the Secretary of Defense's understanding of where DoD and the Services stand in achieving their goals.

Diversity managers of major companies stressed to the Commission that strategic metrics must be driven from the top—the CEO level—and that there must be an accountability structure supporting the metrics. Simply put, collecting data without an idea of how to use them will not result in improvement. To drive improvement, the data must be linked to organizational goals, be demanded by leadership, and form the basis of an accountability structure.

The Commission found that the Services are at various stages in their work on diversity and have taken a variety of approaches. Although many of the Services are doing substantial work in this area, the work is primarily personality driven and is not institutionalized.<sup>5</sup> By developing DoD-wide metrics, OSD will facilitate the Services' work with their respective diversity initiatives and align each Service with DoD-wide goals. (Chapter Eleven's discussion of Recommendation 16 covers metrics in more detail as part of policy development and enforcement.)

The metrics and benchmarks that the Commission is calling for are those that support the understanding that the new diversity paradigm is a response both to U.S. demographic shifts and to the challenging mission environment. These metrics and benchmarks should be designed in a way that enables the Secretary of Defense to track progress toward the goal of having a dynamic and sustainable 20–30-year pipeline of individuals who represent the U.S. population and who have the diverse backgrounds and skills needed to face the challenges of the coming years.

### **Assessment Should Result in Service and National Guard Annual Reports to Congress and the President, Authorized by Corresponding Laws**

Reporting is one of the most powerful methods of communication available to the President, Congress, and military leadership needing to oversee and review the imple-

---

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, the difference between the perspectives of CNO Admiral Roughead on the one hand and former Commandant of the Marine Corps General James T. Conway on the other (see Conway, 2010, and Roughead, 2010). These different personal perspectives translated into major policy and practice differences between the Navy and the Marine Corps. When questioned about why the Navy had a string of three CNOs who were out front on demographic diversity, Admiral Roughead (2010) said it was because one CNO had influence over who was picked to be the next CNO.



mentation of DoD policy. DoD- and Service-wide performance reports can ensure that the right information is put into the hands of the right decision-makers at the right time.

As previously stated, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10, Section 113, to require that the Secretary of Defense report annually on progress toward diversity goals. It follows that similar provisions be made in Title 14, for the Coast Guard (which is part of DHS, not DoD), and in Title 32, for the National Guard.

As codified in Title 10, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard and Reserve when called to active duty. However, most of the time, the National Guard is not on active duty and, therefore, not under federal control.

Title 32 assigns command of State National Guard units to the Governor of the State; each Governor is the commander in chief of his or her State National Guard when it is not under federal control.<sup>6</sup> As commanders in chief, the Governors select the Adjutant Generals for their States.

The Commission recommends that Congress include the National Guard in its reporting requirements. This would mean revising Title 32 in a way that would require the National Guard Bureau to report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of progress toward its diversity management goals. This should include, but not be limited to, reporting on the extent to which each State's National Guard, including its leadership, is representative of that State's general population, relevant labor pool, and eligible population. The report should cover all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard in each State, territory, and the District of Columbia. Requiring these reports will ensure a persistent focus on diversity issues and place accountability at the State level.

### **Regular Meetings Between the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and Senior Enlisted Leaders Should Be Held to Drive Progress**

Like reports, meetings can drive collective progress toward goals. The Commission recommends that Congress require that the Secretary of Defense hold an annual meeting with the leadership of each of the Services. These meetings are an opportunity for the Secretary of Defense to monitor the state of diversity in each of the Services. The meetings could focus on and revisit diversity management goals by going over key strategic metrics, analyses of the root causes of potential concerns, and potential action items for improvement. (Additional information and ideas related to these meetings are provided in the discussion of Recommendation 17.)

## **Conclusion**

The Commission believes that developing diversity leadership skills, establishing diversity as a military core value, and reporting on new key milestones throughout DoD and the Services will firmly communicate that the leadership's commitment to diversity is

---

<sup>6</sup> The President is the Commander in Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard.

absolute. The recommendations presented in this report are founded on military and private sector best practices and are the foundation for the way forward in an era of mission uncertainty.



---

## **SECTION III: DEVELOPING FUTURE LEADERS**

---



# THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF TODAY'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP

---

Current and former military leaders have long argued that developing and maintaining qualified and demographically diverse leadership is critical for mission effectiveness (Becton et al., 2003; Lim et al., 2008). Specifically, they argue that the military should mirror the demographic composition of the population it serves and that senior leaders should mirror the demographic composition of the troops they lead. The chapters in this section (Chapters Four through Ten) present an analysis of how specific barriers at each stage of the military personnel life cycle influence the diversity of military leaders, and they provide recommendations designed to address these barriers and increase diversity at each of these stages.

Although the Commission's definition of diversity states that "diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals," the chapters in this section focus primarily on increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within military leadership. The focus on racial/ethnic and gender representation is due to the fact that the MLDC charter specifically focuses on having the Commission evaluate "policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces." In addition, these categories represent historically and socially relevant groups and are more easily measured than other, unobservable individual attributes (Cox, 1994). The importance of increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within the military has also been a specific priority of senior military leaders and is argued to be critical to mission effectiveness (see Lim et al., 2008). Where appropriate, the Commission also makes recommendations for improving the representation of broader dimensions of diversity, such as structural, language, and cultural diversity.

This chapter offers an overview of the demographic composition of current military leadership. It documents that *military officers today are less demographically diverse than both the enlisted troops they lead and the broader civilian population they serve*. It concludes with the anatomy of the life cycle of a military career.

Chapters Five through Nine are organized around the stages of the military personnel life cycle, each of which promotes or impedes career advancement. Unlike other private and public organizations, the military operates as a closed personnel system. Senior leaders cannot be brought in from the outside but are instead brought up through the lower ranks. Therefore, each stage of the military personnel life cycle—from who is recruited to who is promoted—is intricately linked to the composition of future military leaders. By examining the policies and practices at each stage of the life cycle, the Commission was able to identify both barriers to advancement and potential

policy levers for reducing those barriers for members of underrepresented demographic groups. Chapter Ten makes recommendations for promoting aspects of diversity that go beyond race/ethnicity and gender.

## **Current Military Leadership Still Lags in Terms of Demographic Representation**

Overall, the data show that the demographic composition of the officer corps is far from representative of the American population and that officers are much less demographically diverse than the enlisted troops they lead. With some exceptions, racial/ethnic minorities and women are also underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers and flag/general officers compared with their representation in the ranks below.

The following sections draw on a common dataset provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to make descriptive comparisons among all five Services. They offer demographic snapshots of military leadership for both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) in September 2008.

### **The Officer Corps**


Figure 4.1 shows that, relative to the enlisted forces, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic others (i.e., American Indians, Alaska natives, and those of more than one race) were underrepresented among officers in both the AC and RC.<sup>1</sup> Only AC non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islander officers had representational parity compared with the enlisted force. Compared with the enlisted force, women were roughly equally represented or slightly overrepresented among the officer corps. Finally, compared with the U.S. population as a whole, both racial/ethnic minorities and women were underrepresented to various degrees in the officer corps.

### **Senior Noncommissioned Officers and Flag/General Officers**

Racial/ethnic minorities were also largely underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers and flag/general officers in most of the Services compared with their representation in the ranks below. Figure 4.2 shows that, compared with their representation in ranks E-1 through E-6, among senior noncommissioned officers, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented in the AC of the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and the Navy and overrepresented in the Army and the Marine Corps. In the RC,


<sup>1</sup> These figures are intended to be descriptive in nature. In making comparisons across groups, we calculated representation indexes in which each representation index is equal to the ratio of the reference group's share of the population to its share of the population in the comparison group (e.g., the ratio of the share of officers to the share of enlisted personnel). Values greater than one indicate overrepresentation, values less than one indicate underrepresentation, and values equal to one indicate representational parity. As a rule of thumb, we identified a group as being over or underrepresented based on whether there was at least a  $\pm 0.10$  difference from 1.0. Only the conclusions based on these representation indexes, and not the indexes themselves, are presented in this chapter.

**Figure 4.1. Racial/Ethnic Minority and Female Shares of Officers and Enlisted Personnel, by Component, September 2008**



SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

**Figure 4.2. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, September 2008**



SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.




compared with ranks E-1 through E-6, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented in all Services except the Army and the Marine Corps Reserves.

Figure 4.3 shows that, compared with their representation in ranks E-1 through E-6, women were also underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers across almost all the Services and in both the AC and RC. The only exception to this pattern was in the Marine Corps Reserves, where women in ranks E-1 through E-6 had approximate representational parity with noncommissioned officers. However, women in the Marine Corps Reserves constituted less than 5 percent of all enlisted Marine Corps Reserve personnel—the lowest share across all the Services.

Figure 4.4 shows that, compared with their representation among officers of ranks O-1 through O-6, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented among flag/general officers across all Services in both the AC and RC. However, it should be noted that, because the number of these officers was small, any change in the demographic composition could have significantly affected the percentages.

Figure 4.5 shows that, compared with their representation among officers of ranks O-1 through O-6, women were also underrepresented among flag/general officers across almost all Services in both the AC and RC. The only exceptions to the general pattern were the Marine Corps and Navy RCs, where women actually constituted a greater percentage of the flag/general officer population compared with their presence in ranks O-1 through O-6.<sup>2</sup>


**Figure 4.3. Female Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, September 2008**



SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.


<sup>2</sup> It must be noted, however, that the *number* of female flag officers in the Marine Corps Reserve was one.

**Figure 4.4. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008**



SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

**Figure 4.5. Female Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008**



SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

## Summary

These data show that, as of September 2008, officers were generally less demographically diverse than both the enlisted troops they led and the civilian population they served. In addition, compared with their representation in the ranks below, racial/ethnic minorities and women were underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers across several Services in both the AC and RC. Finally, women (with the exceptions noted above) and racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented among flag/general officers in both the AC and RC.


Given the desire to develop and maintain a military leadership that is demographically representative of the American public, it follows that military leadership should also represent the servicemembers it is entrusted to lead. Leaders from racial/ethnic and cultural backgrounds similar to those of the U.S. citizenry have the potential to inspire future servicemembers and engender trust among the population. Demographic similarities between the enlisted corps and its leaders can equally inspire and facilitate greater confidence. Also, given the fact that American demography is rapidly changing, it is important to design future policies that will shape personnel trends in desired ways. Advancing understanding of how the military personnel life cycle both promotes and impedes members of underrepresented demographic groups from achieving leadership positions is a critical first step.

## Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle

As previously explained, unlike other private and public organizations, the military operates as a closed personnel system. Senior leaders cannot be brought in from the outside but are instead brought up through the ranks. Therefore, each stage of the military personnel life cycle—from who is recruited to who is promoted—is intricately linked to the composition of future military leaders. Figure 4.6 provides an overview of the key stages of the military personnel life cycle and illustrates how the demographic composition of military leadership is shaped by the cumulative effects of barriers at each stage.

As Figure 4.6 shows, the demographic diversity of future military leaders is first shaped by who is eligible to serve and by the ability of outreach and recruiting strategies to attract members from all demographic groups. Following this, career field and assignment decisions, which are shaped by both policy and individual preferences, influence the overall demographic composition within each career field and within key assignments. The career fields and assignments held by servicemembers then play a role in overall career progression and in the resulting demographic composition of those who advance to higher ranks. In the military, however, career progression is a function of both retention and promotion. That is, potential differences in who chooses to remain in and who chooses to separate from the military influence the composition of the available promotion pool. Together, these stages of the military personnel life cycle—and the resulting demographic composition at each stage—determine the final demographic diversity of senior leaders.

Figure 4.6. All Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle Affect the Demographic Composition of Military Leadership



At any stage of the personnel life cycle, a number of barriers may arise to impede career progression to higher ranks. These barriers are both structural and perceptual. Structural barriers are “prerequisites or requirements that exclude minorities [and women] to a relatively greater extent than non-Hispanic whites [and men]” and are “inherent in the policies and procedures of the institution” (Kirby et al., 2000). Perceptual barriers are “perceptions, attitudes, or beliefs that lead minorities [and women] to think they cannot or should not pursue . . . a job or career option” (Kirby et al., 2000).

Chapters Five through Nine are organized around each stage of the military personnel life cycle and its associated barriers, as illustrated in Figure 4.6:

- military eligibility requirements
- outreach and recruiting
- branching and assignments
- promotion
- retention.

Each chapter describes the barriers that characterize that stage of the life cycle and explores their effects on the demographic composition of senior military leaders. Each chapter includes the Commission’s recommendations for addressing those barriers and increasing the proportion of demographic minorities that make it to the next stage of the life cycle. Chapter Ten describes barriers and related policy recommendations for promoting other important diversity dimensions, such as language, cultural expertise, and structural diversity brought by the RC. A more in-depth discussion of methods and findings related to a specific stage in the military personnel life cycle can be found in the relevant Commission issue papers and decision papers.

# THE ELIGIBLE POOL OF CANDIDATES

---

The pool of individuals from which the military can recruit is defined by specific eligibility requirements that can present a structural barrier to service. Although the specific eligibility requirements differ across the Services, in general, those who wish to serve must first meet standards related to age, citizenship, number of dependents, financial status, education level, aptitude, substance abuse, language skills, moral conduct, height and weight, physical fitness, and medical qualifications (see Asch et al., 2009).<sup>1</sup> Together, these requirements define the eligible population from which the Services can recruit. Currently, however, a large portion of young people are not eligible to join the military. In fact, statistics released by the Pentagon show that 75 percent of young people ages 17–24 are currently not eligible to enlist (Gilroy, 2009). Furthermore, racial/ethnic minorities and, in some cases, women tend to meet these eligibility requirements at lower rates than whites and men.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the impact of such requirements on the demographic profile of recruits. Figure 5.1 shows how some basic Marine Corps enlisted requirements shaped the profile of the population that was eligible to enlist in 2009. For example, the education requirement (i.e., high school graduation or General Educational Development diploma) and the minimum Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score requirement reduced the share of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics who could enlist, and the weight and body fat requirements decreased the share of women who could enlist.


Similar patterns are seen in the eligible officer population. Besides height, weight, and medical standards, commissioned officers must have U.S. citizenship and a bachelor's degree, and they must complete a commissioning program (i.e., the Reserve Officers' Training Corps [ROTC], Officer Candidate School/Officer Training School [OCS/OTS], or a Service academy), each of which has its own unique standards for admission. Again using Marine Corps requirements as an example, Figure 5.2 shows how the percentage shares of the eligible population for each demographic group in 2009 changed with the successive addition of each requirement. The share of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics decreased considerably with the addition of the college degree requirement, and the share of female and "other" representation increased.<sup>2</sup> The

---

<sup>1</sup> In certain circumstances, some of these eligibility requirements can be waived. Which requirements can be waived (and when) varies by Service.


<sup>2</sup> The order of the requirements is arbitrary. We could have applied the citizenship requirement before the college-attainment requirement, and it would have shown a "bigger" effect among Hispanics.

**Figure 5.1. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic Composition of the Eligible Enlisted Population, Marine Corps, 2009**



SOURCES: Center for Human Research, 2005; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.  
 NOTES: The “other” category includes Asians, American Indians/Alaska natives, Pacific Islanders, and those of unknown/missing race/ethnicity.

**Figure 5.2. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic Composition of the Eligible Officer Population, Marine Corps, 2009**



SOURCES: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.  
 NOTE: The “other” category includes Asians, American Indians/Alaska natives, Pacific Islanders, and those of unknown/missing race/ethnicity.

female share of the eligible population again decreased with the addition of weight and body fat requirements.

Thus, as illustrated above, the requirements to enlist and to become a commissioned officer shape the demographic profile of eligible recruits, with racial/ethnic minorities and, in some cases, women being disqualified at higher rates. Although there are some differences in how the other Services' requirements shape the profiles of their eligible populations, the overall patterns and effects are the same.

These same requirements also dramatically reduce the overall size of the eligible pool of candidates from which the Services can recruit. In addition to decreasing the number of racial/ethnic minorities and women that are eligible, they also decrease the number of white men that are eligible for Service—just at lower rates. This lack of eligibility among today's youth has been identified as a key concern in the recent *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, which states that,

in coming years, we will face additional challenges to our ability to attract qualified young men and women into the armed forces. Among them are a large and growing proportion of youth who are ineligible to serve in the military for medical, criminal, ethical, or physical reasons. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010)

## **Stakeholders Should Develop and Engage in Activities to Expand the Pool of Qualified Candidates**

### ***Recommendation 6—***

***The shrinking pool of qualified candidates for service in the Armed Forces is a threat to national security. The stakeholders listed below should develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates.***

- ***a. The President, Congress, and State and local officials should develop, resource, and implement strategies to address current eligibility issues.***
- ***b. DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) should***
  - ***Create and leverage formal partnerships with other stakeholders.***
  - ***Institutionalize and promote citizenship programs for the Services.***
  - ***Require the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria for military service.***
- ***c. DoD and the Services should focus on early engagement. They should conduct strategic evaluations of the effectiveness of their current K–12 outreach programs and practices and increase resources and support for those that are found to be effective.***

This recommendation proposes that all stakeholders, and primarily key public officials, develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates for military service. It is important to note that the intention of this recommendation is not to lower eligibility requirements but instead to involve stakeholders in activities designed to bring the qualifications of today's youth up to par with current



eligibility requirements. The Commission proposes three key strategies for achieving this goal.

### **Develop, Resource, and Implement Strategies to Address Current Eligibility Issues**

U.S. military readiness, and thus national security, will depend on the ability of the upcoming generation to serve. Therefore, a shrinking pool of eligible individuals poses a critical threat to military readiness. Although addressing this particular national security issue is well outside the control, missions, responsibilities, and resources of DoD and DHS, it is the collective national security responsibility of the President, Congress, and State and local officials. These top officials have the deep understanding and powerful capability to turn the tide on this issue by developing and executing strong, united, action-oriented programs to improve eligibility by crafting, resourcing, and implementing an integrated and sustainable set of strategies. Addressing such goals as high-quality early education and appropriate in-school fitness plans can ensure that more young Americans meet the standards of the U.S. military and that the military will be capable of keeping America strong and safe.

### **DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) Should Engage in Several Initiatives**

#### ***Create and Leverage Formal Partnerships with Other Stakeholders***

It is not part of the DoD or DHS mission to address the educational attainment issues or other problems affecting American youth. However, given the large number of young people who do not qualify for military service, and particularly the large number of racial/ethnic minority youth in this group, DoD and DHS could partner with other federal departments, federal agencies, and State and local agencies whose job it is to address these issues. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and DHS develop or expand current formal partnerships with such entities as the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, and similar agencies at the State and local levels.

#### ***Institutionalize and Promote Citizenship Programs for the Services***

In an effort to further expand the pool of qualified candidates, the Commission recommends institutionalizing and promoting successful citizenship programs. One such program is the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which was authorized as a pilot program on November 25, 2008, by the Secretary of Defense.

Although noncitizens have served in the military throughout history, changes in law have limited their service. According to Title 10, Section 504(b)(1), enlisted personnel must be U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents of the United States (i.e., green card holders), or citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or Palau. This requirement disqualifies thousands of otherwise eligible legal noncitizens from service in the U.S. military. However, a provision within this same law allows a Service Secretary to authorize the enlistment of a person, regardless of citizenship status, if the Secretary determines that such enlistment is “vital to the

national interest.” This provision is the basis of the MAVNI program and, before the inception of the program, was used only extremely rarely.

Currently, the MAVNI program expands the eligible recruiting market to non-citizens who do not have green cards but are legally present in the United States if they are licensed health care professionals or if they speak at least one of 35 critical foreign languages. This group includes noncitizens with certain student or work visas, refugees, asylees, and individuals with temporary protected status. MAVNI recruits are not only individuals with specialized skills that could greatly benefit the military: They also tend to be among the more highly qualified recruits. Thus, MAVNI represents a viable option for expanding the eligible recruiting pool to highly qualified, legal noncitizens who could greatly increase not only racial/ethnic but also linguistic and cultural diversity throughout the military. The Commission recommends both institutionalizing this pilot program to make it a permanent Service option and increasing the number of slots available for eligible MAVNI candidates. In addition, the Commission recommends both allowing those with other critically needed specialties to access via MAVNI and exploring the possibility of expanding the program to the RC. (Currently, MAVNI permits only those who are health care professionals to serve in the RC.) Finally, although there are many barriers to clearance and citizenship for officers, the Commission also recommends exploring ways to expand MAVNI to precommissioning officer programs, such as ROTC.

### ***Review and Validate Eligibility Criteria for Military Service***

The Commission recommends that DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) require the Services to review and validate their eligibility requirements to ensure that all requirements are mission essential. This recommendation is in no way advocating lowering the entrance standards. Instead, this recommendation is intended to ensure that all of the Service eligibility requirements are necessary and have been validated. In other words, the goal of this recommendation is to ensure that no individual is unnecessarily excluded from service. Furthermore, ensuring that all requirements have been validated or are important predictors of key performance outcomes within each Service will help ensure that the best candidates are selected to join the military. It is important to note that there has already been extensive research done to validate many military requirements, such as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (see, for example, Armor & Roll, 1994; McHenry et al., 1990; and Ree & Earles, 1992). Therefore, those requirements that have been validated as strong predictors of key performance-related outcomes should continue to be used by the Services, and those that have not been validated should be examined to determine whether they are good predictors of key performance-related outcomes.

### **DoD and the Services Should Focus on Early Engagement**

To ensure that there is a large enough pool of qualified and demographically diverse candidates from which to recruit, the Commission believes in focusing on early engagement to help youth become and remain academically successful, physically fit, and successful citizens. It should be added that early engagement programs and initiatives

should not be created with the sole goal of recruiting youth for the military at young ages. Instead, the Commission recommends that there be a renewed focus on good-citizenship programs that provide youth with opportunities for and guidance about achieving more successful futures, regardless of whether they join the military.

The Services already have a variety of outreach programs for youth in kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12). These range from programs designed to help students stay in school to programs focused specifically on introducing youth to science, technology, engineering, and math. However, it does not appear that these programs are consistently evaluated to determine the extent to which they achieve their stated goals. To ensure that the more successful programs are continued or expanded and to identify potential gaps in the curricula of outreach programs, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services conduct a strategic evaluation of the effectiveness of current outreach programs. At a minimum, the programs should be evaluated to determine the extent to which they improve performance on key eligibility requirements, such as physical fitness, high school graduation rates, and performance on aptitude tests. Following this strategic evaluation, DoD and the Services should focus on increasing resources for programs that have been found to be effective at addressing some of the primary military disqualification factors.

The Commission also recommends increasing funding for the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) program, a Service-sponsored program operating within high schools.<sup>3</sup> JROTC is designed to promote good citizenship, leadership, physical fitness, motivation, and teamwork among young people. Participating students are urged to remain drug free and to successfully graduate from high school. The Commission is unaware of any studies examining the effectiveness of JROTC at achieving these outcomes while controlling for self-selection bias. However, the Services report that they track JROTC participants' attendance, high school graduation rates, indiscipline rates, drop-out rates, and grade point averages and compare these outcomes with those of non-JROTC participants. According to the Services, JROTC participants tend to outperform their nonparticipating peers on these outcomes. Based on this evidence, the Commission believes that JROTC appears to provide an important opportunity for outreach to racial/ethnic minorities and is associated with positive outcomes, indicating the potential to expand the pool of qualified youth not only for military service but also for the general workforce.

Finally, it is also important to note that there are nonprofit organizations outside of the Services that provide education and training to familiarize students with military culture, such as the Army Cadet Corps, the Civil Air Patrol Cadet Program, the Young Marines, the Devil Pups (Marine Corps), the Naval Sea Cadet Corps, and the Navy League Cadet Corps. Because these programs are not under the authority and control of the Services, they are not included as part of the Commission's strategic evaluation recommendation. However, the Services may want to both explore whether these programs are effective at producing outcomes desired by the Services and determine whether the Services could provide additional resources to such programs.

---

<sup>3</sup> Detailed information on the JROTC Assessment can be found at [ExpectMore.gov](http://ExpectMore.gov), 2006.

# OUTREACH AND RECRUITING

---

Given a limited pool of eligible candidates, outreach and recruiting strategies play a critical role in attracting *qualified* youth to military service. Furthermore, because the military operates as a closed personnel system, the demographic diversity of accessions directly influences the potential demographic diversity of future senior leaders. These factors underscore the importance of effective outreach and recruiting strategies within the Services. This chapter describes current outreach and recruiting practices across the Services, reports on the demographic composition of recent accessions, and recommends policies to improve the recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities and women.

## Outreach and Recruiting Programs Used Across the Services

During the Commission's October 2009 meeting, each Service presented a briefing on the outreach and recruiting programs it uses to attract members of currently underrepresented demographic groups. Although each Service has its own unique programs and practices, they often employ similar strategies. For example, the Services described establishing organizational divisions or offices specifically devoted to recruiting members of underrepresented demographic groups. They also conduct targeted advertising, such as creating marketing materials in multiple languages and advertising in college newspapers at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority-Serving Institutions. They use media and entertainment marketing sources directed at demographically diverse audiences, such as Telemundo, Black Entertainment Television, and such racial/ethnic minority-oriented publications as *Jet*, *The Root*, and *The Black Collegian*. They work to establish connections with key community influencers (e.g., leaders, educators, administrators) and affinity groups, including by sending representatives to affinity-group events where high-quality candidates might be found. Such events include annual conferences conducted by the National Society of Black Engineers and the Society for Advancement of Chicanos and Native Americans in Science. Finally, the Services also work to increase their own general visibility through social networking sites and participation in community mentoring programs.

## Outreach and Recruiting Programs Across Officer Commissioning Sources

There are four main commissioning sources for officers (see Thirtle, 2001). These are direct appointments (usually of civilians who serve in occupations—such as law, medicine, and the chaplain corps—requiring advanced education), Service academies (which are four-year-degree-granting institutions), ROTC programs (which students attend

while pursuing their bachelor's degree), and OCS/OTS (which are designed for candidates that already have a bachelor's degree). These programs pursue similar recruiting strategies as those just described, but they also use a few methods and programs that are specific to their institutional needs.

For example, the Service academies report using a number of key strategies to attract high-quality applicants from all demographic groups. These include providing summer seminar programs and candidate-parent weekend visits to promote exposure of their academies and targeting recruiting at high schools that serve a high number of racial/ethnic minority students. They also report making use of academy preparatory schools and other academic-improvement programs designed to increase the eligibility of potential applicants. Finally, the academies reported holding a Service Academy Diversity Conference at which directors and chief diversity officers from the Service academies share knowledge and synchronize efforts.

Like the Service academies, ROTC and OCS/OTS programs use many of the outreach and recruiting methods of the general Services. However, they too have several programs designed specifically to attract, from all demographic backgrounds, high-quality applicants who either have a college degree or have expressed an intent to attend college. These include strategically establishing ROTC programs and academic scholarships at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority-Serving Institutions and maintaining a targeted OCS/OTS recruiting presence at these same universities for students who are ready to graduate.

### **Outreach and Recruiting Programs for the National Guard and Reserve**

The National Guard and Reserve use many of the same recruiting strategies discussed above and, in fact, participate in some of the same programs used by their active-duty counterparts. However, because of their local nature, many National Guard and Reserve recruiting efforts are focused on their surrounding communities. This is particularly true of the National Guard because it is, in effect, composed of 54 separate State entities that recruit almost exclusively within their States.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, although Reserve units can recruit both nationally and locally, a good portion of Reserve recruiting efforts are also locally focused. This is because Reserve members are not generally reimbursed for the cost of traveling from home to drill site, so Reserve units are much more likely to attract and retain local members.

This means that the National Guard and Reserve have developed unique strategies focused on local communities. These include engaging key community leaders and educators and attending local fairs, sports games, and other community events. This close interaction with communities makes the National Guard and Reserve a particularly effective bridge between the Armed Forces and civilian communities.

---

<sup>1</sup> Throughout the discussion of the National Guard, *States* includes U.S. territories and the District of Columbia. Note that, although it is not uncommon for individuals from out of state to join a local National Guard unit, State National Guards do not actively recruit outside their States.

## The Demographic Diversity of Recent Accessions

As previously described, the Services use a number of different outreach and recruiting programs targeted toward increasing the demographic diversity of accessions. Unfortunately, there is currently little research on the effectiveness of these individual programs at achieving their specified outcomes or attracting youth to enlist or enroll in precommissioning officer programs. Data on recent enlisted and officer accessions, however, can provide a baseline measure of how well current outreach and recruiting strategies are working to attract qualified candidates from all demographic groups. This section presents an overview of how recent AC enlisted and officer accessions compare with the eligible recruiting pool in terms of demographic representation. Data on recent RC accessions are not included because comparisons with the eligible population would need to be done on a State-by-State basis. In addition, a large percentage of RC enlisted accessions (i.e., 36 percent of Selected Reserve) and a majority of RC officer accessions (i.e., 87 percent of Selected Reserve) are “prior service” accessions who have transferred from the AC.<sup>2</sup> Issues related to helping servicemembers transition from the AC to the RC are addressed elsewhere in this report.

For accession data, the Commission used a common dataset from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (FY 2002–FY 2008), which provides the data in a report series called *Population Representation in the Military Services*. The accession data presented below are from FY 2007 and FY 2008, which are the most recently published datasets. The eligible recruiting pool benchmark was created using data from the March 2008 Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 1973–2008). For enlisted accessions, the eligible recruiting pool was defined as labor force participants (i.e., people who are either employed or actively seeking work) who hold high school degrees (or equivalents) through four years of college (but hold no bachelor’s degree) and are between the ages of 18 and 24. For officer accessions, the eligible recruiting pool was defined as labor force participants who hold at least a bachelor’s degree and are between the ages of 22 and 34.

### Enlisted Accessions

With the exception of the Navy, which had roughly equal or overrepresentation of every nonwhite race/ethnicity group, each Service had one or more racial/ethnic minority group that was underrepresented compared with its representation in the eligible recruiting pool:

- Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Army accessions.
- Non-Hispanic blacks and Asians were underrepresented in recent Marine Corps accessions.

---

<sup>2</sup> Based on data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.



- Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Air Force accessions.
- Non-Hispanic blacks and Asians were underrepresented in recent Coast Guard accessions.

Additionally, although women constituted close to 50 percent of the eligible recruiting pool, they were underrepresented in recent enlisted accessions across all Services, constituting between only 7 percent (Marine Corps) and 22 percent (Air Force) of those accessions.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the data show that there were several underrepresented demographic groups in recent enlisted accessions across the Services.

### **Officer Accessions**

As in the recent enlisted accessions, there was considerable variation across the Services and, in particular, across the commissioning sources in terms of racial/ethnic and gender representation in recent officer accessions. Overall, the data showed that, compared with the eligible recruiting pool, there were in each Service several underrepresented race/ethnicity groups in the various officer commissioning sources:

- Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Navy officer accessions.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic Asians, and non-Hispanic others (American Indians, Pacific Islanders, Alaska natives, and those reporting more than one race) were underrepresented in recent Army officer accessions.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Marine Corps officer accessions.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Air Force officer accessions. However, the degree of “unknown” racial/ethnic accessions in the data was so large that it calls into question the accuracy of the data and the conclusions for the other groups.
- Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Coast Guard officer accessions.

In addition, although women constituted more than 50 percent of the recruiting pool, they were underrepresented across all Services and commissioning sources.

Although the Services are currently engaged in a number of outreach and recruiting efforts, there is little information on the individual effectiveness of these various programs and practices. However, data on recent accessions suggest that, across the Services, racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented even when compared with only the eligible population. Therefore, if the Services wish to reflect the demographics of the larger population, there needs to be further improvement in the outreach and recruiting efforts targeting members of underrepresented demographic groups.

---

<sup>3</sup> As is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, not all occupations are open to women. This may influence accession shares for women.

## Improve Recruiting from the Currently Available Pool of Qualified Candidates

### *Recommendation 7—*

*DoD and the Services should engage in activities to improve recruiting from the currently available pool of qualified candidates by*

- *a. Creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and recruiting from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographic groups.*
- *b. Creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups.*
- *c. Developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs.*
- *d. Closely examining the preparatory school admissions processes and making required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.*

## Create, Implement, and Evaluate a Strategic Plan for Outreach and Recruiting from Untapped Locations and Underrepresented Demographic Groups

All of the Services have recruiting strategies—including many promising outreach programs—directed at demographically diverse populations. The Commission would like to see these initiatives continue and be expanded through having the Services evaluate the effectiveness of current spending on minority marketing and recruiting initiatives and then develop a clear strategic plan that will be submitted to DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) for evaluation. The strategic plan should include an examination of untapped recruiting markets of qualified racial/ethnic minorities, such as recruiting at two-year colleges and strategically locating ROTC host units.

### ***Explore Recruiting at Two-Year Colleges***

Recent data suggest that close to 50 percent of all students in college attended two-year colleges, with slightly higher percentages of blacks and Hispanics attending two-year colleges than average (National Center for Education Statistics, 2008). Specifically, close to 60 percent of Hispanics attending college went to two-year colleges, and a little over half of blacks attending college went to two-year colleges. Furthermore, research done for the Navy found that those with two-year college degrees had higher test scores and higher continuation and reenlistment rates than those with only high school degrees (Kraus et al., 2004). Therefore, two-year colleges may represent a rich market for recruiting not only high-quality enlisted recruits but also high-quality Hispanic and black recruits.

Two-year colleges may represent a rich market for ROTC recruits. A candidate must have completed a bachelor's degree before commissioning through an ROTC program. However, roughly 17 percent of all students attending two-year colleges transfer to four-year colleges. This includes roughly 19 percent of Hispanics and 8 percent of blacks who later transfer to four-year colleges. These members of underrepresented demographic groups could be targeted for ROTC.




### ***Examine Expanding ROTC Hosts to More–Demographically Diverse Locations***

A second way to improve recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities is to ensure that ROTC host locations match the geographic distribution of student populations. The map shown in Figure 6.1 uses Air Force ROTC units to illustrate this point. In the figure, all Air Force ROTC host locations are identified by red triangles. The locations of black students are represented by circles, with larger circles indicating larger populations. The locations of Hispanic students are represented by stars, with larger stars indicating larger populations. Locations that have large populations of black students or Hispanic students (or both) but no ROTC host are potential areas for expanding ROTC demographic diversity and increasing the production of officers. The map shows that there are potentially rich markets in Texas, the southeastern United States, California, and the mid-Atlantic region. Of course, the locations of other Service ROTC units should also be taken into account when examining potential areas for expansion.

In addition, given that the Services have limited resources and that the location of ROTC sites involves many stakeholders, the Commission recommends instituting an independent council similar to the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission to evaluate and decide where new ROTC units should be placed and where unproductive ROTC units would best be moved. A key factor to be considered as part

**Figure 6.1. Comparison of Air Force ROTC Host Locations and Student Body Demographics**



SOURCES: National Center for Education Statistics, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.

of this process is the extent to which ROTC host units are located at colleges and universities with large student populations of racial/ethnic minorities.

### **Create More Accountability for Recruiting from Underrepresented Demographic Groups**

The Commission recommends that DoD and the Services create more accountability for recruiting racial/ethnic minorities and women by developing goals for qualified minority applicants to precommissioning officer programs, developing formal processes for coordinating enlisted and officer recruiting, and working to improve congressional nominations to the Service academies.

#### ***Develop Goals for Qualified Minority Applicants***

The Services have long employed incentive programs for recruiters to ensure that designated accession goals are met. This includes setting goals for the total number of accessions and goals for recruiting individuals with specific attributes, such as a high aptitude level (e.g., a high AFQT score) or specific skills or degrees (see Oken & Asch, 1997). One way to ensure that there is a demographically diverse candidate pool from which to select applicants into precommissioning officer programs is to develop goals for qualified minority applicants. This strategy is currently employed by the Navy and the Marine Corps but not by the other Services. The goals would not be used during the actual admissions decision but would help ensure that there is a demographically diverse pool from which to select new students each year. These goals should be developed with careful consideration of the demographics of the eligible population.

#### ***Coordinate Enlisted and Officer Recruiting***

The Commission recommends that the Services explore developing formal processes for coordinating enlisted and officer recruiting. Except in the Coast Guard, enlisted recruiters are primarily focused on finding enlisted recruits. If they find a prospect with a bachelor's degree, they are required to refer that person to the highest program for which he or she is eligible, and they must have the prospect sign a waiver if he or she prefers to enlist instead of joining an officer commissioning program. However, this coordination does not necessarily apply for high-quality applicants without a bachelor's degree, even if they have the potential to be successful in a precommissioning officer program. Therefore, a formal coordination process between enlisted recruiters on one hand and academy and ROTC programs on the other could help ensure that qualified applicants from all demographic backgrounds have the opportunity to become officers.

#### ***Improve Congressional Academy Nominations***

In addition to meeting the minimum eligibility requirements, potential applicants to the DoD Service academies must secure a nomination from the President, the Vice President, or a member of Congress to apply.<sup>4</sup> However, there was general agreement

---

<sup>4</sup> For the United States Air Force Academy, the nomination must come from the Vice President or a member of Congress (U.S. Air Force, 2009). For the United States Military Academy, the nomination can be a Service-connected nomination or congressional nomination (U.S. Army, 2007). For the United States

among the Service academy representatives who briefed the Commission in October 2009 that available nomination slots are often not fully utilized. Furthermore, recent media reports have highlighted that lawmakers from areas with large racial/ethnic minority populations tend to rank near the bottom when it comes to making nominations for appointment to the academies (Witte, 2009). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), is working with members of Congress to improve their use of nominations, so efforts to engage members of Congress in the academy nomination process are already ongoing. The goal of this recommendation is both to encourage members of Congress to improve their use of nominations and to ensure that any current OSD efforts to improve congressional nominations are sustained over the long term.

### **Develop a Common Application for Service ROTC and Academy Programs**

Currently, each Service academy and ROTC program requires a separate application. Therefore, young people who are interested in multiple schools or programs must apply separately, with sharing of applicant files occurring inconsistently. Also, students may not be aware of all of their options in terms of military commissioning programs. Therefore, the Commission recommends a joint or common application for Service ROTC and academy programs. Through this coordination, students could apply simultaneously to multiple programs, ensuring that they are exposed to all of the options for becoming officers.

### **Closely Examine the Preparatory School Admissions Process and Make Required Changes to Ensure That Accessions Align with the Needs of the Military**

The Service academy preparatory schools originated when President Woodrow Wilson expanded the United States Military Academy's corps of cadets in 1916, authorizing 180 slots for prior enlisted personnel (Malstrom, 2009). The reality at the time, however, was that few enlisted personnel would be capable of transitioning directly to a Service academy without additional academic preparation. The idea of Service academy preparatory schools (for both the Army and the Navy) came about as a way to meet this need. Although there are also private military preparatory schools with programs designed to prepare prospective Service academy appointees, most of the cadets who reach Service academies via the preparatory school route attend the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, the Naval Academy Preparatory School, or the U.S. Air Force Academy Preparatory School. The Coast Guard Academy does not have its own preparatory school. Prior to 2009, the Coast Guard Academy sent some prospective cadets to the Naval Academy Preparatory School. Since 2009, however, the Coast Guard Academy has used only private programs to serve the preparatory school function because the private programs were found to be more cost-effective than the Naval Academy Preparatory School. The modern purpose of the preparatory schools still

---

Naval Academy, the nomination must come from the President, the Vice President, or a member of Congress (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010). The Coast Guard Academy does not require a nomination.

includes their original mission of providing additional preparation for prior enlisted personnel, but it has been generalized to offer opportunities for civilian applicants.

According to data provided by the Services to the Commission, the preparatory schools are currently an important source of racial/ethnic minority enrollment at the Service academies. However, an examination of preparatory school records suggests that there is a large focus on developing athletes to enter into the academies. Approximately 35–40 percent of each of the preparatory school's recent classes consisted of recruited athletes. Although physical fitness is an important characteristic for military officers, the Commission feels some concern that the focus on preparing athletes for the Service academies may be coming at the expense of individuals with other skills that may be more beneficial to the current and future needs of the military. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD have the preparatory schools closely examine their admissions processes and make any required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the future military workforce.



# BRANCHING AND ASSIGNMENTS

---

The next stage of the personnel life cycle is the selection of the particular career field and related assignments each servicemember fulfills during his or her time in the military. Together, these career field and assignment selections can affect potential promotion opportunities to higher ranks. However, due to both structural and perceptual barriers, there are potential demographic differences in career field preferences and command assignment opportunities that influence the future demographic diversity of senior military leadership. This chapter describes those barriers and how they can be addressed through policy changes.

## **Career Fields, Key Assignments, and Demographic Diversity**

As a first step in examining the role played by career fields and assignments in senior military leadership diversity, the Commission explored both the extent to which specific career fields and assignments are related to advancing to senior leadership ranks and the extent to which racial/ethnic minorities and women may be underrepresented in those key career fields and assignments. The Commission used common DMDC-provided AC and RC datasets for these analyses. The data presented in this section are from December 2008 for the AC and June 2010 for the RC. Data on the Coast Guard were not included in the analyses because DMDC personnel data for the Coast Guard were not available.

### **Enlisted Career Fields**

Based on recent data, it appears that functional support and administration occupations are most closely aligned with membership in the senior enlisted ranks in the AC. However, racial/ethnic minorities and women were not underrepresented in functional support and administrative occupations and were not overrepresented in occupations that are currently aligned with junior enlisted pay grades, such as services and supplies. Thus, for the enlisted corps, there is no evidence that career fields have played any significant role in the underrepresentation of racial/ethnic minorities and women in senior leadership ranks within the AC. Given these results, the Commission did not pursue this line of research for the RC.

### **Officer Career Fields**

For both the AC and RC officer corps, data indicate that flag/general officers were, in the periods under consideration, disproportionately drawn from tactical/operational

(i.e., combat) career fields. As Figure 7.1 shows, AC officers with tactical/operational backgrounds tended to increasingly populate the higher levels of military leadership.

Furthermore, compared with other occupations, tactical/operational occupations tended to have higher concentrations of white men. For example, Figure 7.2 shows the percentage of tactical/operational and nontactical/nonoperational AC officers in pay grade O-3 who were white men. (For reference, it also shows the percentage of white men among all flag/general officers.) Even at the O-3 level, 75 percent of all officers in tactical/operational occupations were white men, compared with 50 percent of the officers in nontactical/nonoperational occupations. A similar pattern was seen in the RC.

Of course, the demographics of recent flag/general officers depend on the demographics of their own cohorts and not on the demographics of officers recently at the O-3 level. Nonetheless, Figure 7.2 demonstrates that the tendency of tactical/operational occupations to contain higher fractions of white men persisted as recently as 2008.<sup>1</sup> Thus, as long as tactical/operational occupations continue to be associated with advancement to higher officer grades, and as long as these tactical/operational occupations continue to consist predominantly of white men, there is likely to be limited improvement in the demographic diversity of flag/general officers.

## Key Assignments


The demographic diversity of the officer corps is greatly affected by which career fields and specialties officers enter. However, the types of assignments that officers choose or are given once they enter their career fields can also affect the demographic diversity of the officer corps. In general, this is not a factor for the enlisted corps, so the Commission chose to focus specifically on key assignments for officers.

The Commission defined key assignments as those assignments that are recognized to be especially demanding, to have high visibility, and to provide competitive advantage for advancement. Although none of the Services has “a checklist of assignments required for promotion from one grade to the next,” each Service branch, community, and career field has “a notional career path comprising work and educational assignments that will make a due-course officer effective and credible” (Schirmer et al., 2006). Based on the experiences of the Commissioners and presentations from the Services, these assignments include holding leadership and staff assignments during one’s early career, holding command assignments, meeting certain educational milestones (e.g., getting advanced academic degrees, attending in-residence professional military education, particularly at war colleges), and holding executive officer or assistant positions to current flag/general officers. In addition, current law stipulates that AC officers are required to complete a full joint duty assignment and be designated a joint qualified officer prior to appointment to the rank of flag/general officer.

---


<sup>1</sup> According to information provided to the Commission by the Coast Guard, a majority (about 71 percent) of Coast Guard tactical/operational (i.e., mission-execution) positions are currently filled by white male officers. However, the same can be said of nontactical/nonoperational (i.e., mission-support) positions, which are largely (about 70 percent) held by white male officers.

**Figure 7.1. Percentage of AC Officers in Tactical/Operational Occupations, December 2008, by Pay Grade**



SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

**Figure 7.2. Percentage in Nontactical/Nonoperational and Tactical/Operational Occupations Who Were White Men, December 2008, by Service**



SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.



In general, the Services do not collect systematic data on demographic differences in the key assignments just described. However, for both the AC and RC, several of the Services do capture some data on command assignments. An examination of the AC O-5 and O-6 command selection/screening processes for the command selection boards in the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy<sup>2</sup> revealed that racial/ethnic and gender differences in O-5 and O-6 command selection rates were not the result of a clear bias for or against any particular group but that a vast majority of personnel (i.e., at least 80 percent) selected for O-5 or O-6 command during the period under review were white men. Similarly, RC data showed that, across all the Services, the majority of command billets in the RC were filled by white men.

These findings suggest that racial/ethnic minority and female representation in recent cohorts of command selectees was low because racial/ethnic minorities and women were not highly represented in the candidate pools for command assignments. The lower representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women in candidate pools for command assignments may be due to race/ethnicity and gender differences in accessions, branching, continuation, previous key assignments, and previous promotion rates prior to command.

## **Barriers to Entering Tactical/Operational Career Fields and Serving in Key Assignments**

For racial/ethnic minorities and women, barriers to entering tactical/operational career fields and serving in key assignments can affect their ability to reach the senior leadership ranks, particularly in the officer corps. This section describes two types of barriers that currently exist—structural barriers and perceptual barriers.

### **Structural Barriers**

The Commission identified two structural barriers related to tactical/operational career fields and key assignments—one for women and one for racial/ethnic minorities. The barrier for female officers is created by the collection of DoD and Service assignment policies known as the *combat exclusion policies*. These policies work at two levels. First, they explicitly prohibit women from serving in certain tactical/operational career fields, such as infantry in the Army. Second, within the career fields that are open to women, the policies may prevent women from getting key assignments because they prohibit women from being assigned to units that are likely to be involved in direct offensive ground combat (Harrell & Miller, 1997; Segal & Segal, 2004). Specifically, the assignment policy determines to which unit a female servicemember trained in a particular occupation can be assigned to perform her job. Thus, the assignment policy does

---

<sup>2</sup> Three of the Services provided AC command selection outcomes by race/ethnicity and gender. Specifically, the Commission was able to compare outcomes of the O-5 and O-6 command selection/screening processes for the command selection boards, by FY, in FY 2006–FY 2010 for the Army, FY 2007–FY 2009 for the Marine Corps, and FY 2007–FY 2009 for the Navy aviation community and the Navy surface warfare officer community.

not curtail what women can do, but it does affect the units to which women can be assigned.

These combat policies are most restrictive in the Army and the Marine Corps. Calculations from 2003 data show that women can serve in only 91 percent of Army and 92 percent of Marine Corps occupations, compared with 99 percent of Air Force and 94 percent of Navy occupations (Segal & Segal, 2004). The percentage of Navy occupations has likely increased since these data were reported because, in early 2010, the Secretary of Defense lifted the ban barring female officers from serving on submarines (Peck, 2010). All occupations in the Coast Guard have been open to women since 1978 (U.S. Coast Guard, n.d.).

Although the percentages presented above regarding the occupations open to women do not appear inordinately low, exclusion from these occupations has a considerable influence on advancement to higher positions. For example, in 2006, 92.3 percent of all Army occupations were open to women. However, the remaining 7.7 percent of Army occupations were the combat arms occupations of infantry, armor, artillery, cavalry, and special forces, which are closed to women because of the current DoD policies that exclude women from direct ground combat. This relatively small percentage of combat arms occupations was held by 29.4 percent of all Army personnel and, in this case, was held exclusively by men (Harrell et al., 2007). Additionally, 2006 data show that, in the Army, *80 percent of general officers (ranks O-7 and above) came from combat arms occupations* (Lim et al., 2009).

We have one 4-star female, there is no doubt in my mind that she . . . [could have commanded a] division, she is that professional. She's done everything that any of us have done. So, the culture said no, simple as that.

—Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

The structural barrier related to tactical/operational career fields and key assignments for racial/ethnic minority officers is created by the interaction of two patterns related to accession source. First, nonwhite officers are less likely than white officers to commission via the Service academies. Second, the Army and the Air Force allocate a larger portion of tactical/operational slots to their Service academies compared with other officer commissioning sources. Therefore, in these Services, commissioning via a Service academy provides an advantage in terms of securing assignment to a tactical/operational career field.

Finally, the structural barriers that keep racial/ethnic minorities and women from entering tactical/operational career fields also function as barriers to obtaining command assignments. That is, the lower representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women in tactical/operational career fields means that those servicemembers have fewer opportunities for command.

## Perceptual Barriers

Although there are likely perceptual barriers for female servicemembers, the majority of prior research has focused on perceptual barriers for racial/ethnic minority male servicemembers. In particular, evidence suggests that more white men than racial/ethnic minority men prefer tactical/operational career fields in the Army (Lim et al.,

2009) and the Air Force (Haygood & Morris, 2009) and that more white men than minority men enter special operations forces in the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Kirby et al., 2000). These findings persist even after controlling for such factors as rankings on merit-based lists for initial branching.<sup>3</sup>

There are several potential reasons for the difference in preferences. For example, research has found that racial/ethnic minorities tend to prefer military career fields that they believe will provide skills (e.g., engineering skills) that will readily transfer to the civilian sector (Kirby et al., 2000). Generally, these skills are more likely to be found in nontactical/nonoperational occupations. Additionally, research suggests that, compared with white communities, racial/ethnic minority communities typically know less about certain career fields and are less supportive of decisions to pursue those career fields. For example, Kirby et al. (2000) found that, compared with racial/ethnic minorities, more of the white participants they interviewed knew about special operations forces, such as Navy SEALs, when they were children. The study also found that some racial/ethnic minorities perceive that people in certain military occupational specialties hold racist attitudes. For example, some of the racial/ethnic minority servicemembers interviewed commented that Army Green Berets and Rangers were believed by many to be white organizations with racist attitudes. Finally, anecdotal accounts suggest that identification with certain career fields may be lacking due to the absence of successful racial/ethnic minority role models in those career fields.

There are also potential perceptual barriers that prevent racial/ethnic minorities and women from obtaining key assignments, such as command. In particular, racial/ethnic minorities and women may lack sufficient knowledge about key assignment opportunities, perhaps because racial/ethnic minorities and women do not receive the same career counseling or mentoring about key assignments as their white male counterparts. If this is the case, they would be more likely to miss career-enhancing assignment opportunities.

## **The Services Should Optimize the Ability of Servicemembers to Make Informed Career Choices from Accession to Retirement—with Special Emphasis on Mentoring**

### ***Recommendation 8—***

***The Services should ensure that their career development programs and resources enhance servicemembers' knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Component opportunities,***

<sup>3</sup> Most of the Services' officer commissioning sources have rankings of cadets/midshipmen in terms of "merit-based" factors. These rankings are used to make initial branching and assignment decisions. For example, Army ROTC cadets are put on an Order of Merit List based on a weighted composite of academic grade point average, leadership performance and skills, and physical fitness qualifications (Lim et al., 2009). Although the Services use different strategies when employing merit-based rankings, cadets/midshipmen who are higher on the list generally receive earlier consideration terms of career field preferences than do cadets/midshipmen who are lower on the list.

*to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession to retirement.*

- *a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field decision point and continue throughout the servicemember's career.*
- *b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line of communication between protégé and mentor.*

The Services provide a variety of career development resources, including formal mentoring programs, career counseling events held at individual installations, and websites that provide links to career development information (such as career guides, contact information for career counselors or mentors, and information about enlisted-to-officer programs). However, there are few available data on the effectiveness of these programs and resources.

Additionally, research shows that, compared with nonmentored individuals, mentored individuals tend to be more highly compensated, to receive more promotions, to be more satisfied with their career, to have greater expectations for advancement, to be more committed to their career, and to be more satisfied with their job (Allen et al., 2004). For example, the autobiography of Lieutenant General Frank E. Petersen describes the importance of mentoring to his success. Lieutenant General Petersen describes how, in 1950, as a young cadet, he was having a particularly difficult time with an instructor and was seriously contemplating dropping out of the Naval Aviation Cadet Program. However, he then encountered a phenomenon he considered “an absolute miracle”: He saw “a tall black Army Air Corps captain.”

When I was at the War College in 1975 to 1976, thanks to General Becton, I was supposed to go to the Army War College, but because he was sitting on the board for the National War College . . . he plucked me off and threw me into National War College, and I thank you for that again, Julius. I thank you many times.

—The Honorable Colin Powell,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

[The captain] was Dan “Chappie” James, . . . holding forth at the Sugar Bowl on one of his trips home. I was feeling pretty down, and we talked for about two hours. I told him about the hard times, the racism, the possibility of never making it because of that. I laid it all out there, including the fact that the black guy just in front of me had been wiped out. I felt that “they” were simply waiting to wipe me out, too. . . . Chappie stayed so long that he had to cancel his civilian flight home. He could’ve run. He didn’t. He stayed there and listened. He didn’t say an awful lot at first, except that I could make it if I wanted it badly enough. . . . I looked at him and somehow felt new resolve. I mean, here was a living example that it could be done. I had a role model now. He patted me on the shoulder, then he said it again: “Just don’t give up.” That audience with Chappie helped get me through. (Petersen & Phelps, 1998)

Young Petersen became the first black Marine Corps aviator and retired from the Marine Corps as a lieutenant general.

Based on this evidence about the potential benefits of mentoring, the Commission assumes that servicemembers who receive high-quality mentoring relationships from their Services will be able to make more-informed career decisions. This ability is particularly important for minority male servicemembers, who may not choose tactical/operational career fields partly because of a lack of knowledge about the potential benefits of entering such career fields.

### **Mentoring and Career Counseling Efforts Shall Start Prior to the Initial Career Field Decision Point and Continue Throughout the Servicemember's Career**

The Commission found that the Services value mentoring relationships that benefit both ends of the relationship: Protégés gain from the experience and knowledge of their mentors, and mentors gain a sense of satisfaction and pride from helping to develop the careers of junior individuals. Like many organizations, the Services provide mentoring to inform servicemembers of their career options and to help them develop professionally and personally. However, the Services did not indicate to the Commission that there is a particular focus on mentoring prior to initial career path decisions. Furthermore, a Commission survey involving a small sample of AC servicemembers revealed that, although there were not strong opinions about these career development resources and the assignment process, servicemembers reported that they gained only moderate knowledge of the career process early in their careers. Given that officers in tactical/operational career paths are significantly more likely to be promoted into flag/general officer positions, it is important that newly commissioning officers make their initial career field decisions with full knowledge of these issues.

Mentoring can also have particular benefits for the RC. First, when it comes to retaining qualified and successful servicemembers, mentoring can help inform exiting active-duty members about opportunities available in the RC. Additionally, the RC has its own constraints and issues, particularly for servicemembers who have transitioned from active duty. These include knowledge of the force structure, knowledge of the promotion system, and the geographic distribution of billets that could affect career decisions. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Services ensure that, for both the AC and RC, mentoring efforts start prior to the initial career decision point and continue throughout the career life cycle.

### **Mentoring Programs Shall Follow Effective Practices and Employ an Active Line of Communication Between Protégé and Mentor**

Mentoring can play an essential part in career development, but mentoring can also backfire if there is no solid understanding of what makes mentoring relationships successful. Descriptions of the Services' current mentoring programs and practices indicate that the Services are making extensive efforts to assist servicemembers in their career development. However, there is very little information about the effectiveness of these efforts, either collectively or for specific demographic groups.

Research on mentoring has shown that effective mentoring relationships and programs are characterized by practices that include establishing clear objectives, allow-

ing mentees and mentors to establish multiple mentoring relationships, providing high-quality training for both mentors and mentees, and (if relevant to the mentoring program) matching mentors and mentees based on multiple criteria that align with the goals of the mentoring program (Allen et al., 2006; Finkelstein & Poteet, 2007). These characteristics represent effective practices that can be adopted by the Services. In addition, mentoring programs should foster the development of continuous, active lines of communication between mentors and mentees. Finally, the Services should evaluate the outcomes of their mentoring programs against predetermined goals and criteria. The Services can do this through surveys, interviews, and focus groups used to gather information about mentoring experiences. The Services should also track over time the careers of individuals who use their mentoring programs and tools to assess the extent to which mentoring has helped individuals at key career points.

## **DoD and the Services Should Eliminate Combat Exclusion Policies for Women**

### *Recommendation 9—*

*DoD and the Services should eliminate the “combat exclusion policies” for women, including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all qualified servicemembers. The Commission recommends a time-phased approach:*

- *a. Women in career fields/specialties currently open to them should be immediately able to be assigned to any unit that requires that career field/specialty, consistent with the current operational environment.*
- *b. DoD and the Services should take deliberate steps in a phased approach to open additional career fields and units involved in “direct ground combat” to qualified women.*
- *c. DoD and the Services should report to Congress the process and timeline for removing barriers that inhibit women from achieving senior leadership positions.*

The Commission recommends that DoD and the Services eliminate the combat exclusion policies that have barred women from direct ground combat fields and assignments since the early 1990s. As previously described, these policies constitute a structural barrier that prevents women from entering the tactical/operational career fields associated with promotion to flag/general officer grades and from serving in career-enhancing assignments. The Commission is *not* advocating a lowering of standards with the elimination of the combat exclusion policy. Qualification standards for combat arms positions should remain in place.

The Commission considered four strands of argument related to rescinding the policies. First, the Commission addressed arguments related to readiness and mission capability. One frequently cited argument in favor of the current policies is that having women serving in direct combat will hamper mission effectiveness by hurting unit morale and cohesion. Comparable arguments were made with respect to racial integration but were ultimately never borne out. Similarly, to date, there has been little evidence



First of all, with regard to women in Combat Arms, I don't think you will see a change because I don't think our women want it to change, okay? There are certain demands of officers in a Combat Arms environment that our women see, recognize, appreciate, and say, I couldn't do that—in fact, I don't want to do that because I don't think it best prepares me for success if I am trying to do those things against the male population at Lieutenant, Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel.

—General James T. Conway, remarks to the Commission, 2010

that the integration of women into previously closed units or occupations has had a negative effect on important mission-related performance factors, such as unit cohesion (Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2009; Harrell & Miller, 1997; McSally, 2007). A study by the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (2009) actually found that a majority of focus group participants felt that women serving in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a positive effect on mission accomplishment.

Additionally, panel members discussing this topic at a September 2010 Commission meeting cited the need to bring to bear all talent: The blanket restriction for women limits the ability of commanders in theater to pick the most capable person for the job. For example, Colonel Martha McSally noted,

If you want to have the best fighting force, why would you exclude 51 percent of your population from even being considered for any particular job? I've seen recent statistics that say 75 percent of our Nation's youth between the ages of 17 and 25 are not even eligible to be in the military based on whether it's mental, medical, or other—criminal issues or whatever. So we just have a very small pool to pick from. So if we're trying to have the most ready force, why would we just exclude 51 percent of the population from even competing? (McSally, 2010)

Second, and relatedly, the Commission considered whether the policies are still appropriate given the changes in warfare and doctrine that have occurred over the last decade. DoD and Service policies that bar women from certain combat-related career fields, specialties, units, and assignments are based on standards associated with conventional warfare and well-defined, linear battlefields. However, the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been anything but conventional. As a result, some of the female servicemembers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have already been engaged in activities that would be considered combat related, including being collocated with combat units and engaging in direct combat for self-defense (see Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2009, and Harrell et al., 2007). Thus, the combat exclusion policies do not reflect the current operational environment.

Third, the Commission addressed arguments related to discrimination and fairness. Many Commissioners consider the policies fundamentally discriminatory because they stipulate that assignment decisions should be based solely on gender, without regard to capability or qualifications.

Finally, the Commission considered whether there might be unanticipated effects from rescinding the combat exclusion policies, especially with regard to opening career fields. In particular, the type of effect such a policy change would have on enlisted recruiting is unknown. If young women perceive the opening of combat career fields to mean that they will be *required* to enter these occupations rather than being *allowed* to volunteer for them, female propensity to enlist may drop, and the Services may find it difficult to achieve their recruiting missions.

Based on these considerations, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services eliminate their combat exclusion policies for women, including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all qualified servicemembers. This should be done using a phased approach so that all potential issues, including how to best implement new policies, can be thought through. This recommendation was approved by a majority, but not all, of the Commissioners. Due to concerns regarding the potential effect of the policies' removal on unit effectiveness and to potential challenges associated with implementation, a small number of Commissioners did not approve recommending removal of the policies immediately but instead favored further study. On the other hand, a small number of other Commissioners believed that the recommendation is not strong enough. They would have preferred a more forceful recommendation to immediately eliminate the policies.

The Commission proposes three strategies for implementing this recommendation.

### **Women in Career Fields/Specialties Currently Open to Them Should Be Immediately Able to Be Assigned to Any Unit That Requires That Career Field/Specialty, Consistent with the Current Operational Environment**

As previously discussed, current DoD and Service assignment policies prohibit women from being assigned to units that may be involved in direct ground combat. Again, this means that, for a given occupation, the policies determine to which units a female servicemember may be assigned to do the job for which she has been trained. However, given the nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, women are currently engaged in direct combat, even when it is not part of their formally assigned role. Two key features of the policies have created the disconnect between the roles women may be formally assigned (policy) and the roles they may fill while deployed (practice).

First, many of the terms used in the policies have either lost or changed meaning: Such concepts as “enemy,” “exposed to hostile fire,” “forward,” and “well forward” are no longer useful when determining which units should be closed to women. The enemy is no longer clearly and consistently identifiable, and all units are essentially exposed to hostile fire. Additionally, the spatial concepts of “forward” and “well for-

This is about discrimination of the first order. This is 2010, and as we look at outyears for war, it will probably be much more electronic than it is now. We have things from Creech Air Force Base fighting unmanned vehicles in Afghanistan right now. So we cannot look at the war that was fought in Vietnam and compare that to today or future wars. It's going to be totally different. This has to do with every American citizen being able to be considered for anything that they are qualified to do. It's about discrimination at its very basics.

—Rear Admiral Mary O'Donnell,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010



ward” are inadequate to convey the complexity of such operations as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, once a female servicemember has been assigned to a unit, the assignment policy prescribes neither what duties she can do nor with which other units she may interact. As a result, women are performing in combat roles. Indeed, local commanders have the authority to use their personnel as they see fit to fulfill the unit mission. Harrell et al. (2007) found examples of female servicemembers who had been trained as cooks having received the Combat Action Badge in Iraq, likely because contractor cooks obviated the need for U.S. servicemembers to cook. Instead, these women, along with their male colleagues trained as cooks, were performing other duties, such as guard duty, that placed them in greater danger.

The Commissioners were in near-unanimous agreement that this aspect of the combat exclusion policies should be eliminated immediately because, given current practices for employing women in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems obsolete. The assignment policies constitute an *unnecessary* barrier to women’s advancement.

### **DoD and the Services Should Take Deliberate Steps in a Phased Approach to Open Additional Career Fields and Units Involved in “Direct Ground Combat” to Qualified Women**

As previously discussed, tactical/operational career fields are associated with advancing to flag/general officer grades. Therefore, as long as the combat exclusion policies bar women from entering tactical/operational career fields and units, women will be at a disadvantage compared with men in terms of career advancement potential. The Commission is not arguing that women cannot reach senior leadership levels without being in tactical/operational career fields, and it is not asserting that a large number of women will necessarily choose to enter tactical/operational career fields, given the opportunity. However, the Commission believes that the existing policies are a structural barrier whose removal could help improve both the career advancement potential of qualified women and, ultimately, the demographic diversity of senior leaders. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services take steps to open all career fields and units to all qualified women.

### **DoD and the Services Should Report to Congress the Process and Timeline for Removing Barriers That Inhibit Women from Achieving Senior Leadership Positions**

Although there are no laws that specifically restrict women from being assigned to any career field, specialty, assignment, or unit, Title 10, Section 652, does require the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress about changes to the current combat exclusion policies. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services report to Congress the process and timelines for developing and implementing new policies based on recent combat experience. To be clear, this recommendation means that DoD and the Services will have to first determine *how* to develop and implement new policies, not *whether* to do so.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

# PROMOTION

---

The next stage of the personnel life cycle is selecting servicemembers for promotion. In the military's closed personnel system,<sup>1</sup> the demographic diversity of senior leadership depends largely on the relative career progression rates of members of each demographic group: If racial/ethnic minorities and women advance at lower rates than white men, they will be underrepresented in the top leadership positions. Thus, potential barriers to promotion and resulting demographic differences in promotion rates can affect the future demographic diversity of senior military leadership.

Typically, there are more servicemembers eligible for promotion than can be selected, so selection depends critically on identifying the best and most-qualified candidates. To understand how racial/ethnic minorities and women are currently faring in the military promotion process, the Commission asked the Services to provide data regarding average promotion rates.<sup>2</sup> The findings presented in this chapter do not reflect RC data, however. The information requested from the RC either had not been compiled or collected or was not available in a comparable format.

## Demographic Differences in Average Promotion Rates

### Line Officer Promotion Rates

The Services were asked to provide data on line officers in pay grades O-4 through O-6. Line officers are officers who serve in combat-related specialties, and they constitute the majority of officers. Noncombat specialties include chaplains, lawyers, logisticians, and medical officers. Also, comparing line officers controls for potential occupational differences that may influence promotion rates, such as being in a tactical/operational career field.

In several cases, the data showed that promotion rates from O-4 through O-6 for several racial/ethnic minority groups were lower than the average. In particular,

---

<sup>1</sup> As described in Chapter Four, the military operates as a closed personnel system in that senior leaders cannot be brought in from the outside but are instead brought up through the lower ranks. Therefore, as previously noted, each stage of the military personnel life cycle—from who is recruited to who is promoted—is intricately linked to the composition of the future military leadership.

<sup>2</sup> Army and Air Force averages are based on data from FY 2007 to FY 2009, Navy and Coast Guard averages are based on data from FY 2007 to FY 2010, and Marine Corps averages are based on data from FY 2008 to FY 2010.

- In all the Services, black (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) officers' promotion rates were substantially lower than the pay grade–specific average promotion rates for their respective Services.
- Except in the Army, Hispanic officers' promotion rates were below the Service- and pay grade–specific averages. Across the Services, Hispanic officers tended to have higher promotion rates than black (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) officers.
- Officers from other race/ethnicity groups (i.e., Asians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Alaska natives, and individuals reporting more than one race) in each Service had substantially lower-than-average promotion rates to O-5. In the Air Force and Coast Guard, their promotion rates to O-4 were also below average.
- Female officers in the Navy and Coast Guard had substantially lower-than-average promotion rates to O-4 and O-5.

The Commission also examined demographic differences in flag/general officer promotion rates. However, discussion of flag/general officer promotion rates requires an important caveat: The racial/ethnic minority and female representation in the eligible populations for promotion to O-7, O-8, and O-9 can be very small. In those circumstances, a single promotion can cause a racial/ethnic minority or female promotion rate to change substantially. Therefore, flag/general officer promotion rates are provided for descriptive reference only. Overall, the data show that, in the period under review, the promotion rates of women to O-7 and O-8 roughly equaled the Service averages. This was also true of Asian/Pacific Islanders (except for promotions to O-8 in the Coast Guard). Although Hispanics had well-above-average promotion rates to O-7 in the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, the promotion rates of blacks (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) to this pay grade were below average for these Services. Finally, blacks (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) and Hispanics experienced very low promotion rates to O-8 in the Army and Marine Corps.

### **E-7 to E-9 Promotion Rates**

The Commission examined potential demographic differences in average promotion rates for AC senior noncommissioned officers (i.e., enlisted ranks E-7 through E-9). Overall, the data indicate that there were a few cases, especially in the Marine Corps, in which advancement differed by race/ethnicity or gender. However, below-average rates for racial/ethnic minority noncommissioned officers were not the widespread problem they were for officers. The key findings were that

- Black (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) marines had substantially lower-than-average promotion rates to E-7, E-8, and E-9.
- Hispanic Marines had promotion rates to E-7 and E-8 that were somewhat lower than average.
- Airmen from other race/ethnicity groups (i.e., Asians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Alaska natives, and individuals reporting more than one race) had a substantially lower-than-average promotion rate to E-9. Marines from these

other race/ethnicity groups had a promotion rate to E-7 that was somewhat below average.

- Female marines had a substantially lower-than-average promotion rate to E-9 but a higher-than-average promotion rate to E-7. Female soldiers had slightly below-average promotion rates to E-8 and E-9.

Thus, data on recent AC line officer promotion rates indicate that, overall, racial/ethnic minority officers had lower promotion rates than white officers for pay grades O-4 through O-6. With only a few exceptions—for example, Hispanic Army officers—this pattern appears to have held for all the Services and each race/ethnicity group. However, the gender differences for officers and the racial/ethnic or gender differences for enlisted servicemembers were more varied across both the Services and pay grades and thus do not signal the same widespread, persistent majority-minority gap.

## **The Officer Promotion Process**

It is hard to identify any single reason for or barrier that explains the lower promotion rates of racial/ethnic minorities and women in the military. The Commission did not have access to the required data to control for the effects of other variables when analyzing the rates presented above; however, the current rates tend to be similar to those found by past analyses that did control for factors other than race/ethnicity or gender (see Hosek et al., 2001). Because below-average officer promotion rates appear to be a widespread issue across several Services (rather than just one Service, as in the case of enlisted promotion rates), the Commission further explored the existence of institutional or individual bias in promotion selection boards, assignment histories, performance evaluations, and knowledge of the promotion process.

### **Promotion Selection Boards**

Overall, the Commission found that the promotion board process appears to be designed to be institutionally fair and to mitigate the effects of bias on the part of any individual board member. Selections are made not by a single individual but rather by multimember boards that are, to the extent possible, demographically representative of the pool of candidates. Furthermore, the guidance to these boards—delivered in the form of precepts, instructions, and laws—requires that selections be based on the needs of the Services and that they meet the best-and-fully-qualified criterion, without regard to race/ethnicity or gender.

### **Assignment Histories and Performance Evaluations**

The Commission explored the potential for unfairness in the inputs to the promotion process in terms of assignment histories and performance evaluations. For example, each functional community within each Service has a defined due-course career path describing the successive milestones that servicemembers need to achieve to be competitive for promotion to each rank. Because of the strict timing requirements of the

military promotion system, deviations from the due-course path can negatively affect an officer's competitiveness in the selection process. Similarly, bias in the performance evaluations an officer receives can influence the officer's competitiveness in the selection process.

To examine the potential for unfairness in these inputs to the promotion process, the Commission looked at survey data from several different sources. Overall, the survey data regarding servicemembers' perceptions of the fairness of both assignment opportunities and performance evaluations generated ambiguous results. According to the 2009 Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active-Duty Members (WEOA),<sup>3</sup> racial/ethnic minority servicemembers were more likely than whites to believe that race/ethnicity was a factor in both their assignments and their performance evaluations. In contrast, both the 2008 Status of Forces Survey (SOFS)<sup>4</sup> and a Commission supplement to the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS)<sup>5</sup> indicated that white and non-white servicemembers had similar perceptions about the fairness of these two "inputs." These two surveys did, however, find significant differences by gender: According to responses on both the SOFS and the DEOCS, women were less likely than men to agree that they received the assignments they needed to be competitive for promotion.

In addition, prior research by Hosek et al. (2001) examining differences in career progression for officers in the 1970s and 1980s found that a potential explanation for the lag in black officer career progression was that black officers were more likely to be given assignments that took them off the due-course career path. Although this research is dated, the findings are consistent with the Commissioners' more recent

<sup>3</sup> The survey targets active-duty members of the Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy who had completed at least six months of service at the time the survey was first fielded and were below flag/general officer rank. For the 2009 WEOA, data were collected predominantly via the web in February, March, and April 2009, and completed surveys (defined as those with at least half the survey questions answered) were received from 26,167 eligible respondents. The resulting sample of respondents was 72 percent enlisted and 28 percent officers and 84 percent DoD and 16 percent Coast Guard.

<sup>4</sup> The *Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members* is administered to DoD servicemembers three times a year; the Coast Guard does not participate in the SOFS. As with the WEOA, the target population is active-duty members who had completed at least six months of service and were below flag/general officer rank six months prior to data collection. Members of the National Guard and Reserve in active-duty programs were not eligible. The SOFS data used here were collected via the web between November 5 and December 19, 2008. A total of 10,435 eligible servicemembers returned usable surveys, again defined as those with at least half the questions answered. The final sample included 3,474 officers (33 percent), 6,303 enlisted servicemembers (61 percent), and 658 warrant officers (6 percent).

<sup>5</sup> The Commission added several sets of questions to learn about servicemembers' perceptions of various aspects of the promotion system, and its questions were fielded during March 2010. During this period, a total of 2,196 servicemembers completed the survey, with 2,004 respondents providing usable information. The sample includes AC and RC servicemembers, but the RC sample was too small to allow for separate analysis by demographic group. Relevant shares of the final sample were 87 percent enlisted personnel, 12 percent officers, 1 percent warrant officers, and 60 percent white non-Hispanic. It is important to note that the DEOCS sample is much smaller than the WEOA and SOFS samples, and the DEOCS sample was collected without the use of any particular sampling methodology. Therefore, it is less likely to have been representative of the population of servicemembers as a whole.

experience in their Services. Furthermore, although the 2001 study by Hosek et al. and an OSD report based on the study's early findings (Gilroy et al., 1999) recommended that DoD conduct further research to determine whether black officers' promotion rates were indeed hampered by recruiting- and EO-related deviations from the due-course career path, the Commission was unable to find any indication that this recommendation was ever implemented.

## Knowledge of the Promotion Process

Finally, the Commission explored the extent to which servicemembers felt they had adequate knowledge of the promotion process. Overall, the Services reported using multiple approaches to educate servicemembers about how to be successful in general and about the promotion system in particular. These approaches include formal seminars, formal and informal mentoring, and the establishment of websites that provide general and community-specific information about key career milestones and due-course career paths. However, the Commission also found that no Service is systematically evaluating the effectiveness of these tools, either overall or for different demographic groups.

## Improve Transparency So That Servicemembers Understand Performance Expectations, Promotion Criteria, and Processes

### *Recommendation 10—*

*DoD, the Services, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, must ensure that there is transparency throughout their promotion systems so that servicemembers may better understand performance expectations and promotion criteria and processes. To do this, they*

- *a. Must specify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential necessary to be an effective flag/general officer or senior noncommissioned officer.*
- *b. Shall formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star officer selection in DoD Instruction 1320.4.*
- *c. Shall educate and counsel all servicemembers on the importance of, and their responsibility for, a complete promotion board packet.*

This recommendation calls for making the promotion system as transparent as possible to ensure that all servicemembers have adequate and equal knowledge in their efforts to proactively manage their own careers. Although the Commission did not have data for the RC with which to assess demographic differences in promotion rates or perceptions of the fairness of the RC promotion process, these recommendations should also help improve promotion opportunities for RC servicemembers. To implement this recommendation, the Commission proposes three strategies.



## Specify the Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Potential Necessary to Be an Effective Flag/General Officer or Senior Noncommissioned Officer

Many have noted that future leaders in the officer corps will require a greater mix of knowledge, skills, and abilities in order to be effective in changing operational environments. This claim is supported by changes that have already occurred as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and against Al-Qaeda and its Violent Extremist Affiliates and by forecasts of needed competencies that have been laid out in such reports as the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. For example, many of the forecasts suggest a greater need for foreign-language, regional, and cultural expertise as well as improved expertise in cyber warfare. Although the demand for these skills is growing, in terms of career advancement, it is often risky for servicemembers to deviate from traditional career paths if they seek to reach the highest ranks of the military.

As previously discussed, research shows that the majority of flag/general officers are drawn from tactical/operational occupations. Although there are positions that must be filled by an officer from a tactical/operational occupation, there are other flag/general officer positions that do not require the knowledge, experience, skills, and abilities of an officer in a tactical/operational occupation. The experiences of some Commissioners suggest, for example, that key leadership positions in combat support and combat service support organizations are slated for combat arms officers instead of officers who have spent their entire careers in combat support and combat service support positions. This tendency to slate key flag/general officer positions for those in tactical/operational occupations limits the ability of officers in other occupations to fill key assignments that would increase their likelihood of further promotion.

[W]hen I became an armor officer, supposed to be qualified with tanks and all of those kinds of things, I have never fired a tank on a tank range. I have never gone down range in any part of a tank, and yet I commanded an armor brigade with two tank battalions and an infantry battalion. When I went into combat in Vietnam, I had never been in a cavalry unit, yet I commanded an airborne cavalry unit. When I took command of a division that was converted to an armored division, I had never been on a tank range in a tank, so someone saw something in what I could do. . . . [W]e ought to keep that in mind . . . I don't think we want to deny a person an opportunity when they may not be "qualified." It depends on how you define being qualified.

—Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr.,  
remarks to the Commission, 2011

Therefore, the Commission encourages a change to a more flexible officer career development system that starts with core competencies and progresses to a broader range of skills as the officer becomes more senior. In the short term, based on the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential required for senior leadership positions, the

Services should give consideration, where appropriate, to a wider range of officers. This approach may increase promotion opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities and women who would otherwise not be considered for more-senior levels of advancement.

## Formalize the Process and Requirements for 3- and 4-Star Selection

DoD Instruction 1320.4 contains some information on O-7 to O-8 and O-9 to O-10 promotions, but it lacks an overview of the entire process. Therefore, the Commission

recommends that the selection process for flag/general officers from ranks O-7 through O-10 be made transparent through description and documentation in DoD Instruction 1320.4, *Military Officer Actions Requiring Approval of the Secretary of Defense or the President, or Confirmation by the Senate*, which outlines the current promotion policy.

### **Educate and Counsel All Servicemembers on the Importance of, and Their Responsibility for, a Complete Promotion Board Packet**

As part of their educational efforts, the Services already provide officers with some instruction on how to construct a complete promotion packet in preparation for being evaluated by a promotion board. With this recommendation, the Commission calls out this fundamental step as necessary to ensuring that the promotion system works minimally well for all officers. This is a simple procedural step that, if not done properly, could decrease a servicemember's chances of promotion. The Services should ensure that education on constructing complete promotion packets is effective and that it reaches all servicemembers equally.

In addition to recommending improvements to the transparency of the promotion process, the Commission also makes a recommendation, described immediately below, to address potential unfairness in the inputs (i.e., assignment histories and performance evaluations) to the promotion process.

### **Ensure That Promotion Board Precepts Provide Guidance on How to Value Service-Directed Special Assignments Outside Normal Career Paths or Fields**

#### *Recommendation 11—*

*The Services shall ensure that promotion board precepts provide guidance regarding Service-directed special assignments outside normal career paths and/or fields. As appropriate, senior raters' evaluations shall acknowledge when a servicemember has deviated from the due-course path at the specific request of his or her leadership.*

Although the Commission was not able to conduct a systematic analysis of officer assignment patterns across the Services, there is some indication that officers who are members of demographically underrepresented groups are disproportionately diverted from their due-course career paths to fill recruiting and EO assignments, thus making them less competitive for promotion. This result is mainly supported by the Commissioners' collective wisdom and a study by Hosek et al. (2001). Acknowledging that this pattern has not been confirmed, the Commission feels strongly that officers should not be penalized for helping their Services execute their diversity efforts: It is not only unfair to the officers but also detrimental to the Services' demographic diversity goals. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Services ensure that promotion board precepts provide guidance to board members on how to value Service-directed assignments that take officers off the due-course path and recommends that, when possible,



performance evaluations note whether a candidate has taken an unusual assignment at the request of his or her leadership.

Although the main motivation for this recommendation is to eliminate institutional bias that might contribute to the promotion gap between racial/ethnic minority and white officers, the wording is intentionally general, referring to any Service-directed assignment that falls outside the community norm. This wording reflects the Commission's position that diversity encompasses many kinds of human difference and contributes to mission capability. In particular, diversity of experience, potentially reflected in deviations from the due-course path, is expected to be of extra value in the context of changing warfighting environments and in the development of new doctrine. Indeed, the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may already be changing the Services' ideas about what is considered a "key" assignment. The recent *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, for example, highlights the need to build expertise in foreign-language, regional, and cultural skills (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). These changes mean that promotion boards must be open to nontraditional assignment histories until due-course career paths can be reevaluated.

## CHAPTER NINE

# RETENTION

---

Because career progression depends on the ability to retain as well as promote servicemembers, it is important to examine whether there are demographic differences in who chooses to remain in and who chooses to separate from military service. It is also important to identify potential barriers that influence demographic differences in retention.

To calculate the retention behavior of different demographic groups for the AC, the Commission accessed records from FY 2000–FY 2008 from the Proxy Personnel Tempo files provided by DMDC and from information provided separately by the Coast Guard. For the RC, the Commission accessed records from FY 2004–FY 2009 from the Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System files provided by DMDC.<sup>1</sup> For the AC, the Commission calculated reenlistment rates based on those servicemembers who were eligible (i.e., who had completed at least 17 months of service) both to voluntarily leave active-duty service and to reenlist. Officer retention was based on continuation rates of officers, which are calculated as the percentage of officers in the same Service observed at year  $t$  and again at year  $t + 1$ .<sup>2</sup> For the RC, retention for both enlisted servicemembers and officers was calculated based on continuation rates.

## Retention of Racial/Ethnic Minorities

### Active Component Retention

Among AC enlisted servicemembers, the reenlistment rates of non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islanders were higher than those of whites and members of other races or ethnicities (i.e., American Indians, Alaska Natives,

---

<sup>1</sup> The data focus specifically on the Selected Reserve.

<sup>2</sup> These continuation rates do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separation. Differences in personnel management in the enlisted and officer communities led the Commission to focus on reenlistment rates among active-duty enlisted servicemembers and on continuation rates among active-duty officers. Enlisted servicemembers enlist for a set period of time and, after the completion of that term of service, must decide either to leave or to reenlist for another term. If the servicemember chooses to stay, another stay/leave decision must be made at the end of the second service obligation, and so on. Therefore, retention behavior among enlisted servicemembers can be studied at the time of a decision point using reenlistment rates. In contrast, officers are free to leave active-duty service at any point after an initial obligation period and do not have to make specific recommitment decisions at any particular point. Therefore, retention behavior among officers is usually measured through continuation rates.

and individuals of more than one race). This pattern was consistent across all Services. However, the gap in reenlistment rates shrank as time in service increased.

For AC officers, on average, non-Hispanic black and Hispanic officers had cumulative continuation rates that were greater than or equal to whites' rates at every year-of-service point. Specifically, after the fourth year of service, non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics had consistently higher rates of continuation than both whites and members of other racial/ethnic minority groups. Until 20 years of service, when differences in retention begin to taper, the differences between non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and whites became more pronounced as years of service increased. The one exception to this trend is found in the Air Force, where non-Hispanic blacks consistently had lower continuation rates than whites until year 20, at which point the gap began to close. The retention rates for other racial/ethnic minority officer groups are more complicated because the rates varied according to Service. On average, the rates of non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islanders and members of other minority races/ethnicities (i.e., American Indians, Alaska Natives, and individuals of more than one race) were less than or equal to the rates of whites. Thus, for both the AC enlisted and AC officer corps, racial/ethnic minorities were, overall, more than or equally as likely as whites to remain in service.

### **Reserve Component Retention**

Among RC enlisted servicemembers, average continuation rates varied somewhat across Service components and years of service. However, overall, non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islanders and Hispanics had higher average continuation rates than whites. On the other hand, non-Hispanic blacks and, in some Services, members of other minority races/ethnicities (i.e., American Indians, Alaska Natives, individuals of more than one race, and those of unknown race) had significantly lower average continuation rates than whites. However, the lower continuation rates of non-Hispanic blacks and members of other minority races/ethnicities (i.e., American Indians, Alaska Natives, individuals of more than one race, and those of unknown race) were small, ranging from only a 1- to 4-percentage-point difference.

Among officers in the RC, average continuation rates also varied somewhat across Service components and years of service. Overall, though, the continuation rates of racial/ethnic minorities were higher than or the same as the rates of whites. The only exceptions to this pattern were non-Hispanic blacks in the Air Force Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Navy Reserve and non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islanders in the Coast Guard Reserve. Again, these differences in promotion rates were relatively small, ranging from only a 1- to 4-percentage-point difference.

## **Retention of Women**

### **Active Component Retention**

Examining retention among AC enlisted servicemembers, the Commission found that, across the Services, women were less likely than men to remain in service. There

are two notable exceptions: In the Air Force, women's reenlistment rates early on in their careers (between 17 months and six years of active service) were higher than men's during the mid-2000s. Similarly, men and women had very comparable reenlistment rates earlier on in their careers in the Marine Corps.

Similarly, female officers across the Services were less likely to be retained than male officers. During the first three years of service as an officer, men and women displayed similar continuation rates. However, by the time officers had completed their fourth year of service, differences between male and female continuation rates began to emerge and to increase with years of service through roughly years 8 to 12. By the tenth year of service, the percentage-point difference between male and female officer cumulative continuation rates was 10 in the Army, 15 in the Navy, and 20 in both the Marine Corps and Air Force. In other words, although both male and female officers separated from the military as years of service increased, female officers separated at higher rates during the period under consideration. This difference in later years is likely the result of retention rather than promotion because it occurs before the first competitive promotion point. However, after 20 years of service, the gender gap begins to narrow again, with a difference of less than 5 percentage points by 30 years of service. Thus, overall for both the AC enlisted and officer corps, women were less likely than men to remain in service.

### **Reserve Component Retention**

Women enlisted in the RC, no matter what the Service, were less likely than men to remain in service. Furthermore, continuation rates for women generally remained below those of their male counterparts across years of service, with only some increase in retention past 20 years of service.<sup>3</sup>

As in the case of enlisted trends, data on RC officer continuation rates show that, across all the Services, women were less likely than men to remain in service. In general, female continuation rates were lower than male rates until roughly ten years of service. Female continuation rates then rose above those of their male counterparts between ten and 20 years of service and then dropped back down below the rates of men after 20 years of service. Thus, overall, for both the RC enlisted and RC officer corps, women were less likely than men to remain in service.

### **Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Military Life**

Although there were small differences in the retention rates of racial/ethnic minorities compared with those of whites, particularly in the RC, the largest gap in retention rates was between men and women. To explore why this gender gap in retention exists, the Commission examined potential differences in servicemembers' attitudes toward military life. Using data from the DMDC's November 2008 SOFS (found at Defense

---

<sup>3</sup> RC servicemembers may have had prior service time in the AC before joining the RC. Therefore, the Commission uses the Years of Service Pay Entry Base Date as a measure of years of service rather than years of service in the RC. This Years of Service Pay Entry Base Date metric measures years of service from the time a servicemember first joins the Armed Forces.

Manpower Data Center, 2010c), the Commission assessed whether there were gender differences in satisfaction with military life, organizational commitment, and retention intentions.<sup>4</sup>

In the AC, female enlisted servicemembers were as likely as their male counterparts in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps both to be satisfied with the military way of life and to report that they intended to remain in the Armed Forces. Similarly, in the AC Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, female officers were as likely as their male counterparts both to be satisfied with the military way of life and to report that they intended to remain in the Armed Forces. There was an exception in the case of female Army officers, who, compared with their male counterparts, reported being less satisfied with the military and less likely to stay. Consistent with the AC, female servicemembers in the RC were as likely as their male counterparts to report that they were satisfied with the military way of life and that they intended to remain in the Armed Forces.

However, the results also showed that AC enlisted female soldiers and sailors were less likely than their male counterparts to report that they saw the military as a career. Similarly, across all four DoD Services, female AC officers were less likely than their male counterparts to report that they saw the military as a career. The Commission did not have data on RC servicemember attitudes toward a military career.

Finally, through the DEOCS, the Commission gathered additional AC data on potential reasons for leaving military service.<sup>5</sup> Overall, the results from the DEOCS suggest that men and women cited similar reasons for leaving active duty. Both genders reported dissatisfaction with their job, low pay, and lack of promotion or advancement opportunities as reasons for leaving. For male officers, the most frequently cited

---

<sup>4</sup> The AC sample consisted of 37,494 servicemembers of the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy who had completed at least six months of service and were below flag/general officer rank six months prior to data collection. A total of 10,435 eligible servicemembers returned usable surveys (3,474 officers, 6,303 enlisted servicemembers, and 658 warrant officers). The RC sample included responses from the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. The Coast Guard does not participate in the SOFS.

<sup>5</sup> Survey data were collected in two periods during February–March and May 2010. Although a total of 3,419 servicemembers completed the survey during this period, the Commission focused its attention on the 1,111 AC officers and enlisted servicemembers who reported that they either were leaving at the end of their current obligation ( $n = 592$ ) or were not sure whether they were leaving at the end of their current obligation ( $n = 519$ ) and whose responses were not missing data on race/ethnicity, gender, branch of Service, or rank.

Just over half of the servicemembers in the analytic sample were in the Army (616), and roughly one-third were in the Navy (315). The rest were spread throughout the Marine Corps (87), Coast Guard (70), and Air Force (23). The distribution of respondents across Services reflects differences in how each of the Services uses the DEOCS. The DEOCS is typically not used by the Air Force, which relies on its own internal climate survey. Therefore, it is likely that the Air Force respondents in the sample were in a cross-Service command. In the Navy and Marine Corps, unit participation in the DEOCS is required within 90 days of a new commander taking command and every year thereafter. The Army has its own climate survey that must be administered to units within 90 days of a new commander taking command, but the DEOCS is also available to commanders who choose to use it. The Coast Guard requires administration of the DEOCS to each unit annually, as long as the unit contains at least 16 servicemembers. In general, DEOMI does not generate a DEOCS report unless at least 16 assigned personnel complete the survey.

reason for leaving was failure to be promoted. Although there were fewer female officer responses to analyze, the high frequency of deployments and the desire to settle in one location were both listed as primary motivations for separating. Among male enlisted servicemembers, low pay and low allowances was the most frequently cited reason for leaving; among female enlisted servicemembers, involuntary separation or ineligibility to reenlist was the most frequently cited reason. Overall, however, none of the data points to a single reason or single set of reasons that can explain why women haven't chosen to leave military service at higher rates than men.

## **DACOWITS Should Expand Its Focus to Include an Explanation of the Gender Gap in Retention**

### *Recommendation 12—*

*Where appropriate, DACOWITS should expand its current focus on retention to include an explanation of the gender gap in retention. As part of this renewed focus, DACOWITS should examine the effects of retention programs, such as the sabbatical programs currently offered by the Navy and the Coast Guard as well as any other innovative Service-specific approaches to retention. Findings and recommendations from this research should be presented to the Secretary of Defense.*

Because the data do not clearly indicate why more women leave service earlier and at greater rates than men, the Commission recommends that the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) expand its current focus on retention to examine the gender gap in retention. This examination should also explore why women are less likely to view the military as a career and should help to identify existing policies and practices that may effectively decrease the retention gap between men and women.

The Commission also suggests that DACOWITS examine the effectiveness of a number of sabbatical programs. All the Services currently offer a number of these programs to enhance retention among their servicemembers. However, because the law prohibits the award of benefits to individuals solely based on gender, designing retention programs specifically aimed at women is challenging. Thus, retention outcomes related to three potentially effective, and legal, sabbatical programs should be more fully explored.

In FY 2009, the Navy began to conduct a pilot program, the Career Intermision Pilot Program, to encourage retention through enhanced career flexibility. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 allows 20 officers and 20 enlisted members in each Service to participate in the program each year. The program, which is open to both men and women, allows officers and enlisted personnel to temporarily (for up to three years) take time off from active duty. Participants in the program transition from the AC to the Individual Ready Reserve during this period. Although those who participate in a career intermission do not receive active-duty pay or allowances, they do retain medical and dental care benefits and continued access to

commissaries, exchanges, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs. Servicemembers incur an additional active-duty service obligation of two months for every month of participation in this career intermission. Upon their return to active duty, participants return at the same rank they held upon entering the program.

The Coast Guard has two sabbatical programs worthy of exploring. The first, Care for Newborn Children, and the second, Temporary Separation Program, are restricted to individuals who are at the rank of E-4/O-3 or above. To qualify for Care for Newborn Children, at least four years of active-duty service in the Coast Guard are required; six years are required to qualify for the Temporary Separation Program. Both programs allow for up to a 24-month absence, and the servicemember receives no pay or benefits while away. Upon return, individuals are reinstated at the same rank they held upon leaving, assuming that they meet physical fitness requirements and return within two years. Servicemembers may take advantage of one sabbatical, but not both.

The Commission suggests that DACOWITS examine the available data on these leave programs as well as other innovative Service programs and assess the effect of their expansion on female retention. The Commission also recommends that DACOWITS disseminate the findings and recommendations from its review to a wide audience, including the Secretary of Defense. This can help facilitate the use of successful retention practices that close the gender gap across Services.



# GOING BEYOND RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER

---

Although the majority of Chapters Four through Nine has focused on increasing racial/ethnic and female representation within senior military leadership, the Commission also recommends tracking and improving other aspects of diversity within the military.

## **DoD and the Services Must Better Manage Personnel with Mission-Critical Skill Sets**

### *Recommendation 13—*

***DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise and continue to track language expertise upon military accession and throughout servicemembers' careers in order to better manage personnel with mission-critical skill sets.***

As noted in the recent *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, DoD needs to build regional, cultural, and foreign-language expertise in order to prepare for future security needs (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). Given that no one can predict where the next conflict might be and what future regional expertise would be needed, it is prudent to track all language and cultural expertise, not just that specified by the current *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, throughout servicemembers' careers.

In addition, certain RC civilian expertise can be a critical aid to missions. RC personnel may, via their civilian careers and other experiences, possess skills that are in high demand in the military. Some of these skills, such as regional, cultural, and language expertise, are linked with demographic diversity. Others, such as those related to science and technology, go beyond demographics. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services codify and track civilian expertise that is deemed mission critical.

A mechanism that could be used to track relevant RC civilian expertise is the Civilian Employment Information program, which requires each member of the Ready Reserve to report employment status, employer's name and address, civilian job title, and years of experience in current civilian occupation. This information is stored in the Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System. This program could be expanded to collect information on servicemember skills, including regional, cultural,



language, technical, and scientific expertise. This information would then be available to commanders looking for servicemembers with specific skill sets.

## **DoD Must Promote Structural Diversity, Total Force Integration, and Overall Retention**

### *Recommendation 14—*

*To promote structural diversity, total force integration, and overall retention,*

- *a. DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting transition between Active and Reserve Components and internal Reserve Component transition protocols.*
- *b. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must assess how Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain operational experience and fulfill joint requirements within the constraints of their dual military/civilian lives and take action as appropriate.*

### **Improve the Personnel and Finance Systems Affecting Transition Between Active and Reserve Components and Internal Reserve Component Transition Protocols**

Personnel leaving the AC are valuable resources for the RC, but the current process for transitioning from the Active Duty List to the Reserve Active Status List is lengthy and inefficient. On average, it takes one to six months to transition from the AC to the RC. To encourage servicemembers to join the RC rather than leave the military, DoD needs to improve personnel and pay systems to facilitate the transition. For example, many steps in this process could be made more efficient through automation and better interfaces between personnel and financial (i.e., pay) systems across the Services. These improvements could include automatic checks and balances wherever possible, real-time updated billet availability for assignment approvals, and close-to-real-time transitions between personnel and pay systems across the Services. Overall, streamlining this process would give the RC access to a broader talent pool by making it easier for a servicemember leaving the AC to join the RC.

Additionally, flexible service opportunities, such as seamless transition within the RC, have the potential to improve structural integration within the RC. The force structure constraints of one RC Service may limit promotion opportunities for some qualified servicemembers; however, another RC Service may not have the same constraints. By moving from one RC Service to another, servicemembers can take advantage of a wider variety of promotion opportunities.

### **Assess How RC Members Can More Effectively Gain Operational Experience and Fulfill Joint Requirements**

Joint requirements are currently not aligned with the career path of traditional drilling reservists in the National Guard and Reserve. Unlike their AC counterparts, RC ser-

vicemembers must meet their military educational and operational requirements without detriment to or neglect of their civilian occupations. In addition, their window of opportunity to gain operational experience and credibility in their primary area of concentration and to complete a joint assignment is particularly narrow; thus, these two career milestones are often mutually exclusive. As a result, because they may lack joint qualifications or because they missed out on key operational assignments, many traditional RC servicemembers become uncompetitive for flag/general officer consideration.

To address this issue, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services implement policy that provides flexible opportunities for officers to become joint-qualified to accommodate the constraints and requirements of the RC career path. In particular, the Services should provide mechanisms for officers to acquire both joint and operational experience, at the appropriate rank, and they should provide enough education slots so that all qualified National Guard and Reserve servicemembers can complete their joint professional military education and other education requirements in a timely fashion.

The purpose of this recommendation is to promote a highly qualified RC officer corps that can effectively compete for the highest ranks in the military. The Commission believes that this can add to the structural diversity of the upper ranks by ensuring that traditional reservists are qualified to be promoted to the highest ranks.

## Conclusion

The chapters in this section outlined how specific stages of the military personnel life cycle and related structural and perceptual barriers influence the diversity of future military leaders. In an effort to improve the career progression of racial/ethnic minorities and women at each stage, the Commission made detailed recommendations to address key barriers.

Through partnerships and outreach programs, DoD and the Services can attempt to address current eligibility issues. Improved recruiting efforts focused on members of underrepresented demographic groups can then help improve the demographic diversity of initial accessions. The removal of combat exclusion policies for women and further development of effective mentoring efforts can create opportunities for, and educate servicemembers regarding the importance of, career field selection and key assignments to career advancement. Ensuring that the promotion process is transparent and fair can then help ensure that members of all demographic groups receive opportunities for advancement. Further research into the current gender gap in retention can lead to changes that ensure that there is a demographically diverse pool of candidates for promotion. Finally, going beyond demographics, other important diversity dimensions, such as language skills, cultural expertise, and the structural diversity brought by the RC, should be promoted within the Services. Taken together, these recommendations can help develop and sustain a talented military leadership that truly represents the face of America.



---

## **SECTION IV: ENSURING CONTINUED PROGRESS**

---



# MANAGING AND SUSTAINING DIVERSITY

---

So far, this report has suggested a new definition of diversity, proposed that diversity leadership be a core competency in the Services, and recommended ways that barriers to career advancement can be reduced at all stages of a military career both for under-represented demographic groups and for people with desirable backgrounds and skill sets. These changes, however, cannot be managed and sustained without developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement to ensure continued progress toward greater diversity at all ranks of the military.

This chapter highlights the priorities in these areas and makes recommendations to address them. It begins with the need for a management system with oversight from a Chief Diversity Officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. It then identifies the need for strategic diversity planning, new policies, and metrics for measuring progress across the Services and within DoD. Finally, it describes the importance of holding leaders accountable for progress toward achieving a military workforce that is not only diverse demographically but also inclusive of all the characteristics required for high performance in the future.

## Priority: Aligning the Organizational Structure to Support an Effective Diversity Management System

Currently, responsibility for diversity management in OSD is assigned to the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO). This office is charged with promoting EO throughout DoD and overseeing diversity policy for DoD, including coordinating the diversity efforts of the Services. The diversity mission was an added function initiated by ODMEO leadership to help DoD incorporate diversity management practices and processes into its workforce management culture.

ODMEO grew out of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary (EO) (DUSD(EO)), which was established under the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). DUSD(EO) was established in 2003, when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for EO was elevated to the position of DUSD(EO) and the position was filled by a

In addition to the CEO's leadership, responsibility for diversity in "best-practice" companies is seen as a line-management responsibility, not as a Human Resources . . . staff program or initiative.

—Defense Business Board Task Group  
on Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag  
and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004

political appointee. When that political appointee departed in 2006, the Office of the DUSD(EO) was renamed ODMEIO and placed under the Deputy Under Secretary (Plans). On one hand, this realignment mainstreamed diversity and EO by integrating responsibility for these functions into the established organization responsible for “developing and implementing change in high priority areas within Personnel and Readiness” (Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2006). On the other hand, this change dealt two blows: demotion in status and loss of a political

I think . . . this office has been diluted, has been moved down in a food chain to a point where there is no punch. Taking away the Deputy Assistant Secretary position, burying them five dead letters down in an organization is not the answer.

—The Honorable D. Michael Collins,  
remarks to the Commission, 2010

appointee position to set and carry out the agenda (Haughton, 2010). In 2010, the position of Deputy Under Secretary (Plans) was eliminated, and ODMEIO was placed under the Deputy Under Secretary (Readiness).

For some time, then, ODMEIO has been isolated from top leadership and unable to set the agenda or drive progress.

Although several key diversity initiatives have been undertaken, the diversity management function of ODMEIO’s portfolio has been slow to develop (Johnson, 2011).<sup>1</sup> Today, ODMEIO remains an understaffed office several levels below the Secretary of Defense. In the military departments and the Services, the placement of—and funding and staffing for—the diversity offices varies considerably.

The Commission looked to industry to see how companies with exemplary diversity programs approach and organize for effective diversity management. The Commission found that the personal engagement of top leadership is the single most important factor in achieving diversity leadership and inclusion across any organization. In corporations, personal engagement from the CEO has been shown to be vital. In the U.S. military, the Secretary of Defense is analogous to the corporate CEO and, as such, should be responsible for pushing DoD forward on the path to inclusion. He and his successors will, however, need help and continuity to enforce new policies and ensure that progress continues to be made. *The Commission believes that a systems approach is needed to ensure the sustained emphasis on diversity that has been lacking in the past. Within that system, the establishment of a Chief Diversity Officer (CDO)—a practice common to all the diversity exemplars studied—is the key driver toward embedding diversity within the “DNA” of DoD.*

<sup>1</sup> ODMEIO’s accomplishments include sponsoring a diversity summit, establishing the Defense Diversity Working Group, and promulgating DoDD 1020.02, *Diversity Management, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Military Equal Opportunity in the Department of Defense* (Issue Paper #7; Issue Paper #20; Lim et al., 2009).

## Establish the Position of Chief Diversity Officer

### *Recommendation 15—*

***The Office of the Secretary of Defense organizational structure must be aligned to ensure a sustained focus on diversity and diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the position of a Chief Diversity Officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.***

- ***The existing Research & Analysis office should be directed and resourced to support the Chief Diversity Officer.***
- ***Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures that support DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard diversity leadership efforts.***

In the corporate world, the CDO does not have operational authority per se but depends on others for execution of diversity initiatives. Thus, he or she is a strategic business partner of others in the executive team, “helping them develop strategy for their business units and making sure that they understand what the organization is doing and why, how results are measured, who is accountable” (Dexter, 2010).

The Commission recommends that the DoD CDO report directly to the Secretary of Defense and receive support from the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), who is analogous to a vice president of human resources. This practice is one way of ensuring that diversity management is embraced as a “line” rather than “staff” responsibility. In addition, this reporting relationship supports the goal of establishing diversity leadership as the CEO’s responsibility. It is also consistent with military staff organizations, which typically have a small number of individuals with responsibilities of such importance (e.g., safety) that the commander keeps them close.

The CDO cannot work in isolation, however. *An integrated, holistic system for implementation and accountability is needed if progress is to be sustained.* Figure 11.1 illustrates such an approach and reveals the centrality of the CDO to all facets of the system.

This proposed diversity management system is a set of mutually reinforcing elements that work together to provide effective, consistent implementation and persistent accountability for achieving the goals of diversity and inclusion. Note that all of these components have counterparts in best practices in the Services, the corporate world, or both. The components are

- *Accountability reviews.* The Secretary of Defense meets annually with the leadership of each Service to go over progress toward diversity goals (see Recommendation 17). This prepares him or her for the diversity annual report to Congress.
- *The diversity annual report to Congress.* Called for in Recommendation 5, this report from the Secretary of Defense draws on the Services’ accountability reviews to review DoD’s progress toward its overarching diversity goals.
- *The early warning/inspector general function.* The set of activities undertaken by the CDO together provides the information needed to alert the Secretary of Defense to potential problems with diversity management progress, programs, or practices.



**Figure 11.1. The Centrality of the CDO Within the Proposed Diversity Management System**



- *The Diversity Policy Integration Group.* The CDO, acting as a strategic business partner, chairs a diversity policy integration group, through which OSD's policy offices take responsibility for implementation of diversity initiatives within their domains.<sup>2</sup>
- *Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG) "Diversity Days."* The DAWG, the existing senior DoD leadership forum, follows up in a regular meeting on overarching diversity issues (see Recommendation 19).
- *Expanded DACOWITS special studies.* DACOWITS expands the scope of its work to provide external oversight and special studies focused on the diversity issues of the day (see Recommendation 19).
- *CDO supervision of the Research & Analysis office.* The Research & Analysis office provides support for accountability reviews, the diversity annual report to Congress, barrier analyses, and early warning of systemic diversity issues.

### Provide the CDO with Research and Analysis Support

For the CDO to be effective, he or she needs timely, accurate, insightful research and analysis based on objective, standardized data. In its effort to provide recommendations that are executable, the Commission recommends that the CDO turn to the existing Research & Analysis office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Per-

<sup>2</sup> This group would provide the CDO with access to policy offices that have not traditionally been involved with diversity, and it would ensure the implementation of diversity initiatives, using a "mainstreaming" approach to infuse a diversity perspective across the organization. Implementation of diversity initiatives would be carried out by the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)'s "line" organizations (Reserve Affairs, Civilian Personnel Policy, Military Personnel Policy, and Readiness) and, ultimately, by the Services.

sonnel and Readiness).<sup>3</sup> This office must be properly resourced to support the many data and analysis requirements needed throughout the system, including accountability reviews, barrier analyses (see Recommendation 18), the diversity annual report to Congress, early warning of systemic diversity issues, the DAWG “Diversity Days,” and the expanded DACOWITS special studies.

### **Chief, National Guard Bureau, Must Reinforce Ongoing Efforts to Promote Diversity**

The unique features of the National Guard require specific attention in terms of implementation and accountability.<sup>4</sup> As codified in Title 10, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard and Reserve when called to active duty. Most of the time, however, the National Guard is not on active duty and, therefore, not under federal control.

As explained in Chapter Three, Title 32 assigns command of State National Guard units to the Governors of the States when the units are not under federal control. As commander in chief, the Governors select the Adjutant General for their States. Title 10 and Title 32 effectively indicate that Chief, National Guard Bureau, has no command authority over each State’s National Guard.

Given these governing laws, the National Guard has a very different command and control structure from that of the AC. The fact that National Guard members report to their State’s Governor as commander in chief means that policies are often State-specific and lack national oversight. In September 2009, the National Guard Bureau established the position of Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity. This “diversity office” has a single position, has no annual budget, and reports to the Comptroller and Director of Administration and Management for the National Guard Bureau. Thus, the current diversity office is not staffed, resourced, or placed appropriately in the organizational chart to influence policy or promote accountability, and top leaders are not involved.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> To ensure broad knowledge of workforce issues, the Research & Analysis office should become a truly joint organization by including expert researchers from the major personnel centers of the Services. These Services’ analysts could serve at Research & Analysis on a rotational basis. Such a program would institutionalize knowledge sharing among the Services and OSD. Additional expertise could be provided by diversity experts at the federally funded research and development centers. This talent base should serve as an advisory team to support the CDO and the Research & Analysis office.

<sup>4</sup> Because the major recommendations include the RC through each parent Service, the focus here is on the National Guard.

<sup>5</sup> The role of the Special Assistant for Diversity is to provide diversity policy for the entire National Guard. The Army and Air National Guard offices are responsible for supporting these policies in each of the states. The Army National Guard has a national diversity office and a diversity coordinator in each State. As of this writing, the Air National Guard planned to stand up a diversity office in January 2011, and it has a Human Resource Advisor in each State. However, these offices do not report directly to the National Guard Bureau’s diversity office and are not obligated to advocate national diversity policy. Thus, much of the intended impact of this office is curtailed because it lacks direct implementation power. Given these limitations, good com-

Chief, National Guard Bureau, could take several steps to make the diversity office more effective. As with the Commission's recommendation to establish a CDO who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity should report directly to the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to maximize leadership visibility and involvement. In addition, this office should be properly staffed and resourced to support the policy objectives of the leadership.

A properly resourced diversity office within the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Personal Staff organization can act as the center of communication between the National Guard Bureau and OSD. It can also distribute policy and information to the Air and Army National Guard from the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Personal Staff position. These changes to reporting and resources will increase the ability of the Special Assistant for Diversity to influence National Guard Bureau diversity policy and its implementation.

### **Priority: Developing Strategic Plans, Policies, and Metrics for a Diversity Management System**

The CDO will need a solid foundation on which to build. First, to be effective and practical, the diversity management system must function within the framework of an overall DoD strategic plan that publicly states a diversity definition, vision, and goals for DoD. But individual Services need their own strategic plans for achieving diversity. Currently, only two Services have such plans: the Air Force and the Coast Guard. The release of the Air Force plan was announced during the writing of this report and was therefore not evaluated. The Coast Guard's plan has objectives, milestones, and metrics. Its focus, however, is primarily racial/ethnic and gender diversity, which is not consistent with the Coast Guard's broad definition of diversity. The other Services have pieces of plans, but they have not been synthesized and promulgated and do not provide detailed, coordinated strategies for achieving the diversity visions. Similarly, roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability have not been addressed in any coordinated fashion. Finally, DoD has a diversity policy (DoDD 1020.02), but no strategic plan.

Second, to support the strategic plan, DoD, the military departments, and the Services need a strong set of policies that spells out roles, assigns and aligns responsibilities and authorities, and specifies who is accountable. In addition, to compel progress toward the goals identified in the strategic plan, the Secretary of Defense needs to define a set of strategic metrics that are (1) directly linked to key organizational priorities and goals, (2) actionable, and (3) actively used to drive improvement.

In the area of EO, DoD had in place a number of directives and other policy statements, last revised in the 1990s. Together, these provided a rigorous accountability system designed to ensure the continuation of DoD's pioneering past. These documents included the following mandates:

---

munication about the importance of the message and support for implementing the policy are key elements for successful implementation of national policy in the States, territories, and District of Columbia.

- the DoD Human Goals Charter, part of DoD’s EEO policy for civilian employees, to be reissued by each new Secretary of Defense
- the Military Equal Opportunity Assessment, to be compiled annually from reports and data submitted by the Services
- the Defense Equal Opportunity Council, consisting of DoD’s top leadership, to promulgate policy and track progress.

However, these mandates were allowed to lapse during the George W. Bush administration and have not been revived under President Barack Obama. The Commission believes that DoD needs newly crafted policies and plans that not only restore its leadership in the area of EO but also address the realm of diversity, broadly defined. Ultimately, the goal of this effort is to embed the values of diversity and inclusion into the culture and practices of the military, as called for in Chapter Three.

Finally, the new system requires a set of metrics that enable leaders to monitor progress toward achieving the goals expressed in the strategic plan. Regular, rigorous evaluations and assessments can help military leaders understand how well the new diversity paradigm defined in the strategic plans is “sticking” and how effective each program is at furthering its goals.

## **Implement Clear, Consistent, Robust Diversity Management Policies**

### *Recommendation 16—*

*DoD and the Services must resource and institute clear, consistent, and robust diversity management policies with emphasis on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability.*

- *a. DoD and the Services shall implement diversity strategic plans that address all stages of a servicemember’s life cycle. Each strategic plan shall include*
  - *a diversity mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides a purpose that is actionable and measurable*
  - *a concept of operations to advance implementation.*
- *b. DoD must revise (if appropriate), reissue, and enforce compliance with its existing diversity management and equal opportunity policies to*
  - *Define a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks that enables the Secretary of Defense to measure progress toward the goals identified in the strategic plan, including the creation of an inclusive environment.*
  - *Establish standards that allow for the collection of data needed to generate these metrics and the analysis needed to inform policy action.*
  - *Provide oversight of, and support for, the Services’ respective diversity initiatives and metrics to ensure that, at a minimum, they align with the end state established by DoD.*

## Create Diversity Strategic Plans

Under the umbrella of a DoD strategic diversity management plan, each of the Services needs its own strategic plan, crafted to articulate goals related to the amount and type of diversity in its forces and to explain how all types of diversity should be leveraged to improve mission capability. In particular, the strategic plans should highlight the creation of cultures that value equity and inclusion as a fundamental aspect of successful diversity management and should lay the groundwork for embedding diversity leadership as a core competency of the Armed Forces. The diversity plans must also address the whole personnel life cycle of military members to ensure that the Services both recruit effectively from an ever more demographically diverse eligible population and facilitate career progression for a force that will be increasingly diverse along many dimensions, including not just race/ethnicity and gender but also religion, functional expertise, and military component, among others. Within this diversity management construct, facilitating career progression means equipping servicemembers to proactively map out and follow their own career paths.

Finally, to ensure that strategic plans are translated into practical action, each plan should include a concept of operations (CONOPS) to clearly and concisely express what leadership intends to accomplish and how it will be done with available resources.<sup>6</sup> Specifically, the CONOPS should tell leaders how to plan for and monitor the way diversity is managed from recruiting through training, branching, assignment, education, retention, promotion, and command and should identify who will be held responsible for making progress at each stage.

## Revise, Reissue, and Enforce Compliance with Existing Diversity Management and EO Policies

Good policies outlast individual leaders and are required for institutionalization. Currently, the Services' diversity policy statements say nice things about diversity but contain no specifics about what diversity programs should cover, how they should be executed, or who is responsible for achieving the desired results. The DoD policy on diversity management and EO, DoDD 1020.02, provides a general framework by distinguishing between diversity management and EO, but it is vague about implementation and contains no real accountability mechanism.

Following the development of their diversity strategic plans, both DoD and the Services need to strengthen and finalize their diversity management policies, some of which have been in draft form for many years. Service policies will vary according to Service culture and practices, but, as with the DoD and Service-specific strategic plans, DoD needs to provide a fleshed-out policy umbrella under which those policies can operate. In addition, OSD should remedy some of the omissions of the past decade. The military already has several well-established and well-understood EEO and mili-

---

<sup>6</sup> The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010) define a CONOPS as “[a] verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation.”

tary equal opportunity policies, but some important pieces of DoD EO policies have been allowed to lapse.<sup>7</sup>

These policies will need to be revised in accordance with the vision defined in the DoD strategic diversity management plan and put into effect in ways that not only improve the representation of minorities and women in military leadership but also increase military readiness and support mission accomplishment.

***Define a Standard Set of Strategic Metrics and Benchmarks that Enables the Secretary of Defense to Measure Progress***

The Commission's review of management literature and testimony by diversity managers of major companies suggested that metrics empower an organization by enabling managers and workers to evaluate and control the performance of the resources for which they are responsible and by helping them identify gaps between performance and expectation that, ideally, point to intervention and improvement. To do this effectively, however, metrics need to be designed carefully and to result in clearly communicated messages. The final results should provide the user of the metrics with a sense of knowing what needs to be done without requiring him or her to understand the intricacies of every related process. Poorly developed or poorly implemented metrics can lead to frustration and confusion and can send mixed messages.

DoD already has well-established metrics for measuring progress in demographic diversity. According to DoDD 1350.2, *Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program*, the Services are required to submit an annual Military Equal Opportunity Assessment that reports the demographic composition of promotions, retention, and assignments for that year and contains data on additional aspects of demographic diversity (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995). This assessment was the sole reporting mechanism required from the Services on their affirmative action and EO policies, and although the report is still a requirement according to policy, it was last produced in September 2004, using FY 2002 data. The Commission recommends that DoD enforce this reporting requirement and compliance with the goals of the Services' strategic plans.<sup>8</sup>

Although the Services do internally track the demographic profile of their personnel, they generally do not systematically track other aspects of diversity, such as cultural expertise and ability, and they do not explicitly evaluate the inclusiveness of the environment. To properly assess the broad diversity climate, DoD and each of the Services must begin tracking, reporting on, and reviewing programs and personnel accordingly.

This requires developing a new set of metrics to capture the inclusion and capability aspects of DoD's broader diversity goals. Assessment results will allow leaders to enforce accountability, identify which strategies are most effective, and acquire

<sup>7</sup> DoDD 1020.02 refers to four major EO directives: DoDD 5500.11 and DoDD 1020.1 on nondiscrimination, DoDD 1440.1 on DoD civilian EEO policies, and DoDD 1350.2 on military equal opportunity policies.

<sup>8</sup> The Commission recommends that the data continue to be reported but that the accountability review process be used (see Recommendation 17).



a big-picture view of how the new vision of diversity is being received and implemented across the Armed Forces. These metrics must go beyond the traditional “head-counting” metrics (e.g., how many women are in the Navy?) used to assess the success of diversity policies in the past. Relying entirely on the traditional metrics can send the wrong signal about diversity, suggesting that Armed Forces, to meet diversity “standards,” need to reach a “quota” of certain people, regardless of their qualifications. Establishing an environment of inclusion is not about adhering to a set of regulations but about working with different people toward a common goal, and it is important to create metrics that are consistent with this new vision.

**The Characteristics of Good Metrics.** The Commission believes that the following are the characteristics of good metrics:

- *Developed with an end state in mind and systematically linked to strategic goals.* Metrics should link intended goals, strategies, and actual execution. Metrics not linked to a strategic end state do not create value for organizations.
- *Clearly stated.* Metrics should be easily understood and communicated.
- *Value-added.* Metrics should deliver value to the organization by providing information on key aspects of performance.
- *Actionable to drive improvements.* Good metrics must provide information that has implications for a clear plan of action.
- *Tracked over time.* Metrics must be tracked over time to provide information on the trend in the metric, not simply its status at one particular moment.
- *Verifiable.* Metrics should be based on an agreed upon set of data and a documented process for converting data into the measure.

The primary property of good diversity metrics is that they go beyond simply calculating representation of particular groups in the workforce and actually measure how those groups are integrated in the workforce. Some of the best measures of this kind can come from administrative data sources. The advantages of these sources are both that they release servicemembers from the burden of filling out surveys and that they are the result of standardized, rigorous administrative processes. The example of disciplinary data is used below to illustrate this point.

**Going Beyond Head-Counting.** Survey data are one means of assessing command climate and the extent to which it is inclusive. Data on EO and sexual harassment complaints provide another source of information.

A third metric for an inclusive environment is provided by discipline data: court martial cases and nonjudicial punishment. Discipline data are more reliable than survey data as an indicator of command climate. Each data point represents the results of an investigation that provided sufficient evidence to bring charges, whereas survey data are based on anonymous responses from self-selected samples of servicemembers.

The Services provided the Commission with recent data on courts martial. The Commission analyzed the available data for 2007 and 2008. Table 11.1 shows the 2008 data across court martial type for the four DoD Services combined. Because the data



**Table 11.1. Court Martial Cases, by Race/Ethnicity Group, 2008**

<b>Race/Ethnicity Group</b>	<b>No. of Court Martial Cases</b>	<b>Total No. of Military Personnel</b>	<b>Rate of Cases per Thousand</b>
White	2,937	895,965	3.28
Black, non-Hispanic	1,240	231,645	5.35
Other	715	259,641	2.75
Total	4,892	1,387,251	3.53

NOTE: "Other" encompasses American Indians/Alaska Natives, Asians/Pacific Islanders, Hispanics, and those whose race/ethnicity was unknown.

the Commission received did not use consistent race/ethnicity categories, we show the information for three categories: white, non-Hispanic black, and other.

The discipline data are normalized into rates of cases brought per thousand servicemembers, and they include all active-duty personnel (enlisted servicemembers, officers, and warrant officers). The patterns were consistent across Services and for both 2007 (not shown) and 2008 (shown): Blacks had a much higher rate of being court martialled. The differences were statistically significant: The probability that the differences are due to random chance is very low (less than 0.01). That level of statistical significance was also present in the analysis of each individual Service.

These discipline data can be interpreted in multiple ways. Note that the data presented here do not indicate the outcome of the court martial; information on outcome would add another level of meaning to the data. Differences in discipline rates might reflect difficulties in some servicemembers' feeling fully included in their unit, their Service, and, most importantly, the U.S. military. Differential rates by race/ethnicity might indicate that current acculturation processes have been less successful in getting racial/ethnic minorities to fully incorporate and internalize Service norms, or they might reflect a failure in diversity leadership. Without further investigation, one cannot pinpoint the locations of this potential failure in the existing acculturation process. But the data clearly indicate that the process has failed differentially for black servicemembers.

These data do not take into account an array of relevant factors that influence the numbers, and, due to lack of standardization, the Commission could not look in more depth at patterns for different race/ethnicity categories. It is worth noting, however, that in-depth analyses of such data could be undertaken by the CDO. Such information is a good candidate for a diversity metric at the strategic level.

### ***Establish Standards That Allow for the Collection of Data Needed to Generate These Metrics and the Analysis Needed to Inform Policy Action***

Currently, consistency is lacking across the Services in terms of the data they collect and the metrics they employ. For meaningful metrics, a standard set of data definitions and collection procedures that are uniform across the Services must be employed and enforced. Currently, even basic demographic data are not uniform across DoD,

and such metrics as promotion and retention rates are not calculated in a consistent manner. The CDO should promulgate standards for these basic data elements and for the new types of information required to produce more-meaningful measures of diversity and inclusion. The CDO should also produce standards for analytical methodology to ensure that analysis of the data is rigorous, meaningful, and consistent over time and from one Service to the next.

***Provide Oversight of, and Support for, the Services' Respective Diversity Initiatives and Metrics to Ensure That, at a Minimum, They Align with the End State Established by DoD***

The Secretary of Defense, through the accountability review process described in Recommendation 17, will meet annually with Service leadership to discuss the state of diversity within the Services and the Services' progress toward the two goals of demographic representation and mission capability. Annual meetings at this strategic level are necessary to ensure that top leadership across DoD is fully engaged in meeting the diversity goals established by the Secretary of Defense. The CDO will play a key role in this effort by ensuring the production of consistent, meaningful diversity metrics. He or she should also work with the Services' diversity offices to guide and monitor their Service-specific diversity work.

## **Priority: Holding Leaders Accountable**

Meaningful change is most likely to be sustained if leaders are held accountable for performance at all stages of implementation. Ongoing communication, ongoing assessment, and the establishment of a rewards system are effective approaches to take when trying to change the norms of an organization, but, ultimately, leaders should be responsible for developing an organizational culture that values and benefits from diversity.

The best accountability measures reviewed by the Commission did much more than have managers check a box on a form. Rather, organizations use both internal and external measures to assure top leadership that managers at all levels are committed and engaged. Internally, midlevel leaders are held accountable for their performance in carrying out plans and, if successful, are rewarded accordingly. Externally, all leaders, including those at the top, are reviewed by outside consultants that have the ability to ask the most-difficult questions and give tough feedback—activities that can be challenging for insiders due to lack of critical distance or fear of repercussion.

Once DoD develops a plan, policies, and metrics, it cannot just put them on the shelf. The most-senior leaders must make use of these tools to drive progress by holding themselves and leaders below them accountable for following the plan, implementing the policies, and measuring the results. The diversity annual report to Congress discussed earlier is the bedrock of accountability. It requires the Secretary of Defense to document, from a strategic level, the extent to which the Services are reaching their goals of achieving better racial/ethnic and gender representation across the ranks and creating a more inclusive environment. Later in this chapter, the Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense add another subject to that annual report.

## Institute a System of Accountability Reviews

### *Recommendation 17—*

*DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute a system of “accountability reviews” that is driven by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (Coast Guard).*

- *a. The Secretary of Defense shall meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, senior enlisted leaders, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, to drive progress toward the diversity management goals identified in the strategic plans. The Coast Guard should be subject to a similar review.*
- *b. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security should send an annual report to Congress and the President on the progress made toward diversity management goals in the Services, including the Reserve Component; the report should include the barrier analyses described in Recommendation 18.*
- *c. The National Guard Bureau should report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of diversity in each State, territory, and the District of Columbia for all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard. This report shall show how reflective the Army and Air National Guard are of the eligible pool in their particular State or territory or in the District of Columbia.*
  - *Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce a “dashboard” of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National Guard. This dashboard shall show comparisons across States, territories, and the District of Columbia and highlight best practices.*

The practice of annual accountability reviews was initiated for the Navy by then-CNO Admiral Mike Mullen and was expanded by his successor, Admiral Roughead. Admiral Roughead sits down annually, one on one, with each of his 16 enterprise heads (all flag officers) on the topic of racial/ethnic and gender diversity within that enterprise or community. In these reviews, each enterprise head discusses with the CNO the demographic diversity health of his or her community.

These meetings do not consist of a 100-slide briefing deck; rather, they are conversations that focus on both progress and problem areas. Enterprise heads are expected to speak knowledgeably and comfortably about the current composition of their force, the factors that led to that composition, and any initiatives undertaken to affect that profile in the future.

The Commission considers Admiral Roughead’s accountability review process a best practice that each Service can follow either on its own or in support of OSD-level reviews. This recommendation uses the Navy’s accountability review construct as the model for a series of similar sessions across DoD that culminate in a meeting between the Secretary of Defense and each Service, represented by its Service Chief,

[The accountability reviews] are extraordinarily valuable. . . . [They have] focused leadership in a way that is more than shouting louder. It’s about substance, mentoring, development, understanding who you have, moving them along.

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks to the Commission, 2010

Service Secretary, and senior enlisted leader. At that meeting, Service leadership discusses with the Secretary of Defense progress in meeting the goals in the Service's diversity strategic plan.

One way for the Service Chief to prepare for the meeting is to sit down, one on one, with his or her enterprise heads or their equivalents. Another option is using the senior leadership forum in each Service to share community diversity status and lessons learned.<sup>9</sup>

Regardless of the specific process, a system of accountability reviews would force diversity accountability down as leaders prepared to brief up the chain. It would also serve as a powerful indicator of leader commitment to achieving and leading a diverse force. Finally, it would enable military leaders not only to see evidence on demographics but also to take stock of the diversity awareness and leadership of those in line to succeed them. In particular, it would provide a forum for senior leaders to assess whether and how leaders at lower levels are leveraging all types of diversity in their units to improve capability.

The roles of the CDO in the accountability review process are preparation and facilitation. The CDO's responsibilities might include analyzing data, assembling evidence, preparing the Secretary of Defense, coordinating with the Services, attending each Service's review, and monitoring compliance with directives.

The command and control structure of the National Guard makes holding leaders accountable at the State level a complex issue. To increase accountability at the State level, the National Guard Bureau should both prepare the diversity annual report to Congress (called for in Recommendation 5b) and set up and maintain a detailed diversity "dashboard" to help National Guard units, and their State leadership, assess their diversity efforts related to demographic representation.<sup>10</sup> The dashboard will include statistics on career progression and on racial/ethnic and gender representation compared with State-specific civilian population benchmarks. Easy access to such data should increase stakeholder and public awareness about diversity issues in the National Guard and, consequently, increase accountability.

The Air National Guard developed a web-based dashboard that enables continuous updating and interactivity. An expanded dashboard covering both the Air and Army National Guard could help each State identify diversity problem areas and solutions. This expanded dashboard should incorporate some of the same statistics included in the diversity annual report to Congress, augmented with diversity indicators at the unit level. Moreover, the dashboard website should include a compendium of diversity best practices and programs. Such a compilation will be a resource for States just beginning (or currently struggling) to implement diversity initiatives.

All of the information contained in the dashboard should be available to the States. Taken together, the statistics and best practices will help leaders assess the

---

<sup>9</sup> This recommendation envisions focused annual meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the different Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders. In contrast, the DAWG would focus on policy and take on specific issues as they arose.

<sup>10</sup> A dashboard is a detailed display of key metrics.

diversity situation of their units or commands and facilitate improvement in State National Guard diversity programs.

## The Services Should Conduct Annual Barrier Analyses

### *Recommendation 18—*

*As part of the accountability reviews, the Services, in conjunction with the Chief Diversity Officer (established in Recommendation 15), should conduct annual “barrier analyses” to review demographic diversity patterns across the military life cycle, starting with accessions.*

- *a. To ensure comparability across Services, DoD shall establish a universal data collection system, and the analyses of the data should be based on common definitions of demographic groups, a common methodology, and a common reporting structure.*
- *b. The annual analyses should include*
  - *accession demographics*
  - *retention, command selection, and promotion rates by race/ethnicity and gender*
  - *analysis of assignment patterns by race/ethnicity and gender*
  - *analysis of attitudinal survey data by race/ethnicity and gender*
  - *identification of persistent, group-specific deviations from overall averages and plans to investigate underlying causes*
  - *summaries of progress made on previous actions.*

The diversity annual reports and the accountability review process will provide military leaders of all components with the information they need to move toward the goals of representation and inclusion. However, the Commission believes that further steps are required to ensure that both the annual reports and the accountability reviews are based on accurate data and that appropriate analysis has converted the data into actionable information.

To prepare for the accountability reviews, each Navy enterprise conducts barrier analyses based on what the data show about how racial/ethnic minorities and women are progressing along the community’s notional career path. This practice should be adopted by all the Services and should take place at the Service level. All steps along the career life cycle—recruiting, career field selection, assignment to command and other key billets, education milestones, retention, and promotion—should be assessed. The process should include not only assessments of statistical variances by race/ethnicity and gender and analyses of root causes for any differences (i.e., barriers) but also identification of corrective actions and creation of representation goals and metrics.

Each Service has its own career structures, career progression patterns, and other idiosyncrasies, which it understands best. For this reason, and to ensure that the Services take ownership of diversity initiatives, the Services should take the lead in preparing the barrier analyses. The CDO should serve as a consultant to each Service, ensuring analytical consistency across DoD and seeking to understand any inherent and valid differences. The CDO must ensure that all the Services are adhering to the

data and reporting standards described above. Once the standards are promulgated, accountability reviews within each Service can take advantage of the standards to produce consistent analysis both across communities and over time.

If the barrier analyses, accountability reviews, and annual reports are to be meaningful over time and across reporting groups (i.e., Services and components), consistent, comparable data must be collected from all the Services. OSD should define and DMDC should promulgate these standards and data structures to the Services, and the Services must be directed to follow them. In addition, analysis of the data must also adhere to common standards and methodology.

The Commission's research was hampered by the lack of such standards. All of the Commission subcommittees that analyzed personnel data faced the same problem: lack of consistency across the Services. For example, the Services do not use the same procedures for estimating retention rates or even consistent race/ethnicity categories for their calculations; they also do not regularly report retention results. This made it very hard to make comparisons across Services, but, more importantly, it also makes it difficult to formulate any DoD-wide assessments of retention patterns. This Commission recommendation asks all the Services to collect and analyze equivalent data in order to compare retention rates and other important aspects of career progression, but it still allows them to individually calculate whatever statistics may be meaningful within each Service.<sup>11</sup>

Regardless of the type of data collected, it must be consistent not only across Services but also over time. This can be achieved through the use of common methodologies, data definitions, and reporting conventions. By keeping track of consistent data year after year, DoD and each individual Service can assess when and where interventions may be necessary to address differential rates of career progression. They can also use the data to help assess whether policy or program changes have made a difference.

---

<sup>11</sup> The Commission recommends that three different types of data be collected for the purpose of tracking career progression across diverse groups:

- Personnel data can be used to show actual behavior and outcomes. Personnel data should go beyond race/ethnicity and gender to include other aspects of diversity (e.g., religion; language ability; other low-density, high-demand skills) as need dictates.
- Survey data that show attitudes and opinions can be used to assess why group-level differences in career progression may be occurring. For example, exit surveys could be used to collect information about reasons for leaving active-duty service. Currently, some Services do not conduct exit surveys, and there is no centralized system for collection or analysis of this type of data. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Congress required that every member separating from active-duty service during a six-month period be surveyed regarding his or her reasons for leaving. The survey was conducted once by DMDC and never repeated (see Deak et al., 2002).
- Focused qualitative data can more specifically address the issues identified by personnel or survey data. Although exit surveys can be helpful in terms of quantitative analysis, they sometimes do not supply the nuanced reasons for separation from active-duty service. Thus, the Commission also recommends the use of focused qualitative data, such as that obtained in focus groups, to study personnel and manpower issues.



## **Institute Mechanisms for Accountability and Internal and External Monitoring for Both the Active and Reserve Components**

### *Recommendation 19—*

*DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring for both the Active and Reserve Components.*

- *a. The Services must embed diversity leadership in performance assessments throughout careers.*
- *b. DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should establish diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and flag/general officers, including 3- and 4-star positions and Service Chief.*
  - *The Senate Armed Services Committee should include this criterion in its confirmation questionnaire.*
- *c. The Secretary of Defense must transfer the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD's leadership, the existing Deputy's Advisory Working Group.*
- *d. The Secretary of Defense must expand the DACOWITS charter, where appropriate, to encompass diversity as a whole.*

Over the years, there have been many reports, studies, and bodies established to look at EO and racial/ethnic and gender diversity in the military. The Commission has heard that, in the past, when progress was made in increasing demographic diversity among senior officers, there was no deliberate, coordinated effort to monitor that progress and ensure that it continued. As a result, the same themes and recommendations can be found in studies conducted during the past 20 years.

Early in this chapter, the Commission laid out a system for diversity management, centered on the CDO. The CDO does not have the authority, however, to establish policies or ensure adherence to them. In particular, the CDO cannot, on his or her own, drive the cultural change needed to create an inclusive environment or embed the use of effective diversity leadership practices. Thus, the final piece of the Commission's recommended implementation and accountability system is aimed at institutionalizing diversity leadership throughout the Armed Forces, forcing continuing engagement on the part of senior leadership, and providing the means for sustained effort.

### **Embed Diversity Leadership in Performance Assessments Throughout Careers**

Accountability for internalizing and modeling diversity leadership is needed throughout the Armed Forces, not only at senior levels. Discussions about evaluating an individual's diversity leadership often center on the difficulty of measuring such a thing. But, a simple checkbox on an assessment form will accomplish nothing. In its research, the Commission discovered several practices that could be used by the Services to evaluate diversity leadership throughout a servicemember's career. Based on its understanding of private sector practices and military culture, the Commission believes that



the Services must incorporate such assessment mechanisms into their performance evaluation systems. Possible mechanisms for embedding diversity leadership into the core competencies expected of a servicemember include the following:

- documentation of one's diversity leadership in a self-statement
- incorporation of diversity perspective into leadership assessment
- 360-degree evaluations
- utilization of the following relevant indicators:
  - climate survey trends
  - discipline and EO data
  - retention rates.

One place to start could be following the Coast Guard practice of producing a self-statement that documents what one has done to foster an environment of inclusion. Another approach could be drawing from the Navy's incorporation of EO practices into its assessments of enlisted personnel. This approach could be expanded through incorporating diversity leadership and inclusion into the existing assessment of leadership in general.

And, even though it runs counter to the hierarchical military culture, the Services could experiment with 360-degree evaluations. These incorporate assessments from peers and subordinates, as well as supervisors. Sodexo uses these 360-degree evaluations to gauge its executive team's performance in diversity management, diversity leadership, and inclusion.

At higher levels of the hierarchy, other options are available, including a careful utilization of numerical indicators. For officers who have held command, possible metrics involve indicators of the climate within their units. These include trends in climate surveys, unit disciplinary and EO data, and retention rates. Although it is expected that such data will form part of the accountability reviews described in Recommendation 17, it may be worth examining their usage in individual assessment at a lower level.

Both quantitative and qualitative metrics are important and should be utilized. Whereas quantitative metrics are generally easier to collect, making the extra effort to integrate both types of metrics provides a more complete picture of an individual's diversity leadership. At Sodexo, for example,

the quantitative metrics look at recruiting, retention, promotion of women and minorities. The qualitative metrics . . . are about behavior change. We look at things like mentoring, like engagement in the community. . . . So, the qualitative aspect of the scorecard [has] been very, very critical in changing the behaviors because otherwise it becomes just a numbers game, "the quota has to be filled" is how it's perceived. But here what we are saying is, their behavior systematically need[s] to be changed. If you get the right behaviors, you'll get to the numbers. So, we look at really both of those. (Anand, 2010)

## Diversity Leadership as a Criterion for Top Leadership

The assessment of diversity leadership performance must be extended to the highest levels of the Services. Demonstrated diversity leadership should be a topic of conversation in both the nomination and confirmation of flag/general officers to 3- and 4-star positions, both within DoD and during the congressional confirmation process. Although this is important for all senior leadership positions, it is especially relevant for Service Chiefs and senior enlisted leaders. As discussed elsewhere in this report, personal commitment at the top is a crucial ingredient in establishing and sustaining successful diversity leadership throughout an organization.

The Commission heard about effective diversity practices from CDOs at companies that have been acclaimed for their excellence in creating demographically diverse workforces and inclusive environments. One of the topics these CDOs spoke about was the need for an executive team committed to diversity.

In response to a question about how Sodexo ensures that executives hired from outside are as committed to diversity and inclusion as the rest of the senior team, Dr. Rohini Anand indicated the importance of including diversity leadership in the interview process:

[T]he candidates who've come from the outside to Sodexo have actually said that they are very surprised [by] the emphasis that the organization places on diversity in the interview process, so they really are asked about their commitment, what they have done, their understanding. And if they are not articulate on this particular topic, we don't seriously consider them. (Anand, 2010)

Along these lines, the Commission believes that those individuals considered for top leadership positions, both senior enlisted appointments and 3- and 4-star nominations, should be expected to be “articulate on this particular topic.” They should be able to address their experience in providing diversity leadership not only for race/ethnicity and gender but across all dimensions.

Congress can assist in establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for 3- and 4-star positions through the questionnaire each nominee must submit to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Requiring a self-statement that explains how the nomi-

Regardless of how staff support is provided or where it is placed, all “best practice” companies regard diversity as a line management leadership issue. This leadership imperative in several “best-practice” companies is active and visible through:

- Diversity Councils—heads of major business units that meet periodically with the CEO and . . . [Human Resources]/diversity head to review diversity progress and plan initiatives.
- Advisory Boards—distinguished outside advisors and experts who meet periodically with the business leaders and Affinity Group leaders . . . to bring external perspectives and developments to the company.
- Performance Appraisals and Leadership Assessments—that reinforce the importance of diversity by including assessments of creating a diverse culture and recruiting, developing and promoting a diverse talent pool in measuring executives' performance.

—Defense Business Board Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004

nee has demonstrated diversity leadership will further emphasize diversity leadership's importance and will lead to sustained progress.

### **Reestablish a Leadership Forum for Diversity**

As part of an integrated, strategic approach to accountability, the Commission recommends that DoD revisit the goals and duties ascribed to the now-defunct Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) with an eye toward transferring applicable goals and duties to the DAWG. The membership of the DAWG is close to that of the former DEOC, and specifying diversity, broadly defined, as part of the DAWG's mission and purview will both reinstate the high-level attention to EO that had been allowed to lapse and expand it to encompass other aspects of diversity.<sup>12</sup>

DEOC, first established in 1987, was given the responsibility to advise the Secretary of Defense on EO policies, coordinate policy and review programs, and monitor progress of program elements. DEOC members presented regular progress reports on how well DoD was doing in meeting EO goals, and they appointed members to attend to specific issues by forming working committees, such as the DEOC Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment. This body was one of the mechanisms set forth in DoD's EO policies that, like the Human Goals Charter and the Military Equal Opportunity Assessment, fell into disuse in the past ten years.

The DAWG, established in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review process, consists of the most-senior military and civilian leaders, including its co-chairs, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Meetings are held twice weekly and consist of presentations on and candid discussion of matters concerning military leadership. The Commission recommends that this body also hold regular meetings, at least annually, on diversity issues. Such meetings will form part of the strategic accountability system proposed by the Commission. They will also help anchor the concepts of diversity and inclusion among the most-senior leadership of the Armed Forces.

### **Expand the DACOWITS Charter**

In 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall established DACOWITS to provide advice and recommendations on issues related to women serving in the military. DACOWITS is now a Federal Advisory Committee, authorized by Congress. Currently, it comprises up to 35 civilian members distributed across demographic groups,

---

<sup>12</sup> The chair and membership of the DEOC differ in the two directives that establish it, DoDD 1440.1 and DoDD 1350.2. According to DoDD 1440.1, first published in 1987, the chair was to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel); members were to include the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the military departments' assistant secretaries for personnel policy and Reserve affairs. DoDD 1440.1, first published in 1995, raised the bar, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense as chair, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) as vice chair, and a membership including the under secretaries of defense, the secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The more-senior membership of the latter directive is close to that of the DAWG, and, at the time, it ensured that the panel was sufficiently senior to assume leadership and take decisive action.

career fields, and geography. DACOWITS members come from the following groups: former servicemembers, military family members, and experts in women's workforce issues. DACOWITS's list of accomplishments over the past 60 years is long.<sup>13</sup>

The Commission suggests that DACOWITS expand its charter beyond gender to include diversity of all types. The group would continue to hold regular meetings, sponsor research, and undertake installation visits and other means of eliciting servicemembers' views. In addition,

the expanded committee would receive briefings from DoD leadership on metrics and progress made toward implementing diversity management plans and policies. The Commission notes that DACOWITS dates to 1951 and has provided a clear, unapologetic forum on issues for women in the military. This focus must not disappear when other elements of diversity are addressed. Besides the example provided by DACOWITS, this concept—creating an external body to monitor progress toward achieving diversity goals—was recently adopted by Sodexo. Its CEO views this establishment as a “next phase in [Sodexo’s] commitment to diversity and inclusion” (Sodexo, 2010).

Providing an external body to focus on diversity in the Services would help “keep things honest” and add an additional dimension to DoD’s monitoring mechanisms. Expanding DACOWITS’s charter would provide continuity and place gender issues within the broader context of diversity.

The Committee is composed of civilian women and men who are appointed by the Secretary of Defense to provide advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Armed Forces. Historically, DACOWITS' recommendations have been very instrumental in effecting changes to laws and policies pertaining to military women.

—Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, n.d.-b

## **Include an Assessment of Qualified Minority and Female Candidates for Top Leadership Positions in the Diversity Annual Report to Congress**

### *Recommendation 20—*

*In congruence with Recommendation 5, Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to require the Secretary of Defense to report annually an assessment of the available pool of qualified racial/ethnic minority and female candidates for the 3- and 4-star flag/general officer positions.*

- *The Secretary of Defense must ensure that all qualified candidates (including racial/ethnic minorities and women) have been considered for the nomination of every 3- and 4-star position. If there were no qualified racial/ethnic minority and/or female candidates, then a statement of explanation should be made in the package submitted to the Senate for the confirmation hearings.*

<sup>13</sup> See the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, n.d.-a, for more information on DACOWITS's processes, research, and reports.

As part of the effort to improve accountability, the Commission suggests that Congress include an additional requirement to the revisions in Title 10 called for in Recommendation 5: The Secretary of Defense, in his or her diversity annual report to Congress, should provide an assessment of the pool of qualified minority and female candidates for 3- and 4-star positions. Developing a pool of strong nominees from traditionally underrepresented demographic groups must also become a DoD-wide goal. How well leaders are doing at promoting members of underrepresented groups should be made transparent through documentation.

This recommendation complements Recommendation 10b, which involves formalizing and documenting the process and requirements for promotion to 3- and 4-star rank. One of the reforms the Commission would like to see made permanent is the requirement for the Services to provide to the Secretary of Defense biannual “lay-downs” of their flag/general officer corps.<sup>14</sup> These would focus on the up-and-coming 2-star officers and on the paths laid out for their advancement. With Recommendation 20, the Commission suggests that the racial/ethnic and gender aspects of the lay-down be provided annually to Congress.

The second part of this recommendation carries this concern over to a case-by-case certification that, as each nomination is sent to the Senate, qualified racial/ethnic minority and female candidates were considered. If no qualified racial/ethnic minority or female candidates were identified, the Secretary of Defense should accompany each nomination with an explanation.

## Summary

This chapter has presented a combined approach to the challenges of designing and implementing diversity policies throughout DoD: It has taken the best from military diversity practices and from corporate diversity practices that are especially congruent with DoD concerns and culture.

Successful implementation of diversity initiatives requires a deliberate strategy. Piecemeal efforts will not effect the change in culture that is needed, and they will not address all of the stages of a servicemember’s career. Among the issues that the Commission addressed are the need for a systems approach and for the designation of an individual to facilitate and sustain change. Clear, robust policies that specify roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability are required to institutionalize change. Appropriate Service-wide metrics and reporting tools must be put in place, and leaders must be held accountable for progress toward explicit diversity goals. Finally, the Commission believes that a continuing external monitoring mechanism will serve as an insurance policy, so that another military leadership diversity commission will never be needed.

---

<sup>14</sup> Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld instituted the practice of requiring the Services to provide a comprehensive picture of their flag/general officers and the positions they held. Information in these “laydowns” included when positions were projected to become vacant and which candidates were likely to fill them.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

# CONCLUSION

---

The Armed Forces have long been national leaders in securing advancement opportunities for men and women of different racial/ethnic backgrounds. This report describes how they can sustain that role in the future by institutionalizing a broad definition of diversity that includes both demographic representation and dimensions of diversity to develop military leaders who reflect the troops they lead and embody the qualifications the Services need to maintain readiness and perform their missions.

The Commission first recommends that all members of the Armed Forces embrace an understanding of diversity that goes beyond the traditional focus on eliminating discrimination against members of certain demographic groups and moves toward valuing all kinds of human differences for their contributions to military capability and readiness. Such a concept needs to become a core value that informs the way servicemembers interact with one another and helps motivate the way the organization works. Effectively leading diverse groups—i.e., diversity leadership—requires recognizing the differences among members of a group as assets that have the potential to improve performance, neutralizing the tensions that can arise within a diverse working group, and leveraging diversity in support of the mission. Top leaders need to make a personal and visible commitment to diversity for these needed changes to take hold; to sustain change, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10 to require the Secretary of Defense to report annually on the progress of DoD's diversity efforts.

In its second set of recommendations, the Commission urges the Services to recognize the barriers that may have prevented racial/ethnic minorities and women from advancing through the stages of their careers to positions of leadership. Beginning with the pool of eligible recruits, racial/ethnic minorities are at an increasing disadvantage in terms of meeting military eligibility requirements. The Commission recommends that all stakeholders work together to improve the educational and physical readiness of American youth. It provides recommendations for improving current recruiting practices toward underrepresented demographic groups. The Commission also recommends the removal of existing institutional barriers relating to assignments—both the initial career field assignment and subsequent assignments to key positions. An important step in this direction is to remove the restrictions that prevent women from engaging in direct ground combat. Other recommendations address the need to educate and mentor all servicemembers about the promotion process, especially early in their careers.

Finally, the Commission offers recommendations to ensure continual progress toward inclusion by the Chief Diversity Officer, who works with the Services and OSD to achieve effective diversity management by developing policy goals for the Services to



achieve, metrics for measuring their achievements, and annual reporting requirements that hold military leaders accountable for progress toward stated goals.

This report began by comparing two previous committees dedicated to expanding diversity in the Armed Forces. Both committees identified gross inequities of opportunity in the Services and made detailed recommendations for reform, some of which are echoed in this report. In one case—that of the Fahy Committee—the committee not only received clear commitment from the President for its tasks but was also directly involved in the implementation of desegregation policies that helped shift the entire culture of the military. In the other case—that of the Gesell Committee—the committee played only an advisory role, and the Secretary of Defense ignored the most important recommendations in a setback that stalled progress toward equal opportunity and led to protracted conflicts among servicemembers in posts around the world.

The lesson in this contrast between the two earlier committees is that the ultimate impact of the recommendations in this Commission's final report will depend on the unwavering commitment of the President of the United States, the resolute conviction of the Secretary of Defense, and the concerted effort of military leaders at all levels to bring about enduring change. The U.S. military is a learning institution that can continue to evolve, but only if the highest leaders of the Nation provide a clear vision and sustained oversight. The Armed Forces have led the Nation in the struggle to achieve equality. To maintain that leadership, they must push forward once more, renewing their commitment to equal opportunity for all. The time has come to embrace the broader concept of diversity needed to achieve the Armed Forces' goals and to move the Nation closer to embodying its ideals.



# THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION CHARTER

---



---

## Military Leadership Diversity Commission Charter

---

### Scope:

The commission shall conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers.

### Deliverables:

Not later than 12 months after the date on which the commission first meets, the commission shall submit to the President and Congress a report on the study. The report shall include the following:

- The findings and conclusions of the commission.
- The recommendations of the commission for improving diversity within the Armed Forces.
- Such other information and recommendations as the commission considers appropriate

### Tasks:

- **Develop** a uniform definition of diversity to be used throughout DoD congruent with the core values and vision of DoD for the future workforce.
- **Incorporate** private sector practices successful in cultivating diverse leadership to DoD policy.
- **Assess** the ability of the current organizational structure to ensure effective and accountable diversity management across DoD, including ODMEQ and other similar offices within the Military Departments.
- **Explore** options available to improve the substance and implementation of current plans and policies of DoD and the Military Departments.
- **Examine** existing metrics and milestones for evaluating DoD diversity plans (including the plans of the individual Services) and how to facilitate future evaluation and oversight.
- **Evaluate** efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership at all levels of the Armed Forces.
- **Analyze** successes and failures of efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership, particularly of flag officers.
- **Determine** the status of prior recommendations made to DoD and Congress concerning diversity initiatives within the Armed Forces.
- **Consider** the benefits of conducting an annual conference focused on diversity attended by DoD civilians, active duty and retired military personnel, and corporate leaders, to include a review of current policy and the annual demographic data from the DEOMI and DMDC.
- **Examine** the possible effect of expanding DoD secondary educational programs to diverse civilians populations, including military academy preparatory schools.
- **Evaluate** the ability of current recruitment and retention practices to attract and maintain a diverse pool of qualified individuals in sufficient numbers in pre-commissioning officer development programs.
- **Assess** the pre-command billet assignments of ethnic-specific officers.
- **Examine** command selection for officers of particular ethnicities.
- **Evaluate** the establishment and maintenance of fair promotion and command opportunities and their effect by gender and ethnicity for officers at O-5 and above.
- **Evaluate** the existence and maintenance of fair promotion, assignment, and command opportunities for ethnic- and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces at the levels of warrant officer, chief warrant officer, company and junior grade, field and mid-grade, and general and flag officer.
- **Measure** the ability of current activities to increase continuation rates for ethnic- and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces.



## COMMISSION MEMBERS

---

### Current Commissioners

General Lester L. Lyles (U.S. Air Force, Retired), *Chairman*  
Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr. (U.S. Army, Retired), *Vice Chairman*

Major General LaRita A. Aragon (Air National Guard, Retired)  
Major General Arthur M. Bartell (U.S. Army)  
The Honorable Gilbert F. Casellas  
Chief Master Sergeant Gary G. Coleman (U.S. Air Force, Retired)  
The Honorable D. Michael Collins (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Retired)  
Marieli E. Colon-Padilla  
Rear Admiral Jay DeLoach (U.S. Navy, Retired)  
Mary M. Dixon  
Brigadier General Rebecca Halstead (U.S. Army, Retired)  
Vice Admiral Cecil D. Haney (U.S. Navy)  
Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Harris (U.S. Army, Retired)  
Colonel Mary Higley Hittmeier (U.S. Air Force)  
Lieutenant General John Hopper, Jr. (U.S. Air Force, Retired)  
Colonel Ronald M. Joe, Sr. (U.S. Army, Retired)  
Sergeant Major Hallie Johnson (U.S. Army Reserve, Retired)  
Colonel Jorge J. Martinez (U.S. Army National Guard, Retired)  
Rear Admiral Edward Masso (U.S. Navy, Retired)  
Senior Chief Petty Officer Thomas McGhee (U.S. Navy, Retired)  
Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller (U.S. Marine Corps)  
The Honorable Richard J. Noriega (Colonel, Army National Guard)  
Rear Admiral Mary P. O'Donnell (U.S. Coast Guard, Retired)  
Lieutenant General Frank Petersen (U.S. Marine Corps, Retired)  
Master Chief Petty Officer Angela R. Rodriguez (U.S. Coast Guard)  
Shamina Singh  
Sergeant Major Jack L. Tilley (U.S. Army, Retired)  
Sergeant Major William I. Whaley (U.S. Marine Corps, Retired)  
Major General Leo V. Williams III (U.S. Marine Corps, Retired)  
Frank H. Wu

## **Former Commissioners**

Captain Kathleen Contres (U.S. Navy, Retired)  
Colonel Mohammed A. Khan, Jr. (U.S. Air Force, Retired)  
Brigadier General Belinda Pinckney (U.S. Army, Retired)  
Lieutenant General Willie J. Williams (U.S. Marine Corps)

## **Commission Staff**

### **Executive Directors and Designated Federal Officers**

Colonel James J. Campbell (U.S. Air Force, Retired)  
Master Chief Petty Officer Steven Hady (U.S. Navy)

### **Research Staff**

Nelson Lim, RAND Corporation, *Research Director*  
Amanda Kraus, CNA, *Associate Research Director*

Carolyn Chu, RAND Corporation  
Kate Giglio, RAND Corporation  
Jeremiah Goulka, RAND Corporation  
Kimberly Curry Hall, RAND Corporation  
Erin-Elizabeth Johnson, RAND Corporation  
Kirsten Keller, RAND Corporation  
Maria Lytell, RAND Corporation  
Jennifer S. McCombs, RAND Corporation  
Sarah Meadows, RAND Corporation  
Ann Parcell, CNA  
Martha Farnsworth Riche, CNA  
Seema Sayala, CNA  
First Lieutenant David Schulker (U.S. Air Force), RAND Corporation  
Lynn Scott, RAND Corporation  
Karen Domabyl Smith, CNA  
Leopoldo E. Soto Arriagada, CNA  
Madeleine Wells, RAND Corporation

*Staff from CNA and the RAND Corporation provided research and analysis to inform the Commissioners' deliberations; however, the findings and recommendations presented in this report are those of the Commissioners alone.*

### **Office Staff**

D'Oshemeka Amadi, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Vergie Anderson, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Ryan Callanan, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Jennifer Conger, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Ernest Duncan, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Cassandra Gray, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Patricia Grier, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Beulah Hall, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Myrtle Johnson, Washington Headquarters Services (in memoriam)  
Erica Dorosin, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Patricia McClaine, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC  
Jessica Schroeder, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC



# RECOMMENDATIONS

---

## **Recommendation 1—**

DoD shall adopt the following definition: Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the Nation we serve.

## **Recommendation 2—**

To enhance readiness and mission accomplishment, effectively leading diverse groups must become a core competency across DoD and the Services. To implement this recommendation,

- a. Leadership training at all levels shall include education in diversity dynamics and training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively.
- b. DoD and the Services should determine the framework (e.g., curriculum, content, methods) for how to inculcate such education and training into leader development, including how to measure and evaluate its effectiveness.

## **Recommendation 3—**

The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority.

## **Recommendation 4—**

DoD and the Services should inculcate into their organizational cultures a broader understanding of the various types of diversity by

- a. Making respect for diversity a core value.
- b. Identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 21st century.
- c. Using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision and values.

## **Recommendation 5—**

Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to

- a. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks to track progress toward the goal of having a



dynamic and sustainable 20–30-year pipeline that yields (1) an officer and enlisted corps that reflects the eligible U.S. population across all Service communities and ranks and (2) a military force that is able to prevail in its wars, prevent and deter conflict, defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.

- b. Add diversity annual reports to the list of topics on which the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress and the President. Similar provisions should be added to Title 14 for Coast Guard reporting and to Title 32 for National Guard reporting.
- c. Require the Secretary of Defense to meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders to drive progress toward diversity management goals.

### **Recommendation 6—**

The shrinking pool of qualified candidates for service in the Armed Forces is a threat to national security. The stakeholders listed below should develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates.

- a. The President, Congress, and State and local officials should develop, resource, and implement strategies to address current eligibility issues.
- b. DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) should
  - Create and leverage formal partnerships with other stakeholders.
  - Institutionalize and promote citizenship programs for the Services.
  - Require the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria for military service.
- c. DoD and the Services should focus on early engagement. They should conduct strategic evaluations of the effectiveness of their current K–12 outreach programs and practices and increase resources and support for those that are found to be effective.

### **Recommendation 7—**

DoD and the Services should engage in activities to improve recruiting from the currently available pool of qualified candidates by

- a. Creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and recruiting from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographic groups.
- b. Creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups.
- c. Developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs.
- d. Closely examining the preparatory school admissions processes and making required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.

### **Recommendation 8—**

The Services should ensure that their career development programs and resources enhance servicemembers' knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Compo-

ment opportunities, to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession to retirement.

- a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field decision point and continue throughout the servicemember's career.
- b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line of communication between protégé and mentor.

**Recommendation 9—**

DoD and the Services should eliminate the “combat exclusion policies” for women, including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all qualified servicemembers. The Commission recommends a time-phased approach:

- a. Women in career fields/specialties currently open to them should be immediately able to be assigned to any unit that requires that career field/specialty, consistent with the current operational environment.
- b. DoD and the Services should take deliberate steps in a phased approach to open additional career fields and units involved in “direct ground combat” to qualified women.
- c. DoD and the Services should report to Congress the process and timeline for removing barriers that inhibit women from achieving senior leadership positions.

**Recommendation 10—**

DoD, the Services, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, must ensure that there is transparency throughout their promotion systems so that servicemembers may better understand performance expectations and promotion criteria and processes. To do this, they

- a. Must specify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential necessary to be an effective flag/general officer or senior noncommissioned officer.
- b. Shall formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star officer selection in DoD Instruction 1320.4.
- c. Shall educate and counsel all servicemembers on the importance of, and their responsibility for, a complete promotion board packet.

**Recommendation 11—**

The Services shall ensure that promotion board precepts provide guidance regarding Service-directed special assignments outside normal career paths and/or fields. As appropriate, senior raters' evaluations shall acknowledge when a servicemember has deviated from the due-course path at the specific request of his or her leadership.

**Recommendation 12—**

Where appropriate, DACOWITS should expand its current focus on retention to include an explanation of the gender gap in retention. As part of this renewed focus, DACOWITS should examine the effects of retention programs, such as the sabbatical programs currently offered by the Navy and the Coast Guard as well as any other

innovative Service-specific approaches to retention. Findings and recommendations from this research should be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

**Recommendation 13—**

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise and continue to track language expertise upon military accession and throughout servicemembers' careers in order to better manage personnel with mission-critical skill sets.

**Recommendation 14—**

To promote structural diversity, total force integration, and overall retention,

- a. DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting transition between Active and Reserve Components and internal Reserve Component transition protocols.
- b. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must assess how Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain operational experience and fulfill joint requirements within the constraints of their dual military/civilian lives and take action as appropriate.

**Recommendation 15—**

The Office of the Secretary of Defense organizational structure must be aligned to ensure a sustained focus on diversity and diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the position of a Chief Diversity Officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.

- The existing Research & Analysis office should be directed and resourced to support the Chief Diversity Officer.
- Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures that support DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard diversity leadership efforts.

**Recommendation 16—**

DoD and the Services must resource and institute clear, consistent, and robust diversity management policies with emphasis on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability.

- a. DoD and the Services shall implement diversity strategic plans that address all stages of a servicemember's life cycle. Each strategic plan shall include
  - a diversity mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides a purpose that is actionable and measurable
  - a concept of operations to advance implementation.
- b. DoD must revise (if appropriate), reissue, and enforce compliance with its existing diversity management and equal opportunity policies to

- Define a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks that enables the Secretary of Defense to measure progress toward the goals identified in the strategic plan, including the creation of an inclusive environment.
- Establish standards that allow for the collection of data needed to generate these metrics and the analysis needed to inform policy action.
- Provide oversight of, and support for, the Services’ respective diversity initiatives and metrics to ensure that, at a minimum, they align with the end state established by DoD.

**Recommendation 17—**

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute a system of “accountability reviews” that is driven by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (Coast Guard).

- a. The Secretary of Defense shall meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, senior enlisted leaders, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, to drive progress toward the diversity management goals identified in the strategic plans. The Coast Guard should be subject to a similar review.
- b. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security should send an annual report to Congress and the President on the progress made toward diversity management goals in the Services, including the Reserve Component; the report should include the barrier analyses described in Recommendation 18.
- c. The National Guard Bureau should report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of diversity in each State, territory, and the District of Columbia for all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard. This report shall show how reflective the Army and Air National Guard are of the eligible pool in their particular State or territory or in the District of Columbia.
  - Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce a “dashboard” of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National Guard. This dashboard shall show comparisons across States, territories, and the District of Columbia and highlight best practices.

**Recommendation 18—**

As part of the accountability reviews, the Services, in conjunction with the Chief Diversity Officer (established in Recommendation 15), should conduct annual “barrier analyses” to review demographic diversity patterns across the military life cycle, starting with accessions.

- a. To ensure comparability across Services, DoD shall establish a universal data collection system, and the analyses of the data should be based on common definitions of demographic groups, a common methodology, and a common reporting structure.

- b. The annual analyses should include
  - accession demographics
  - retention, command selection, and promotion rates by race/ethnicity and gender
  - analysis of assignment patterns by race/ethnicity and gender
  - analysis of attitudinal survey data by race/ethnicity and gender
  - identification of persistent, group-specific deviations from overall averages and plans to investigate underlying causes
  - summaries of progress made on previous actions.

**Recommendation 19—**

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring for both the Active and Reserve Components.

- a. The Services must embed diversity leadership in performance assessments throughout careers.
- b. DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should establish diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and flag/general officers, including 3- and 4-star positions and Service Chief.
  - The Senate Armed Services Committee should include this criterion in its confirmation questionnaire.
- c. The Secretary of Defense must transfer the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD's leadership, the existing Deputy's Advisory Working Group.
- d. The Secretary of Defense must expand the DACOWITS charter, where appropriate, to encompass diversity as a whole.

**Recommendation 20—**

In congruence with Recommendation 5, Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to require the Secretary of Defense to report annually an assessment of the available pool of qualified racial/ethnic minority and female candidates for the 3- and 4-star flag/general officer positions.

- The Secretary of Defense must ensure that all qualified candidates (including racial/ethnic minorities and women) have been considered for the nomination of every 3- and 4-star position. If there were no qualified racial/ethnic minority and/or female candidates, then a statement of explanation should be made in the package submitted to the Senate for the confirmation hearings.

## APPENDIX D

# GLOSSARY

---

*Accession:* in general, refers to the act of entering upon or attaining an office. For military purposes, accession refers to entering military service, and the term is applied to new recruits.

*Active Guard and Reserve:* National Guard and Reserve members who are on voluntary active duty providing full-time support to National Guard, Reserve, and Active Component organizations for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Components (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Amicus curiae:* a phrase that literally means “friend of the court”; a person or group who is not a party to specific litigation but who believes that the court’s decision may affect his, her, or its interest.

*Armed Forces of the United States:* a term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when mobilized under Title 10 to augment the Navy) (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Barrier analysis:* the process by which an organization uncovers, examines, and removes barriers to equal participation at all levels of its workforce. A barrier is an organizational policy, principle, or practice that limits or tends to limit employment opportunities for members of particular groups (e.g., on the basis of race/ethnicity or gender).

*Benchmark:* any standard or reference by which something can be judged or evaluated. The benchmarks referenced in this report are used to evaluate racial/ethnic minority and female representation in the Armed Forces. For example, there are three commonly suggested external benchmarks for the military: racial/ethnic minority and female shares of the current national population, the future national population, and the military-eligible population.

*Billet:* a personnel position or assignment that may be filled by one person (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Capability:* the ability to execute a specified course of action (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Competency/core competency:* DoD- or Service-set requirements that holders of particular positions or ranks must meet and be accountable for meeting.

*Concept of operations:* a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Core values:* the foundational principles that guide how people in an organization will conduct their everyday business. The DoD core values are leadership, professionalism, and technical know-how. DoD also places particular emphasis on the special core values that everyone in uniform must live by: duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty.

*Dashboard:* a visual interface that illustrates key measures that an organization has determined are tightly linked to its success or failure in executing strategy.

*Diversity:* differences among individuals involving any attributes (e.g., personal, work related, or other) that determine how they perceive one another. For strategic purposes, organizations define diversity based on the attributes that are relevant to their operations and cultures. Types of diversity and diversity related concepts are summarized below:

- Types of diversity:
  - *Demographic diversity:* diversity in terms of immutable differences among individuals, such as race/ethnicity, gender, or age, as well as personal background differences, such as religion, education level, and marital status
  - *Functional diversity:* diversity in terms of occupation, task, or training background
  - *Structural diversity:* diversity in terms of organizational units, including military rank, Service, and component
  - *Cognitive diversity:* differences pertaining to thinking styles, including the mental processes of perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning, as well as differences in personality types
  - *Global diversity:* diversity related to national affiliations resulting from working with coalition partners, host-country employees, etc.
- Diversity related concepts
  - *Diversity management:* how organizations drive or affect the impact of diversity on key organizational outcomes through plans, policies, and practices
  - *Diversity leadership:* how leaders at all ranks and organizational levels manage people in order to shape the impact of diversity dynamics in the forces under their command through the practices they employ day to day
  - *Diversity dynamics:* how human differences affect interactions between people
  - *Diversity climate:* the prevailing culture, leadership style, and personnel policies and practices of an organization.

*Flag/general officer:* a term applied to an officer holding the rank of general, lieutenant general, major general, or brigadier general in the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps or admiral, vice admiral, or rear admiral in the Navy or Coast Guard (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Inclusion/inclusive environment:* An inclusive culture is one where individuals of all backgrounds experience a sense of belonging and experience their uniqueness as being valued. With effective diversity leadership, in a culture of inclusion, the diversity of knowledge and perspectives that members of different groups bring to the organization shapes how the work is done.

*Military personnel life cycle:* the phases of a servicemember's career, from recruitment and accession to assignment, training, advancement, and separation or retirement.



*Mission:* the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*National Guard:* a joint reserve component of the Army and the Air Force that maintains two subcomponents: the Army National Guard of the United States for the Army and the Air Force's Air National Guard of the United States.

*Promotion board:* Promotion boards, also known as selection boards, recommend for promotion to the next higher permanent grade promotion-eligible officers in grades O-3 through O-6. Promotion boards are statutory selection boards because the rules governing them are found in Title 10.

*Racial/ethnic minorities:* members of historically excluded or underrepresented race/ethnicity groups (i.e., groups other than non-Hispanic whites).

*Readiness:* the ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: (1) Unit readiness, which is the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. (2) Joint readiness, which is the combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Ready Reserve:* the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard liable for active duty as prescribed by law (Title 10, Sections 10142, 12301, and 12302) (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Reserve Component:* The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists of (1) the Army National Guard of the United States, (2) the Army Reserve, (3) the Navy Reserve, (4) the Marine Corps Reserve, (5) the Air National Guard of the United States, (6) the Air Force Reserve, and (7) the Coast Guard Reserve (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Retention:* the proportion of individuals who remain in service, regardless of whether they have reached a decision point.

*Services:* the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

*Title 10:* the part of U.S. law that provides the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of DoD and each of the Services.

*Title 14:* the part of U.S. law that establishes the Coast Guard as a military service and a branch of the Armed Forces and outlines its role.

*Title 32:* the part of U.S. law that outlines the role and organizational structure of the National Guard.

*Total force integration:* DoD's strategy to create a more capable, but also smaller and more affordable, force by purposefully balancing the expertise and experience of personnel from all its components (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

# REFERENCES

---

- Allen, T. D., Eby, L. T., & Lentz, E. (2006). Mentorship behaviors and mentorship quality associated with formal mentoring programs: Closing the gap between research and practice. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 91*, 567–578.
- Allen, T. D., Eby, L. T., Poteet, M. L., Lentz, E., & Lima, L. (2004). Career benefits associated with mentoring for protégés: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 89*, 127–136.
- Anand, R. (2010, April). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Fishkill, NY.
- Armor, D. J. (1996). Race and gender in the U.S. military. *Armed Forces and Society, 23*, 7–28.
- Armor, D. J., & Roll, C. R., Jr. (1994). Military manpower quality: Past, present, and future. In B. F. Green & A. S. Mavor (Eds.), *Modeling cost and performance for military enlistment: Report of a workshop* (pp. 13–34). Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
- Asch, B. J., Buck, C., Klerman, J. A., Kleykamp, M., & Loughran, D. S. (2009). *Military enlistment of Hispanic youth: Obstacles and opportunities* [MG-773-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Becton, J. W., Jr. (2010, March). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Annapolis, MD.
- Becton, J. W., Jr. (2011, January). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Charlottesville, VA.
- Becton, J. W., Jr., et al. (2003, February 19). Amicus curiae brief in support of respondent, *Gratz v Bollinger*, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 539 U.S. 244, June 23, 2003, and *Grutter v Bollinger*, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 539 U.S. 306, June 23, 2003.
- Boyer, J. (2010, May 13). *Mattis speaks to close out 2010 JWC*. Retrieved on January 31, 2011, from <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/pa051310.html>
- Casey, G. W., Jr. (2010, June). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, McLean, VA.
- Center for Human Resource Research. (2005). *NLSY97 user's guide*. Columbus, OH: Center for Human Resource Research, 2005.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006). *Behavioral risk factor surveillance system survey data*. Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
- Chief of Naval Operations. (2008). *Diversity policy*.
- Collins, D. M. (2010, March). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Annapolis, MD.
- Conway, J. T. (2010, March). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Annapolis, MD.

Cox, T. (1994). *Cultural diversity in organizations: Theory, research, and practice*. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.

Deak, M., Helba, C., Rockwell, D., Helmick, J., & Hoover, E. C. (2002). *Tabulations of responses from the 2000 Military Exit Survey*. Rockville, MD: Westat Inc.

Defense Business Board Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks. (2004, March 1). *Increasing diversity in the Defense Department's flag ranks and senior executive service*.

Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. (n.d.-a). Homepage. Retrieved November 30, 2010, from <http://dacowits.defense.gov/>

Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. (n.d.-b). *About DACOWITS*. Retrieved November 30, 2010, from [http://dacowits.defense.gov/tableabout\\_subpage.html](http://dacowits.defense.gov/tableabout_subpage.html)

Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. (2009). *2009 report*. Washington, DC: Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services.

Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Directorate of Research. (2008, October 14). *DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS)*. Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute.

Defense Manpower Data Center. (2009). *November 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members: Administration, datasets, and codebook* [Report No. 2008-033]. Arlington, VA: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Defense Manpower Data Center. (2010a). *2009 Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active Duty Members* [WEOA2009].

Defense Manpower Data Center. (2010b). Active duty transition files [Dataset].

Defense Manpower Data Center. (2010c). *Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members: Attitudes toward promotions*.

Dexter, B. (2010). *The chief diversity officer today: Inclusion gets down to business*. Heidrick & Struggles International.

Dobbin, F. (2010, June). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, McLean, VA.

ExpectMore.gov. (2006). *Detailed information on the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Assessment*. Retrieved October 10, 2010, from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003233.2006.html>

Finkelstein, L. M., & Poteet, M. L. (2007). Best practices in workplace formal mentoring programs. In T. D. Allen & L. T. Eby (Eds.), *The Blackwell handbook of mentoring: A multiple perspectives approach* (pp. 345–367). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Gilroy, C. (2009, March 3). *Recruiting, retention, and end strength overview: Prepared statement of Dr. Curtis Gilroy, Director for Accessions Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, before the House Armed Services Subcommittee*.

Gilroy, C., Eitelberg, M., Enns, J., Hosek, S., Kilburn, R., Laurence, J., Mehay, S., Tiemeyer, P., & Verdugo, N. (1999, August). *Career progression of minority and women officers*. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness).

- Harrell, M. C., Castaneda, L. W., Schirmer, P., Hallmark, B. W., Kavanagh, J., Gershwin, D., & Steinberg, P. (2007). *Assessing the assignment policy for Army women* [MG-590-1-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Harrell, M. C., & Miller, L. L. (1997). *New opportunities for military women: Effects upon readiness, cohesion, and morale* [MR-896-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Haughton, C., Jr. (2010, March). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Annapolis, MD.
- Haygood, A., & Morris, M. (2009, November). *Air Force accessions*. Briefing presented to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Melbourne, FL. Retrieved January 18, 2010, from <http://mldc.whs.mil/download%5Cdocuments%5Cmeetings%5C200911%5CAF1.pdf>
- Holvino, E., Ferdman, B. M., & Merrill-Sands, D. (2004). Creating and sustaining diversity and inclusion in organizations: Strategies and approaches. In M. S. Stockdale & F. J. Crosby (Eds.), *The psychology and management of workplace diversity* (pp. 245–276). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Hosek, S. D., Tiemeyer, P., Kilburn, M. R., Strong, D. A., Ducksworth, S., & Ray, R. (2001). *Minority and gender differences in officer career progression* [MR-1184-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- House Armed Services Committee approves senior military officer diversity commission; increases Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps units* [Press Release]. (2008, May 15).
- Jackson, S. E., Joshi, A., & Erhardt, N. (2003). Recent research on team and organizational diversity: SWOT analysis and implications. *Journal of Management*, 29, 801–830.
- Johnson, C. (2011, January 14). *Memo to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission research director*.
- Johnson, J., Ham, C., et al. (2010, November 30). *Report of the comprehensive review of the issues associated with a repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."* Retrieved December 20, 2010, from [http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610\\_gatesdadt/DADTReport\\_FINAL\\_20101130\(secure-hires\).pdf](http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130(secure-hires).pdf)
- Kalev, A., Dobbin, F., & Kelly, E. (2006). Best practices or best guesses? Assessing the efficacy of corporate affirmative action and diversity policies. *American Sociological Review*, 71, 589–617.
- Karabel, J. (2003, March 28). Race and national security. *Christian Science Monitor*.
- Kirby, S. N., Harrell, M. C., & Sloan, J. (2000). Why don't minorities join special operations forces? *Armed Forces and Society*, 26, 523–545.
- Kraus, A., Hodari, A. K., Riche, M. F., & Wenger, J. W. (2007, November). *The impact of diversity on Air Force mission performance: Analysis of deployed servicemembers' perceptions of diversity/capability relationship* [Research Memorandum D0015452.A2]. Alexandria, VA: CNA.
- Kraus, A., Wenger, J., Houck, L., & Gregory, D. (2004). *College recruits in the enlisted Navy: Navy outcomes and civilian opportunities*. Alexandria, VA: CNA.
- Lim, N., Cho, M., & Curry, K. (2008). *Planning for diversity: Options and recommendations for DoD leaders* [MG-743-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Lim, N., Marquis, J., Hall, C., Schulker, D., & Zhuo, X. (2009). *Officer classification and the future of diversity among senior military leaders: A case study of the Army ROTC* [TR-731-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Malstrom, F. (2009, June). Before there was a USAFA prep school. *Checkpoints*, 30–33.

McHenry, J. J., Hough, L. M., Toquam, J. L., Hanson, M. A., & Ashworth, S. (1990). Project A validity results: The relationship between predictor and criterion domains. *Personnel Psychology*, 43, 335–354.

McSally, M. (2007). Women in combat: Is the current policy obsolete? *Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy*, 14, 1011–1059.

McSally, M. (2010, September). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Baltimore, MD.

Mershon, S., & Schlossman, S. (1998). *Foxholes and color lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2009). *What is the relationship between demographic diversity and cognitive diversity?* [Issue Paper #4]. Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2009). *The Defense Diversity Working Group* [Issue Paper #7]. Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2010). *Business-case arguments for diversity and diversity programs and their impact in the workplace* [Issue Paper #14]. Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2010). *Demographic profile of the active-duty enlisted force: September 2008 snapshot* [Issue Paper #19]. Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2010). *Services' processes for developing definitions of diversity and diversity policy statements* [Issue Paper #20]. Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2010). *Change as a process: What business management can tell us about instituting new diversity initiatives* [Issue Paper #21]. Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

Military Leadership Diversity Commission. (2010). *Effective diversity leadership: Definition and practices* [Issue Paper #29]. Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission.

Montelongo, M. (2010, April). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Fishkill, NY.

Mor Barak, M., Cherin, D. A., & Berkman, S. (1998). Organizational and personal dimensions in diversity climate: Ethnic and gender differences in employee perceptions. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 34(1), 82–104.

Mullen, M. (2009, September). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Arlington, VA.

National Center for Education Statistics. (2008). Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System [Dataset].

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136, January 6, 2006.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. 110-417, 122 Stat. 4356, October 14, 2008.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, October 28, 2009.



- National Defense Research Institute. (2010). *Sexual orientation and U.S. military personnel policy: An update of RAND's 1993 study*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- O'Donnell, M. (2010, September). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Baltimore, MD.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). (FY 2002–FY 2008). *Population representation in the military services*.
- Oken, C. & Asch, B. J. (1997). *Encouraging recruiter achievement: A recent history of military recruiter incentive programs* [MR-845-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Peck, T. R. (2010, March 6). *Women serving in Navy continue reaching milestones* [NNS100306-17]. Retrieved October 11, 2010 from [http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=51758](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=51758)
- Petersen, F. E., & Phelps, J. A. (1998). *Into the tiger's jaw: America's first black marine aviator*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Powell, C. (2010, March). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Annapolis, MD.
- Ree, M. J., & Earles, J. A. (1992). Intelligence is the best predictor of job performance. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 1, 86–89.
- Riche, M. F., Kraus, A., & Hodari, A. K. (2007). *The Air Force diversity climate: Implications for successful total force integration*. Alexandria, VA: CNA.
- Roughead, G. (2010, June). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, McLean, VA.
- Schirmer, P., Thie, H. J., Harrell, M., & Tseng, M. S. (2006). *Challenging time in DOPMA: Flexible and contemporary military officer management* [MG-451-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Segal, D. R., & Segal, M. W. (2004). America's military population. *Population Bulletin*, 59(4).
- Shinseki, E. (2010, September). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Baltimore, MD.
- Sodexo. (2010, September 24). *Sodexo launches diversity and inclusion advisory board to continue progress for minorities, women*. Retrieved November 30, 2010, from <http://www.sodexousa.com/usen/newsroom/press/diversityandinclusionadvisoryboard.asp>
- Stanley, C. (2010, September). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Baltimore, MD.
- Thirtle, M. R. (2001). *Educational benefits and officer-commissioning opportunities available to U.S. military servicemembers* [MR-981-OSD]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Thomas, D. A., & Ely, R. J. (1996, September–October). Making differences matter: A new paradigm for managing diversity. *Harvard Business Review*, 79–90.
- Thompson, D. E., & Gooler, L. E. (1996). Capitalizing on the benefits of diversity through workteams. In E. E. Kossek & S. A. Lobel (Eds.), *Managing diversity: Human resource strategies for transforming the workplace* (pp. 392–437). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Tsui, A. S., Egan, T. D., & O'Reilly, C. A. (1992). Being different: Relational demography and organizational attachment. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 37, 549–579.
- Tsui, A. S., & Gutek, B. A. (1999). *Demographic differences in organizations*. Lanham, MD: Lexington.



Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). (2006, June 23). *Improving diversity through realignment of the Equal Opportunity Office* [Memorandum].

U.S. Air Force. (2009). *Officer opportunities: Commissioned programs*. Retrieved March 17, 2010, from <http://www.airforce.com/opportunities/officer/education/>

U.S. Army. (2007). *Three ways to become an officer*. Retrieved March 17, 2010, from <http://www.usarmy.com/845/3-ways-to-become-us-army-officer/>

U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d.). *2009 national population projections (supplemental)*. Retrieved December 20, 2010, from <http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/2009projections.html>

U.S. Census Bureau. (1973–2008, March). Current population survey [Dataset].

U.S. Census Bureau. (2007). American community survey [Dataset].

U.S. Coast Guard. (n.d.). *Women & the U.S. Coast Guard: Moments in history*. Retrieved January 21, 2010, from <http://www.uscg.mil/History/uscghist/WomenChronology.asp>

U.S. Department of Defense. (n.d.). *DoD 101: An introductory overview of the Department of Defense*. Retrieved October 4, 2010, from <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/dod101/dod101.html>

U.S. Department of Defense. (1987, May 21). *The DoD Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program* [DoDD 1440.1]. Certified current as of November 21, 2003.

U.S. Department of Defense. (1995, August 18). *Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program* [DoDD 1350.2].

U.S. Department of Defense. (2010, February). *Quadrennial Defense Review report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. (n.d.). *Overview*. Retrieved October 5, 2010, from <http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm>

U.S. General Accounting Office. (1995, November). *Military equal opportunity: Certain trends in racial and gender data may warrant further analysis* [GAO/NSIAD-96-17]. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2010, November 8). *Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms* [JP 1-02]. As amended through December 31, 2010.

U.S. Marine Corps. (2010). *U.S. Naval Academy*. Retrieved March 17, 2010, from [http://officer.marines.com/marine/making\\_marine\\_officers/commissioning\\_programs/us\\_naval\\_academy](http://officer.marines.com/marine/making_marine_officers/commissioning_programs/us_naval_academy)

Visconti, L. (2010, April). Remarks to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Fishkill, NY.

The White House. (1948, July 26). *Establishing the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services* [Executive Order 9981]. Washington, DC.

Witte, B. (2009, November 20). *Lawmakers send few minorities to academies*. Retrieved April 23, 2010, from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34066952/>